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ABSTRACT 
The failure of democracy in Africa can be partially attributed to the Eurocentric 
assumptions that belie Western recommendations for Africa. This thesis focuses on the 
failure of the modernisation school to account for the resiliency of tradition in the modern 
African state, which is described by Sklar (1991) as amounting to a form of ' mixed 
government', combining the traditional with the modern to create a uniquely African 
form of governance. This notion of a ' mixed government' is addressed from the vantage 
point of traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape. It maps the vacillating relationship 
between the chiefs, the people and the government through colonialism, Apartheid and 
democratisation. It concludes that although the Eastern Cape provincial government has 
subordinated the chiefs, this does not signify a victory for modernity over tradition 
because the chiefs are not a spent force. History has shown that when the government 
fails to act in the interests of the people, they seek an alternative authority namely, the 
chiefs. The ANC government's centralising tendencies have negative implications for 
democracy and consequently for the people. This opens up space for the chiefs to assert 
themselves provided they play an active role in furthering democracy, development and 
modernisation in the interests of the people. Hence, although ' mixed' government in the 
post-1996 South Africa is currently on the ANC's terms, traditional leaders may someday 
playa vital role in the modern democratic state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Traditional leadership in our country has lived for centuries and will continue to 
do so. It is our pride as the people of South Africa, and a tradition that cannot be 
divorced from us. Now that we have put history behind us, traditional leaders now 
occupy a critical place in the great partnership of all sectors whose joint effort will 
make our country just and prosperous. Government alone cannot transform this 
country, but as a united nation we will succeed". I 
The nature of this 'joint effort' continues to be the site of great debate. Chief Mopeli of 
the Basuthu argued that South Africa needs a "democracy with African characteristics" 2 
One interpretation of this is a post-apartheid version of a bifurcated state based on 
separate rules of governance for rural and urban areas3 Sklar's definition of a ' mixed' 
government is one in which the state and traditional authority constitute relatively 
autonomous spheres that do not compete for authority. Under this interpretation, 
traditional authorities "complement, sustain and legitimise the modern state,,4 Although 
the African National Congress-led government has emphasised the importance of "co-
operative governance"s it has effectively sidelined, subordinated and contained the chiefs. 
Any attempts at mixed government are on the government's terms as the institution of 
traditional leadership is haunted by its history of dependency and collaboration with the 
Apartheid state. In addition, it is divided by party and intra-chieftaincy disputes, it is 
financially dependent on the government, constrained locally and is being threatened 
from below by civics and the youth. Hence, it has been convenient for the ANC and the 
chiefs to invent the myth of an ahistorical, precolonial democratic institution of 
traditional leadership; but this myth simply masks the true power relations of a dominant, 
1 Nelson Mandela, At the installation of Paramount Thovehela Toni Peter Mphemphu Ramabulana. Issued 
by the Office of the President, 28/11 /1998. 
2 R. Singer. "South African Tribal Chlefs Assert Power" in Christian Science Monitor, V92 issue 208. 
09/1912000: 6. 
3 Ntsebeza, L. 'Traditional Authorities Rule" in Land & Rural Digest. No.15. 2000: 22. 
4 R. L. Sklar, "The African Frontier for Political Science" in R. H. Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe and J. O'Barr 
(eds) , Africa and the Disciplines. Chlcago: University ofChlcago Press. 1983: 86. 
5 Department of Provincial and Local Government, A Draft Discussion Document Towards a White Paper 
on Traditional Leadership and Institutions, II April 2000. 
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centralising party manipulating the weak, divided and dependent institution of chieftaincy 
for its own purposes. 
This thesis focuses on the complex interactions of three marn actors, namely the 
government, traditional leaders and the people. The relationship between these actors has 
been manipulated by the precepts of colonialism, neocolonialism (Apartheid) and 
democratisation. In each phase, the government appears to be the prime mover because of 
its legislative and coercive power. However, state support is not necessarily tantamount 
to chiefly legitimacy. The chief could be endowed with material and military backing but 
in real terms, the chief may continue to be the target of popular discontent. The chiefs' 
power is largely determined by the extent to which the people regard the chief as a 
rightful authority. Their complete survival depends on whether they can reconcile two 
contrasting roles, being loyal to the people and to the state. In the past, chiefs sought 
government recognition and material benefits even if this meant becoming the 
government's ' new jockeys' wielding the whip of oppression over the rural population. 
However, in post-1996 South Africa, the chiefs have been excluded from governance and 
the benefits that this entailed in the past. Their continued survival largely depends on 
whether the people continue to regard the chiefs as legitimate. Without this legitimacy, 
the ANC would not feel compelled to dangle 'carrots' in front of them to ensure their 
support (and their bloc votes) in elections. In their attempts to remain legitimate, the 
chiefs focus on tradition and culture, appealing to a romantic, ahistorical and democratic 
past, and their role as protectors of this heritage. In other words, they appeal to the past to 
gain legitimacy in the present even if it involves a degree of invention and creative 
glorification. However, this strategy is shortsighted. The chiefs should be adapting and 
playing a greater role in democratisation, modernisation and development in the interests 
of the people. Prior to the 1940's the chiefs were largely excluded from local governance, 
but they were regarded as legitimate because they acted as bulwarks against state 
intrusion and offered the people a sense of protection and security. As the government is 
increasingly centralised, and increasingly failing to act in the interests of the people, the 
3 
chiefs have the chance to stand as an alternate authority provided they act in the interests 
of the people. 
In discussions about traditional leaders, little is known of the people and their interests; 
instead, the issue has become a 'political football' manipulated by parties vying for 
power. According to Buthelezi, "It is obvious that the state was under the false 
assumption that traditional leadership does not have a broad constituency,,6 In 
agreement, Singer states that there is "no doubt" that the majority of people still respect 
the institution of traditional rule. 7 In contrast, Maloka argues that chiefs are "not 
representing popular feelings in the rural areas. We do not see the rural masses rising ... to 
oppose central government and defend the institution of chiefiaincy,,8 The assumption 
that the people continue to recognise chiefs as legitimate leaders has not been proven. On 
the one hand, one could point to the 1995 Eastern Cape local elections in which people 
voted against their chief s orders9 On the other hand, one could point to meetings held by 
the Independent Electoral Commission (lEC) in the Eastern Cape in which rural groups 
overtly backed traditional leaders against the demarcation process. However, this support 
was partially motivated by fears that taxes would be increased by incorporation into 
urban districts. lo Alternatively, one could argue that traditional leaders had the power and 
influence to disrupt seven registration booths in Qumbu. II Hence, one must agree with 
Ewing's argument that "the opinions of those who live under customary law have not 
been adequately canvassed or considered,,12 In general, contemporary studies lack real 
quantitative evidence, they do not show the extent to which legitimacy is assigned to 
traditional leaders and they lack proper historical and ethnographic focus. 13 
6 Gazelle: 2411112000. 
, Singer, "Chiefs Assert Power", p. 6. 
8 E, Maloka."'Traditional' leaders and the Current Transition" in The A/rican Communist. Second Quarter. 
NoI41-145. 1995: 41. 
9 E. Maloka. "Populism and the Politics of Chieftaincy" in Journal o/Contemporary African Studies. V34. 
No 2 (July). 1996: 160. 
10 Daily Dispatch: 1410912000. 
11 Daily Dispatch: 2411112000; Eastern Province Herald: 26/912000 
12 Ewing, D. "The rocky road to democracy and development in Kwa-Zulu Natal" in Sash V37 no.2. 1995: 
7. 
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This thesis attempts to overcome these shortcomings. It is emphasised that the issue does 
not simply revolve around two actors, the chiefs and the state, who compete for the 
support of the people, but is played out at the local level amongst the people. The people 
do not deal in dichotomies that are implicit in all discussions on traditional leadership, 
which divide the issue into rural/urban, developed/underdeveloped, primitive/civilised 
and traditional/modern. Rather, the people deal with issues that affect them directly; these 
include impoverishment, state intrusions, customs and the violation thereof These factors 
are often ignored in Eurocentric writings on Africa and the chiefs. This is evident in the 
failure of modernisation theory to comprehend the resiliency of culture in modern 
African state. It ignores the extent that the modern state needs the chiefs, the extent that 
the people need the chiefs and the extent that chiefs can adapt to these changing needs. 
This thesis explores the dynamic relationship between the government, people and chiefs, 
with particular reference to the Eastern Cape. Utilising varied secondary sources as well 
as primary sources in the form of archival documents, ANC and SACP documents, 
government publications, parliamentary debates (hansards) and newspaper articles this 
thesis attempts to provide a respectful, historical account of the lives of rural dwellers 
who have been repeatedly subject to state intrusions. Even now, these intrusions do not 
act in their interests. It also sketches the tale of the liberation movement whose attitude to 
the chiefs was largely contingent on the popular support that this latter group enjoyed. 
Lastly, it provides the story of the chiefs who were given the ultimate choice of becoming 
'bad chiefs,' favouring the government over the people; or 'good chiefs ' protecting the 
people from the government. The majority of chiefs chose the former option and thereby 
betrayed their people for the sake of material benefits. Nevertheless, the chiefs continue 
to playa role in the new, modern, democratic South Africa because of the needs of the 
ANC playing in a new political terrain characterised by transition, negotiation and 
elections; and the ' intangible' legitimacy bestowed upon them by the people. 
13 Keulder, C. Traditional Leaders and Local Government in Africa: Lessons fo r South Africa. HSRC: 
Pretoria. 1998: 13. 
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By focusing on the Eastern Cape this thesis offers a local perspective on issues that crop 
up at national level. The history of traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape informs the 
general discussion on the role that chiefs can play in furthering democracy and their 
future in an increasingly modernised African country. It appears that through their 
subordination, modernity is victorious over tradition, thereby living up to modernisation 
theory's predictions. However, this view is shortsighted. Chiefs will continue to playa 
role in the modern democratic state, although the exact nature of this role is contingent on 
its shifting relationship with the government and the people. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
MIXED GOVERNMENTS AND MIXED METHODOLOGIES 
In the aftermath of World War Two political scientists turned to Africa as a new frontier 
of research with the explicit aim of advancing freedom, by developing a new truly 
'universal' human, social or behavioural science. The modernisation paradigm which 
emerged in this context saw democracy as the end result of social, institutional and 
behavioural transformations largely associated with the rise of bureaucratization and 
industrial civilization.14 Using 'the West' as a yardstick it offered newly independent 
'non-western societies' ' advice' regarding the consolidation of democracy in the 
' modern ' state. However, modernisation scholarship failed to deliver the desired results 
as statist mismanagement, corruption, economic stagnation, dictatorships and increased 
human rights abuses came to characterise the new independent 'modern' states l5 The 
failure of modernisation theory lay largely in its Eurocentric assumptions that 
modernisation was inextricably interlaced with Western values and culture. In so doing 
modernisation theorists underestimated the adaptability of African culture to an 
increasingly modernized African state. The resilience of African traditions is evident in 
the figure of the chief "who is a socio-political phenomenon which forces a synthesis 
between antagonistic forces stemming from different state models, bureaucracies and 
world views,,16 This synthesis is evident in the notion of a 'mixed government,' which to 
varying degrees incorporates the modern and the traditional in a uniquely African version 
of democracy. 
"R.L Sklar and C.S Whitaker, "A Perspective on Scholarship in African Studies" in R.L Sklar and C.S 
Whitaker (eds), African Politics and Problems in Development. USA: Lynne Reinner. 1991: 3-4. 
15 Ibid, p.9. 
16 E.A.B van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "Chieftaincy in Africa-Thee Facets of a Hybrid Role" in E.A.B van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and R. Van Dijk, African Chiejlaincy in a New Socia-Political Landscape. 
Hamburg: Lit Verlag. 1999: 21. 
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Modernisation Theory 
Broadly modernisation is "a process of increasing complexity in human affairs within 
which the polity must act".!7 Modernisation theorists believed that through this increasing 
complexity, democracy should, could and would spread to the colonial 'backward' world. 
This notion of societal and cultural transformation was greatly informed by classical and 
nineteenth century philosophy in which civilization was linked to the urban arena while 
rural dwellers were regarded as primitive and barbaric. Aristotle regarded the polis, the 
Ancient Greek City as central to political forms of social organisation in which men were 
"fit to rule ... rule and are ruled in turn". The Latin translation of the Greek word polis is 
the urbs, a population dense center or the Civitas, the political center or town of the 
' native' tribes. In Rome, civilised citizens inhabited and ruled colonia, urban-based 
areas. IS In other words, it was assumed that civilization emerged from a transformation 
from the un-political hinterland or rural arena to the political urban domain. 
This notion of transformation was also evident in the Hegelian formula of Universal 
Absolute and the Final Cause in the quest for World Reason. Hegel described aboriginal 
Americans as vanishing in the European presence. Africans were described as cannibals, 
traffickers in the sale of their children, primitives, heathens and needing of Western 
slavery. He argued that one must not mention Africa again because "it is no historical 
part of the World, it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements 
in it - that is in its northern part - belong to the Asiatic or European world,,19 Hegel's 
legacy survived in the general Eurocentric assumption that Western 'excesses' such as 
slavery, modern colonialism, the African partition and neo-colonialism were justified as 
necessary to import modern progress to the barbarian tribes of Africa20 
17 D.E. Apter, 7'l1e Politics of Modernisation. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1965: 3. 
18 R. Thornton, What is 'civil' about 'civil society ' in Africa? A Review Essay. Internet: 
http://www.wits.ac.zaJfac/arts/socanthlCivil%20society.html. April 1997: 8. 
19 G.W.F Hegel, The Philosophy of History, New York: Dover Publications. (1837) 1956: 
20 CM Jean, Behind the Eurocenlric Veils: The Search for African Realities. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press. 1991: 16. 
8 
The underlying logic informing this assumption was that structures and processes of 
human societies develop from simple forms of traditionalism to complex expressions of 
modernity. In 1876 Herbert Spencer wrote that progress with respect to "size, coherence, 
multiformity and definiteness" in the structure of society would lead to change from 
simplicity to complexity21 In his classic study' Ancient Law', Sir Henry Maine argued 
that legal development was a shift from "status to contract in legal principles, processes 
and institutions of progressive societies" 22 This was echoed by the German theorist 
Ferdinand Tonnies who stated that the process of modernisation would transform 
customs and folkways to formal legislation as the structural basis of society shifted from 
a community in which ' natural will ' predominated to an association dominated by 
' rational will. ,23 Durkheim also saw a transformation as necessary from a ' mechanical ' 
primitive society in which repression was utilised to enforce compliance with custom, to 
an 'organic' modern society based on functional interdependence24 
The early twentieth century theorist Max Weber regarded modernity as emerging from a 
transformation in which political traditionalism expressed in the highly personal but 
unaccountable forms of gerontocracy, patriarchy and patrimonialism developed into a 
rational-legal modern state. He excluded racial determinism from the complex forces of 
history and disavowed suggestions of Western cultural superiority; however, he regarded 
the West as unique in terms of its emphasis on rationalism. He argued that no other 
culture had invented harmonious music based on rational intervals of scales, nor had any 
other culture produce a science that moved beyond observation to experiment. The West 
developed rational calculation in the form of book keeping, transformed profit making 
and invented the notion of a wage. Furthermore, Western societies were based on a 
technically superior form of administration in the form of the modern rational-legal 
bureaucracy. This modern bureaucratic rationalism was regarded as the inescapable 
destiny of the world; the fact that the West led the transformation meant that it was more 
21 H. Spencer, Principles o/Sociology. S. Andreski (cd) London: Macmillan. 1969: 155. 
22 H. Maine, Ancient Law. London: 101m Murray. 1908: 151. 
" F. Tonnies, Community and Association. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1955. 
" E. Durkheim, The Division o/Labour in Society. New York: Free Press. 1964. 
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advanced, not necessarily supenor. Hence, traditional culture was regarded as an 
evolutionary stage in the modernisation process25 
Talcott Parsons utilised Weberian typology to characterise other subsystems and cultural 
formations. He argued that in non-literate societies, kin networks are intertwined with 
instrumental, political and religio-cuitural structures and thus social life is ascriptive, 
diffuse, affective, particularistic and dominated by concern for the group's welfare. In 
contrast, the West (United States in particular) is quintessentially rational as social action 
is governed by norms of achievement, specificity, neutrality, universalism and self-
interest because social institutions are differentiated from the kinship system. The 
transformation of non-literate societies depends on this differentiation; however, "there 
seems to be no doubt that there is an inherent factor of the directionality of change in 
social systems, a directionality which was classically formulated by Max Weber in what 
he called the 'process ofrationalization' ... We may speak of the process of rationalization 
with considerable confidence as a general directional factor in the change of social 
systems".26 
Karl Marx also conceived of a modernisation process driven by a class struggle from one 
mode of production to another. The economic structure of society conditions the social, 
political and intellectual process (superstructure), thus one cannot conceptualise of a 
democratic form of governance in a largely peasant society or one governed by feudal 
means and forces of production. Industrial capitalism is necessary to create the conditions 
for a worker revolt and the subsequent development of a true democracy based on an 
industrial order in which classes and private property are absent and science and 
secularism dominate, thereby "replacing the domination of circumstances and change 
over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances,,27 
Marx likened the French peasantry to a "sack of potatoes,,28 engaging in the "ideocity of 
25 M. Weber, The Theory o/Social and Economic Organisation. (Ed) Talcott Parsons. New York: Free 
Press. 1964. 
26 T. Parsons, The Social System. Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe. 195 1. 
21 K. Marx, Selected Writings, (ed) D. McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977: 190. 
" K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" in Selected Works, Vol I . Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House. 1958 (1853): 334. 
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rural life" 29 Traditional Asian life was described as an "undignified, stagnatory and 
vegetable life" under "oriental despotism" which "restrained the human mind, making it 
the unresisting tool of superstition ... depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies"JO 
Although his democratic solution differed to that advocated by liberal democrats, Marx 
followed the broad pattern of castigating traditional cultures and societies by regarding 
them as a mere step in the evolution of a modernized, rational and democratic society. In 
short, "the country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed, 
the image of its own future" J I 
In general, theorists in the 1960's drew on the liberal or democratic-socialist traditions by 
defining modernisation as "the process of change towards those types of social, economic 
and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America"n As 
"a modernizing force" colonialism was "the model by which modernisation has been 
universalized,,33; in other words, by means of colonialism the modernized Western world 
brought 'primitive' Africans to their ' civilised' destiny. Further factors stimulating 
modernisation include an increase in population size, environmental changes, 
technological innovation, urbanisation and industrialisation. Modernisation does not 
necessarily involve industrialisation as industrialisation is just one aspect of 
modernisation; a period in society when manufacturing determines societal roles . In 
many African countries, modernisation occurred as a result of commercialization and 
bureaucratization rather than industrialisation.34 
Nevertheless, modernisation theorists such as Apter and Fallers conceptualised a broad 
model by which modernisation's effects on society and culture could be analysed. In 
brief, new economic activities lead to the development and differentiation of new 
stratifications and societal roles. Apter highlighted the three forms of social stratification 
29 K. Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in Selected Works, Vol I. Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House. 1958 (1853): 38. 
30 K. Marx, "British Rule in India" in Selected Works, Vol I. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House. 1958 (1858) : 350. 
31 K. Marx, Capi tal, I. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976: 91. 
32 S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernisation: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1966: l. 
33 D.A. Apter, The Politics a/Modernisation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1965:52.7 
34 [bid, p.43, 67. 
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that frequently co-exist in modernizing societies. These include the caste system (in the 
widest sense as including racial and cultural stratifications), the class system and the 
system of statutory hierarchies within which individual competition occurs. He also 
highlighted three 'ideal type' roles found in modernizing societies namely traditional, 
adaptive (partial transformation of traditional roles) and innovatory (new) roles35 The 
competition of these roles can take two courses namely, 'reconciliation' and 
'mobilization.' In the former case, the diversity of roles and stratifications is maintained, 
but the enlargement of the' modern sector' ensures that competition puts traditional roles 
at a disadvantage. In the latter case the state or ruling party assumes control of the 
economy and the development of new social roles, resulting in radical cultural 
transformations. 36 Hence, in both cases traditional roles are challenged. 
In this modernizing society, income, wealth and ascription come to determine social 
status as opposed to lineage and kinship groups37 In addition, kinship groups shrink as 
occupation roles exist outside the domestic context and are more mediated by the 
educational structure and labour market than by relationships with kinship members38 
Furthermore, in this external sphere, local particularistic links are forged between 
different members of class and status groups thereby ensuring that members of kinship 
groups become members of a more impersonal polity. In this new polity, new values and 
social morals compete with traditional values particularly since members of the new class 
and status groups attempt to justify and defend their positions by manipulating culture 
and the image of the 'admirable man,39 As old cultures are questioned, old forms of 
power decline and change. For example, the fact that "the libations and sacrifices he (the 
chief) offers have lost their full significance for some of his Christian subjects, who no 
longer believe that the crops will fail or that misfortune will befall the tribe if the 
sacrifices to the ancestors are not performed,,4o largely contributed to the decline in the 
" Ibid, p. 123-124. 
36 Ibid, p.2S , 36. 
37 K.A. Busia, The Challenge of Africa. London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press. 1962: 131. 
38 L Fallers, "Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States" in C. Geertz (ed), Old Societies and 
New States. London: Free Press of Glencoe. 1963: 167. 
39 Ibid, p.182, 162. 
40 K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chiefin the Modern Political System of Ashanti. London: Oxford 
University Press. 1951: 197. 
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power of the Ashanti chiefs in Ghana. Furthermore, old leaders lose power as their 
economic position is eroded; for example, the traditional tributes received by the chief in 
exchange for protection, land, and cattle are not forthcoming because members of the 
' tribes' can accrue economic resources beyond the scope of the tribe41 In other words, 
modernisation has "destroyed the old correlation between the chief s political power, 
religious authority, economic privilege and military strength, with the consequent decline 
in hi s prestige and authority" 42 
The declining power of old authorities results in the emergence of new authorities. At the 
political level, a party system and administrative sphere based on bureaucratic principles 
are established to maintain social order. This politio-administrative system links different 
social groups and strata on the basis of rational criteria. It is in this context Apter 's 
'sacred collectivity model' becomes transformed into a 'secular-libertarian model'43 
which fosters 'democratic' personality types. The development of skills, awareness of 
time and mastery over nature is transformed into a search for personal integrity, work and 
respect. Tolerance is a result of the exposure to socio-economic change and education44 
According to Lipset, education reflects the higher levels of political capacity, interests 
and participation45 This in turn increases popular expectations from government, a 
greater ability to comprehend and participate in national-level politics and the 
development of a civil society. This ensures that expertise forms the basis of the new, 
modern political realm and that secular, universalistic values are diffused throughout the 
system;46 thereby providing the impetus towards a liberal democracy which is based on 
an ' ethic of science,47 and is thus, the embodiment of political modernity. 
41 Ibid, p.199; L. Mair, "African Chiefs Today" in P.F.M. McEwan and R.B. Sutcliffe (eds), The Study of 
Alica. London: Methuen. 1965: 112. 
4 K.A. Busia, 'The Chief in Ashanti", p.214. 
43 D.E. Apter, 'The Politics of Modernisation', p. 28-30. 
44 M. Moore, "Is democracy rooted in material prosperity?" in R. Luckham and G. White (eds), 
Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1996: 54. 
" S. M. Lipset, Political Man. London: Mercury Books. 1960: 55. 
46 G. White, "Civil Society, Democratization and Development" in R. Luckham and G. White (eds), 
Democratization in the South: the Jagged Wave. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1996: 190; 
L. Fallers, "Equality, Modernity and Democracy", p.205. 
47 D.E. Apter, "The Politics of Modernisation", p.461. 
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Marxist political scientists portray a similar great transformation. The nse of a 
bourgeoisie provides the political impetus for liberalization, and subsequent 
democratization. The growth of this class is conditioned by a number of variables, these 
include the pluralisation of social power; separation of public and private spheres; the 
assertion of public ownership rights; demands for political rights and freedoms; state 
power being undermined by the force of the market; the desire of dominant classes to 
tame the state and to use it to serve their interests and lastly the democratizing influence 
of other groups brought into existence through successful capitalist development48 In 
other words, economic growth through industrialisation provides the platform on which 
democratic values, institutions and processes can be sustained. Capitalist socio-economic 
development enhances the power of the working class as a democratic force and 
diminishes the power of 'anti-democratic' social groups49 Hence, as Gavin Kitching 
argues, "materially poor societies cannot produce the democratic life which is an 
essential pre-requisite for the creation of socialist democracies" .50 
Both liberal and socialist theorists used modernisation theory to identify longer term, 
glacial factors such as changes in cultural and socio-economic systems that are vital in 
the historical transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' societies. Although the economic 
prerequisites for democracy are an important facet of modernisation theories51 , for the 
purposes of this study I will focus on the tenet that modernisation and democracy 
inevitably undermines tradition and traditional forms of authority. As Mair argues, "It is 
quite easy to predict that the chiefs will eventually disappear from the scene ... Although 
their position differs in many respects from that of a landed aristocracy in Europe, it is 
equally vulnerable to the forces of modern economic development,,52 Modernisation 
theorists falsely assumed that African culture would emulate European cultural history. 
Thus, these theorists used "the measuring rod of Western democracy to describe the 
" G. White, "Civil Society, Democratization", p. 190. 
" A. Leftwich, "On the Primacy of Politics in Development" in A. Leftwhich (ed), Democracy and 
Development. USA:Polity Press. 1996:9-10. 
" Cited in Leftwich, "Politics in Development", p.9. 
51 See Lipset, "Political Man". Moore, "Material Prosperity". Leftwich, "On Primacy of Development". 
" L. Mair, "African Chiefs Today", p.120. 
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working of regimes that by tradition and necessity cannot be measured in this way" 53 
This is evident in Fallers' analysis of the persistence of tradition amongst the Soga in 
Uganda: "If something resembling the liberal democratic state for Uganda as a whole is 
the aim, then we may say that the prerequisite institutions do not yet exist or are as yet 
only partially institutionalized" 54 Thus, the prerequisites used by these political 
'scientists' were derived from Western history and Western assumptions thereby ensuring 
that African cultural factors such as concepts of power, the person, witchcraft, polity and 
chieftainship were largely ignored. 
In reality, "in modern Africa, signs of the traditional past are everywhere apparent" 55 As 
Appiah recollects, "I grew up knowing we were democrats and that we respected 
chieftaincy,,56 But, modernisation theorists were unable to conceive of this combination 
as their rhetoric was based on dichotomies such as rural/urban, traditional/modern, 
sUbject/citizen, underdeveloped/developed, and primitive/civilised largely derived from 
the Eurocentric philosophical traditions of Aristotle, Hegel, Weber and Marx. Their 
failure to understand the complexity of Africa ensured that they were unable to conceive 
of a democratic formula that combined the modern and the traditional in the form of a 
'mixed government.' 
Mixed Government 
In the search for parliamentary democracy the new states sought partly to adapt 
traditional African systems and partly to adapt Eurocentric models. The result was a 
fusion in which "western-type executive, judicial, and legislative institutions exist side by 
side with ' traditional' institutions - familial, religious, economic and political,,57 
53 E. Shils, ' ·On the Comparative Study of the New States" in C. Geertz (ed), Old Societies and New States: 
the Questfor Modernity in Asia and Africa. USA: Free Press of Glencoe. 1963:24. 
54 L. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy. Cambridge: Heffer and Sons. 1965: 246. 
55 E.O. Awogu, Political Institutions and Thought in Africa: An Introduction. New York: Vantage Press. 
1975:179. 
" K.A. Appiah, In My Father's House - Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Great Britain: Methuen. 
1992:256. 
57 W.S.T. Clair Drake, "Traditional Authority and Social Action in Former British West Africa" in The 
Study of Africa. London: Methuen. 1965: 121. 
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Modernisation theorists regarded the fact that "the two types of authority systems to-day 
stand side by side in the same society, both institutionalised and both in large measure 
treated by the same persons as legitimate," as "unusual" and "interesting,,58 precisely 
because modernisation theory was unable to conceive of a role for tradition in the modern 
society, beyond that of a 'buffer' to ease the pain of modernisation. In reality, tradition 
came to play a prominent role in the new African states as one dimension of a dualistic 
authority. 
Plato, Aristotle and Polybius highlighted the notion of ' mixed government' to refer to a 
mixture of political institutions designed to protect the interests of both the poor and the 
rich. In its modern form, the notion has been used to refer to the Estates-Generals of 
France, which represented the clergy, nobles and citizens of towns, and the Mixed 
Monarchy of England. Neither one of these usages accurately comes to grips with the 
African form of 'mixed government.' On the other hand, Medieval Europe' s bifurcated 
political life consisting of two "self-subsistence realms of government at arms length 
from one another" known as Priceps (King and military organisation) and Populus 
(Judicial and municipal officials independent of the King), shares the political cleavages 
prevalent in modern Africa5 9 Under a single undisputed sovereign, two dimensions of 
government co-exist namely, a state sovereignty and traditional government. Both 
dimensions govern the same communities of citizens and subjects. 
Mamdani also describes modern African politics as bifurcated but argues that traditional 
authorities rule subjects who act in a traditional, 'non-political' way and are thus not 
included in the citizenship of the state, while the elected government rules citizens in 
urban areas who are fully incorporated into the politics of the rational-individualist 
state60 It is clear that Marndani falls into the Eurocentric trap by focusing too much on 
dichotomies, epitomised by the title of his book, Citizen and Subject, and in so doing he 
fails to understand the linkages between urban and rural areas facilitated largely by the 
58 L.A. Fallers, "Bantu Bnreancracy", p. 19. 
59 R.L. Sklar, "The African Frontier for Political Science" in R.H Bates, v.y Mudimbe, J O 'Barr (eds), 
Africa and the Disciplines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1993: 86. 
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migrant labour system and the power of the chiefs in both these areas. Furthermore, 
Mamdani makes the Eurocentric fault of assuming that the power of chiefs is restricted to 
the sphere of society which is bound up by ethical conviction, ties of affection and shared 
worlds of meaning, or is confined to the private realm, the realm of individual beliefs and 
actions. In other words, he shares the Western view of the state as claiming supreme 
authority over a territorial domain, having the right to back up its authority with force and 
functioning without personal affection, religion, ethnicity and tradition61 The public 
domain on this account includes the government of the territorial states, their 
subdivisions and international organisations created by territorial states62 Mamdani fails 
to understand the dynamics of a 'mixed government' in which both chiefs and the 
sovereign state are regarded as legitimate by citizens in both urban and rural areas. 
In modern Africa, the state shares the public realm with a second state or 'state-behind-
the-state.' The officials of the second state are traditional authorities; in other words, 
these individuals owe their positions of public trust to customary, rather than statutory 
rules although statutory law usually regulates their duties and appointments63 The nature 
of the ' mixed government' differs from country to country. In some states, the mixed 
government is dual rather than consolidated into two systems of authority; in other words, 
traditional rulers have advisory, ceremonial and extra-constitutional powers. In others, 
the constitution incorporates traditional leaders into the basic processes of modern 
government. Hence, mixed government follows two broad patterns: first, the participation 
of traditional authorities in the exercise of sovereign authority occurs on a privileged 
basis and is usually designed simply to enhance the legitimacy of the modern state. 
Second, traditional authorities function in accordance with customary law, and practice in 
their own domains at national and local levels. Botswana, Nigeria and Senegal follow the 
former pattern, while Ghana and Lesotho follow the latterM In Botswana, the 
60 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. USA: 
Princeton University Press. 1996: 25-26. 
61 K.A. Appiah, "In my Father's House", p.257-258. 
62 R. L. Sklar, "The African Frontier", p.87. 
63 Ibid, p.87 . 
64 Ibid, p.92. 
government consults the kgotla (public meetings conducted by chiefs)65 
have an impact on the grass-roots level. In Nigeria, the constitution of 
Traditional Councils presided over by traditional leaders, to advise 
Government Councils although they lack executive, legislative or jud 
most cases, the secular system of modern government is superior in terms of its comllu 
over political resources particularly finances, but technically there is supposed to be 
mutual accommodation between the two states. The extent to which this occurs and the 
nature of the mixed government depends largely on the outcome of zero-sum games in 
which the chiefs and the state are locked into a mutually dependent but competitive 
relationship67 
Chiefs and the State 
Mamdani argues that the institution of chieftainship is a "legacy of late colonialism,,68; in 
other words, the survival of the chiefs "depended largely on the pattern of colonial 
administration,,69 Indirect Rule as formulated by Lord Lugard ensured that the power of 
the chiefs was like a "clenched fist" in which administrative, bureaucratic, judicial, legal, 
and executive powers were fused, thereby entrenching their elite status and economic 
superiority7 0 However, this view fails to recognise that colonial principles of devolution, 
hierarchisation and bureaucratisation served to undermine the authority of the chiefs in 
the eyes of the people, and thus undermined their long-term survival. The fact that the 
chiefs continue to exercise considerable power in modern Africa points to an alternative 
explanation for their continued existence which includes colonialism, modernisation, the 
65 Traditionally attendance of these meetings was restricted to men but now they include women and non-
Tswana minority groups. This highlights the adaptability and resiliency of traditional institutions to 
democratic settings. Sklar, "The African Frontier" , p.91. 
66 Ibid, p.90. 
67 E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "Chieftaincy in Africa: Three Facets of a Hybrid Role" in E.A.B 
van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and R.Van Dijk (eds), African Chieftaincy in a New Socia-Political 
Landscape. Hamburg: Lit Verlag. 1999: 24. 
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70 Marndani, "Citizen and Subject", p. 26. 
18 
legitimacy cns!s faced by the new states, the adaptability of the chiefs and the 
"indestructible appeal',7! of African culture. 
Colonialism's impact on the chiefs varied depending on whether direct or indirect forms 
of rule were utilised72 Without going into too much depth at this stage, direct rule simply 
abolished the formal authority of the chiefs while indirect rule sought to rule the 
indigenous people through the chiefs. In other words, indirect rule incorporated the 
institution of chieftaincy into the political and administrative structure using the three 
main principles of devolution, hierarchy and administration districts. In terms of 
devolution, the central state through the figure of the district officer would reserve the 
right to appoint, install and dismiss chiefs thereby overriding traditional rules of 
divesture. In addition, the colonial government invented or strengthened hierarchical 
relations between different chiefs. It also placed the chief in an intermediary position 
between the local colonial administration and population. Furthermore, colonial regimes 
created administrative districts on the bases of artificial territorial boundaries. This 
altered the principles of authority and leadership between the chief and his subjects, 
which were previously based on social, cultural, political and personal relations73 These 
three principles facilitated the development of a "civil-service chief',74 who was totally 
dependent on the state for recognition and financial resources. 
As the agent of colonial intrusions, the chief was further alienated from the people and 
further came to depend on the colonial government for political, economic and military 
support. This support enhanced the chief's power and ability to extract resources from the 
11 R Thornton, "What is 'civil' about 'civil society' in Africa", 9. 
12 For an extensive discussion on various forms of direct and indirect rule see E. A B van Rouveroy van 
Nueuwaal, "Chiefs and African States: Some Introductory Notes and an Extensive Bibliography on African 
Chieftaincy" in Journal of Legal Pluralism. Vo. 25 -26. 1987: 9-14. The structnre of indirect rule also 
varied from country to country. In Easteru Nigeria, chiefs were ex officio presidents or chairmen of local 
councils. In Ghana and Western Nigeria, up to a third of local councillors were chiefs and an advisory 
council of chiefs was established at a later stage. In Zambia and Malawi, chiefs dominated rural local 
councils. See D. A Kotze, Traditionalism in African Local Government with Special Reference to the 
Transkei and Lesotho. PHD thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch. 1968: 95-96. 
13 T. Van Trotha, "From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy" inJournal of Legal Pluralism (37&38). 
1996: 77-82. EAB. Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "Chiefs and States - Are Chiefs Mere Puppets?" in Journal 
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poverty-stricken peasants. Experience in the colonial administration increased the 
adaptability of the traditional chief to the new modern bureaucracy. This experience and 
the resources accumulated, served to place chiefs in the African modern elite. However, 
collaboration and great misuse of power served to delegitimise the chiefs. Thus, the 
chiefs were not only materially dependent on the new independent state but also needed it 
to buttress their fading popular legitimacy. On the other hand, the needs of the new 
African states salvaged the position of the chiefs whose role as 'protectors' of the 
traditional world came to be emphasised and manipulated. 
The elites of the newly independent countries attempted "simultaneously to elevate the 
dignity of their traditional culture and their standing in the world. But they also wish( ed) 
to have for the sake of economic progress and because it is entailed in being modern, a 
modern culture" 75 They were faced with the problem of establishing and maintaining a 
modern political apparatus as well as the problem of bridging the cultural gap left by the 
West because "no state, not even an infant one, is willing to appear before the world as a 
bare political frame. Each would be clothed in a cultural garb symbolic of its aims and 
ideal being,,76 By donning the 'cultural garb' these elites attempted to develop a sense of 
national pride by countering the negative and racist connotations implicit in the 
intellectual and cultural dominance of their previous colonial overlords. Thus, because 
they saw the chiefs as "symbols of national pride" they could not simultaneously 
repudiate them altogether and assert the value of their own historic tradition77 
Furthermore, they needed the chiefs and the tradition they embodied to 'buffer' the 
modernisation process and the imposition of an alien bureaucratic culture, in an attempt 
to overcome the problem of accruing support for activities and social relations that "were 
not only different from those familiar to traditional societies but that also had developed 
out of an alien tradition and came backed by an alien power"n Generally, the new elites 
needed tradition, and chiefs in particular, to enhance their popular legitimacy and to act 
J5 E. Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States" in C. Geertz (ed), Old Societies and New States: 
The Quest f or Modernity in Asia and Africa. USA: Free Press of Glencoe. 1963: 2. 
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as voting banks. Utilizing modern forms of political expression such as the political party 
and ideology, leaders manipulated tradition because it was a valuable resource in the 
sphere of power. For example, in the Congo, the image of the president was projected as 
a reflection of a traditional sovereign, seizing the throne to protect his people, acting as a 
just and charismatic chief in the best interests of the collectivity79 Leaders across Africa 
literally donned the garb and rhetoric of their chiefly counterparts in an attempt to 
legitimize their presence. 
Thus, chiefs and the state were locked in a dependent relationship but they also competed 
for control over resources and the allegiance of the people. All African countries sought a 
means of controlling the chiefs, because "just as the chief was the center of opposition to 
colonial rule at the initial stages, so too the chief constituted a new threat to the political 
power of the new African leaders,,80 Legislation attempted to encapsulate the chiefs into 
the bureaucratic structure so that recalcitrant chiefs could be punished like mere civil 
servants or simply dismissed; in other words, the state attempted to use the colonial 
principles of devolution, hierarchy and administrative districts to subvert the power of the 
chiefs. However, these efforts met with limited success because chiefs were actors who 
had access to a number of different resources. 
First and most importantly, chiefs had a resource in the legitimacy bestowed from below 
by the people. As chiefs were regarded as a ritual and moral authority they served as a 
buffer against foreign intrusions, which came in the form of the state and its 
accompanying bureaucracy. Many people did not comprehend the nature of the new 
states so they turned to the 'old language' of tradition which seemed to offer them 
protection and peace of mind. Space for the chiefs to maneuver was created by this "gap 
that exists between a modern, bureaucratic, organised state that derived its authority from 
state law, and the social context of the majority of the African citizens associated with a 
completely different ideological, symbolical and cosmological world view,,81 Thus the 
79 G. Balandier, Political Anthropology. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. Great Britain: Penguin Press. 
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chief was used as an icon against external threats and as a figure through which people 
could voice their concerns. As Mair argues, "it is around their office that much local 
opposition rallies in an attempt to preserve long-cherished prerogatives and old methods 
of social control. Where these happen to be local economic interests, which it is felt the 
State does not sufficiently recognise, these also may seek to use the chief as a mouthpiece 
and political front,,82 This was evident in Kabylia in Algeria where peasants were 
incapable of conceiving in what way they belonged to an abstract state so they revived 
their old forms of authority to place pressure on the state. In Aures, peasants used the 
chiefs to service ends opposite to tradition namely, to complain about under-
administration and the slowness of modernisation in their area83 Thus, the allegiance of 
the masses ensured that chiefs had access to a powerful bargaining chip in their relations 
with a modern state that was desperately seeking legitimacy and respect. 
Whilst emphasising their role as 'guardians of tradition' , many chiefs simultaneously 
turned to modern enterprises to entrench their position as members of the entrepreneurial 
elite. Not only were chiefs highly educated and part of the state bureaucracy but, changes 
in the modern economy had created new economic opportunities for them. Busia cites the 
case of an Ashanti chief who was a cocoa-broker, rubber-processor, and an owner of a 
tile and water-cooler factory84 Although this removed the chiefs dependence on the state 
for resources it was a risky strategy because the chief was involved in the modernity that 
his subjects feared, thereby creating a situation of mistrust and suspicion. 
Thus, the chief had a foot in both the traditional and modern realms but achieving the 
balance between two inherently conflicting roles and loyalties was often difficult. 
Nevertheless, the chief s ability to "take off his traditional garment and trade it for a 
European outfit,,85 enhanced his ability to maneuver in conflicts with the state. As van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal argues, "chiefs and states are profit-maximizing actors who 
82 L. Mair, "African Chiefs Today", p. 107. 
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constantly strive to expand or at least stabilize their power" 86 However, the fact that their 
relationship was also characterised by mutual dependence, ensured that the conflict could 
be contained and diverted to serve democratic ends. 
Chiefs and Democracy 
In the last section I focused largely on the transition to modernisation and democracy in 
the newly independent African states. As was shown, the new elites and the masses 
desperately clung to tradition to offset what they believed were the negative effects of 
bureaucratization and other forms of modernisation. Although I referred to the chief s 
mutually dependent yet competitive relationship with the state in past tense, this is not 
where the story ends, contrary to what modernisation theorists would have us believe. 
Many African citizens lost faith in the ability of the modern state to serve their needs. 
This was based on a gross overestimation of the ability of these states as well as tbe 
inability of the state to foster socio-economic development. Thus, the relationship 
between the state and civil society degenerated into oligarchic patrimonialism. The 
African state frequently resorted to force to accrue support and thus African states 
became characterised by human rights abuses, chronic instability, glorification of 
personalities, poverty, increased national debts and the flight of African intellectuals. 
Once again, the people turned to the chiefs as an alternative form of power, and the state 
desperately sought an alliance with the chiefs to increase its legitimacy. Thus to many, a 
coalescence between tradition and modernity would increase the ability of a uniquely 
African version of democracy to gain a foothold in a war-torn and poverty-ridden 
continent. 
Opponents of this notion of ' mixed democracy' argue that the existence of chiefs in 
national government increases the negative and divisive effects of ethnicity on the sense 
of nationhood; they block innovation and development; enhance patrimonialism; and the 
nature of their institution contradicts the essence of democracy. According to Fallers and 
Geertz, the existence of chiefs enhances the conflict between primordial and civil 
" E.A.B. Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "Chieftaincy in Africa", p. 25. 
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sentiments, and in so doing undermines the nation and the government itselfl7 by 
"sapping people's loyalty to the wider society and polity,,88 Fallers cites the case of the 
Baganda who view the traditional kingdom as the natural vehicle for modernisation and 
thus refuse to give loyalty to the wider national unit. 89 However, this argument is based 
on the assumption that loyalty to the State is ' modern' while loyalty to the tribe is 
anachronistic. In other words, it falsely assumes that one cannot simultaneously be loyal 
to one ' s lineage or tribe and to a larger unit, the nation. 
Apter argues that the existence of tradition in a modern state undermines innovation and 
development and would thus contribute to Africa 's economic impoverishment and state 
mismanagement.9o However, this view fails to recognise the adaptability of tradition, and 
chiefs in particular. As Busia argues, "The chiefs have adapted themselves to the new 
situation and have led in the construction of roads, the establishment of treasuries, the 
building of schools, the provision of wells, sanitary services, and the like,,91 
Furthermore, innovation coated in tradition would appear more as an endogenous 
initiative and thus have a greater chance at success in a continent wary of alien intrusions. 
Fallers argues with reference to the Soga in Uganda that the hierarchically, centralised 
state and lineage organisation is structurally antagonistic and thus "makes for strain and 
instability"n In the modern bureaucracy, authority pertains to the office not the person 
but rules are designed to maximise disinteredness and impersonality. But by introducing 
an element of tradition and personal loyalty in the form of kinship, this notion of 
rationality is distorted and thus "behaviour which in the traditional system contributed to 
laudable personal loyalty becomes, in terms of the civil service system, 'nepotism' and 
'corruption".93 This argument is based on two Eurocentric assumptions: first, the rational, 
impersonal Western notion of bureaucracy is the superior form of institutional 
87 C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in C. Geertz, Old Societies and NI!W States. London: The Free 
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organisation Second, Fallers fails to understand the nature of the traditional political 
system in which loyalty, tributes and so forth were monitored by checks and balances to 
ensure that a misuse of authority did not occur. 94 Thus, there is no reason to assume that 
the traditional system would necessarily allow for nepotism in the modern state. 
In general, opponents of the role played by traditional leaders in the modern democracy 
argue that it undermines the precepts of democracy. Traditional leaders are the 
embodiment of rural patriarchy; its hereditary title, male-centredness, racial and tribal 
nature and history of repression during colonial times is an obstacle to a non-sexist and 
non-racist democracy95 These objections are valid but fail to recognise how traditional 
leaders can advance the consolidation of democracy in Africa in terms of increasing 
popular participation, maintaining social order, acting as a form of checks and balances, 
increasing government accountability and aiding the state in executing its policies. 
Skalnik describes these 'mixed governments' as being characterised by elements of direct 
democracy complementing representative democracy.96 The fact that "the vast majority 
of Africans in all probability know only their immediate local, traditional, or religious 
rulers and governing councils,,97 places the chief in an important position. The masses 
have a direct relationship with the chiefs with whom they can share their grievances 
personally. The chief may in turn approach the head of the modern state with these 
problems. This scenario ensures that the state is linked to the people and is aware of their 
needs as well as ensures that it can be held accountable by the people. In other words, this 
chiefly linkage is responsible for increasing popular participation in the processes of 
governance and enhances the effectiveness of government policies. The chief could also 
be an important executor of these policies at local level. 98 Furthermore, the chief could 
94 These checks and balances came in the form of a council of elders, council of men, the ability of nnhappy 
subjects to leave the tribe and succession disputes. See W. D. Hammond-Tooke, Commond or Consensus: 
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act as a set of vertical as well as horizontal checks and balances where it is incorporated 
into the state structure9 9 Lastly, the chiefs and the traditional values they represent are 
necessary to maintain civic morale and a degree of social order and stability in societies 
in flux and in times of hardship. 100 Thus, Africa's political revival could be aided by 
uniting the modern and the traditional in a political framework. As Harris argues, "The 
urgent task for political leadership in the new African republics is to seize the idea of 
constitutionalism by limiting the power of the rulers, reconstituting the polity and 
engendering new forms of political solidarity that incorporate fragments of the African 
political tradition into a new constitutional framework" . 10 I 
Hence, the fact that African states have accepted modernisation selectively does not 
necessarily hinder the success of democracy in the continent. After all, "democratic 
norms and principles are universal, but the institutions which inform democracy and the 
concrete forms of its political space may vary in times and space".102 The success of 
democracy is not determined by the existence of modern Western institutions but by the 
extent to which a society reaches the ideal of a "government by the people, for the 
people, and of the people". As an ideal, Africa's 'mixed government' is an attempt to 
solve Africa' s unique problems with a unique African solution; only time will tell 
whether this solution will fare better than that advocated by modernisation theorists. It 
may produce negative results but in the meantime, 
"those who have the courage, and enough respect for the Mrican to point out the 
shortcomings of contemporary political experiments, as measured against the 
accepted and avowed standards, perform a valuable service for democracy as well 
as for Africa; those who fall over backwards, whether out of desire to please, or 
fear to give offense, or contempt for the African, to defend the shortcomings and 
represent them as the best that can be achieved are being pernicious to both the 
99 P. Skalnik, "Authority versus Power", p. 11 8. 
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freedom and welfare of the African societies and to international relations and 
world peace". 103 
Mixed Methodologies 
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The Eurocentric paradigm does not provide an adequate account of African culture and 
African realities because it assumes a hegemonic universal character. Western culture is 
placed at the center of the social structure and is used as a reference point, or yardstick by 
which other cultures are measured. As shown above, modernisation theorists were more 
concerned with explaining the fate of Western institutions, values and power in an 
African context. This paradigm is based on dichotomies, which regard deviations from 
the Eurocentric model as defective conditions. As Whitaker and Sklar argue, social 
scientists in Africa need to revise their methodologies to include Afrocentricity 
(Afrocentrism), which broadly states that "those who interpret Africa should acquire a 
sympathetic understanding of African thought and values". 104 Thus, one needs to 
question not only what methods researchers use in the field but also what they 
conceptually take to the field. 105 
Afrocentrism has its ongm 10 three areas of inquiry: first, it emerged out of the 
intellectual trends of post-modernism, Marxism, and the destruction of other ideas in post 
World War Two academia. Writers such as Foucait, Derrida, Jameson and Greenblatt 
castigated the bourgeois social order as corrupt, repressive and arbitrary, and argued that 
anyone is capable of forming their own truth to suit their own political and social 
purposesl06 Second, it had its roots in the black power movements of the 1960' s and 
1970's and drew inspiration from Marcus Garvey, Malcom X, Eda Wells and W.E.B Du 
Bois. Third, it further drew strength from the rise of African nationalism, 'Negritude' 
103 K.A. Busia, Africa in Search 0/ Democracy. London: Routledge. 1967: 17l. 
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advocated by Leopold Sedar Senghor in the 1930's, African Socialism propagated by 
Julius Nyerere and the Black Consciousness Movement led by Biko. 107 
At one level Afrocentrism argues that the West views the world through Eurocentric eyes 
and thus suppresses or denies the achievements of other cultures. Afrocentrism seeks to 
put Africa at the center of world history, so that African concerns, standards and values 
are considered. l08 This, it is argued, is necessary to allow Africans to come to full self-
determination and achieve humanity. 109 In so doing, Afrocentrism does not aim to replace 
Eurocentrism as a perspective but seeks to allow for the recognition of the validity of 
other non-hegemonic perspectives, Asia-centered, Africa-centered, America-centered and 
European-centered. As the world is multicultural, it must be analysed from different 
angles in order to understand the complexity of different peoples and communities 
centered in their own histories and cultures.llo It is thus based on one uncompromising 
principle namely, the rejection of notions and principles that have 'universal tendencies.' 
As a methodological principle, 'Afrology' seeks to focus on Afrocentric issues and to 
interpret those issues in such a way that will expose the 'essential' cultural factors that 
constitute the subject and motivate the subject's actions I I I It thus seeks to analyse 
events, thoughts and behaviour critically in order to understand the diversity inherent in a 
multicultural world. 
At another level, Afrocentrists argue that history must be rewritten and Eurocentric myths 
rectified. Anta Diop and Bernal argue that Afrocentrists must use ancient Kemetic 
(Egypt) civilization as the classical reference point for studying African civilization. They 
argue that Egypt was of African origin and since it was the earliest known civilization, 
101 K. Chowdhuny, "Afrocentric Voices: Consttucting Identities, (Dis) Placing Difference" in College 
Literature. June 1997 (24: 2): 35. R.L. Sklar, "The African Frontier", p.IO!. 
10' M. K. Asante, Afrocentricity, New York and Eritrea: Africa World Press. 1996 (2nd ed):6. 
109 M. Njeza, "Fallacies of the new Afrocentrism: A Critical Response to Kwame A. Appiah" in Journal 0/ 
Theology/or Southern Africa 99. November 1997: 48. 
11 0 B. Oyebade, "African Stndies and the Afrocentric Paradigm" in Journal o/Black Studies. Vol. 21 (2). 
December 1990: 234. 
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Africa is the birthplace of humanity and the cradle of civilization. 112 They further argue 
that these ancient roots unite diasporic Africans (Afro-Americans) with Africans in a 
common culture. This culture is based on a shared anthropological and theological 
foundation and is revealed in shared oratory forms of expression found in African 
societies across the globe. This unity forms the basis of a cultural call to arms: "Up from 
the intellectual and spiritual pit which has held our mighty people! Let each person take 
his post in the vanguard of the collective consciousness of Afrocentrism! Teach it! 
Practice it! And victory will surely come as we carry out the Afrocentric mission to 
humanise the universe". 113 According to Asante, liberation can be achieved by following 
Nija, "the collective expression of the Afrocentric worldview which is grounded in the 
historical experience of African people . .It places Afrocentricity in the African population 
of the Diaspora and the continent". 114 
Criticism is mainly directed to this latter, more extreme version of Afrocentrism on the 
grounds that it incorporates the Eurocentric dichotomies that it abhors, it is racist and 
divisive; falsely assumes the existence of a single, unified, pure African culture; it 
assumes that there is only one oppressor and one group of oppressed and it IS 
intellectually weak, inaccurate and mythical. Afrocentrism is accused of adopting 
Eurocentric viewpoints. As Appiah argues, Afrocentricism is "thoroughly at home in the 
frameworks of nineteenth-century European thought...(and that it) seems very much to 
share the presuppositions of the Victorian ideologies against which it is reacting" 115 
Diop's theory of history begins with the origins of humanity then traces it to the rise of 
Nubia and the subsequent evolution of an authentic Black Egyptian civilization. This 
suggests a Hegelian notion of totality and continuum, which ignores the alternate micro-
narratives that may disrupt or rupture the continuum of history. Asante on the other hand, 
replicates the Western hegemonic systems he so criticises1l6 His work is essentially 
112 C. A. Diop, The African Origin a/Civilization: Myth or Reality. Trans: Mercer Cook. Westport: 
Lawrence Hill. 1974; M. Bernal, BlackAthena: the A/roasiatic Roots a/Classical Civilization. Brunswick: 
Rutgers. 1987. 
113 M. K. Asante, "Afrocentricity", p.6. 
114 Ibid, p. 22. 
11 5 K. A. Appiah, "Europe Upside Down: Fallacies of the new Afrocentrism" in R.R Grinker and C. B 
Steiner (eds), Perspectives on A/rica. London: Blackwell Publishers. 1997: 729. 
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reactionary and thus becomes an adversarial ideology. In so doing, it fall s into the 
Eurocentric trap of assuming that there is one version of the truth and one privileged 
agent of social and historical changel1 7 Thus, "the colonized legitimizes the colonizer by 
miming his authority". As Appiah argues, Afrocentrism is simply "Europe turned upside 
down".1l8 
Afrocentrism also shares the Eurocentrist racial orientation by glorifying African (black) 
culture as humanist and just while repudiating European (white) culture as individualist, 
competitive, selfish, exploitative and engaged in cultural and material thievery. 119 This is 
evident in its preoccupation with the skin colour of Ancient Egyptians. Its racial 
fundamentalism is divisive; instead of highlighting the similarities between Africans and 
Europeans, it emphasises the differences and is thus dangerous in a multicultural 
setting. 120 By stressing the essential cultural differences between the races, it assumes the 
existence of a single, homogenous African culture once again echoing the insensitivity 
and uncritical nature of Eurocentrism. In reality, Africans are a culturally heterogeneous 
group and thus to assume a unified African culture is false particularly if one postulates a 
cultural commonality between Africans and Afro-Americans, who are a highly 
Westernised grouping. 121 Furthermore, it assumes that there is one oppressor and one 
group of oppressed. It tends to downplay continued economic domination and the plight 
of women. In so doing, it ignores a large volume of feminist thought that could buttress 
its criticism of Eurocentric concepts of person and community. 122 Lastly, in its attempts 
to wage a war against European myths it disseminated new myths, which are inaccurate 
and fraught with "intellectual weaknesses". 123 
11 7 Ibid, p. 52. 
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According to Early and Moses, "the Afrocentric tradition must be understood as a variety 
of utopian or millenarian movement, although the Mrocentric utopia is in a romanticized 
past, rather than a chiliastic future" 124 Like all utopia, Afrocentricism provides an ideal 
society and in doing so, reflects the flaws of the present. The sad truth is that cultural 
domination continues to oppress groups such as black people and women by constructing 
a negative view of the self, which is described by Fanon as an "inferiority complex". 125 
Steven Lukes was correct in his description of the 'third dimension' of power as being 
exercised indirectly over people's subconscious beliefs about who they are and what they 
can achieve. 126 This highlights the importance of formulating new methodologies that 
critique past assumptions and stereotypes so as to ensure that the cycle of domination 
does not continue. 
Although a broad account of the Mrocentric debate has been sketched, a number of 
important methodological points are evident. First but not least, it is important to respect 
indigenous customs and beliefs. This requires critical analysis and the recognition that 
diverse cultures do exist. Although Afrocentrists claim to respect cultural differences, 
they are not sensitive to the complexities that exist among Mricans as a group; these 
include cultural, ethnic, gender, class and individual differences. Furthermore, 
Afrocentrists claim to accommodate the existence of alternate paradigms; however, they 
offer their version of African history as the truth without recognising that their own 
biases and intentions have warped their historical rendition. This highlights the 
importance of adopting a critical viewpoint towards one's own and other's motivations 
and assumptions. One needs to recognise that true objectivity in the social sciences is 
virtually impossible because the researcher's perspective is conditioned by specific 
experiences rooted in one's culture and upbringing. Lastly, the failure of Mrocentrists to 
escape the Eurocentric influence highlights the futility of offering a single historical or 
methodological account in a globalising and multicultural world. By seeing these 
124 G. Early and W.J. Moses, "Symposium: Historical Roots of Afrocentrism" in Academic Questions. Vol. 
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paradigms as separate and distinct, opporturutles to understand the similarities, 
differences and ways in which they can complement each other, are undermined. 127 
Thus, one needs to utilise a mixed methodological approach in the social sciences. One 
needs to reject the positivism paradigm, which adopts a 'scientific' and 'objective' 
approach to explain human behaviour by utilising variables and proofs.128 This approach 
fail s to understand the complexity of this behaviour and the extent to which both the 
subject and observer are influenced by their own biases and cultures.129The interpretive 
paradigm recognises attempts to understand these complexities by focusing on the subject 
and researcher's actions and interactions no On the other hand, this approach is flawed as 
it offers a one-sided viewpoint; it focuses too much on the subjective meanings of the 
subject's action as opposed to the underlying structures and ideologies. 131 In contrast the 
critical theory paradigm, argues that one needs to look beyond the subject ' s immediate 
behaviour and beliefs to the structures that condition them. In doing so, it aims to 
emancipate the oppressed by empowering them to question their actions, beliefs and the 
societal constraints that limit them. 132 This approach has been criticised for concentrating 
on patterns and structures without recognising unique individual or small group 
experiences within these social arrangements. 
Afrocentrism falls into both the interpretive and critical theory paradigms. It adopts a 
relativist position in its recognition that there is no ultimate truth and inquiries are not 
value-free, and it attempts to reconstruct the world from an African position without 
predicting or controlling that world. Furthermore, Afrocentrism seeks to highlight the 
cultural and intellectual oppression caused by Eurocentrism and in so doing, seeks to 
emancipate Africans across the world. However, as shown above, Afrocentrism is equally 
127 M. L. McPhail, "From Complicity to Coherence", p. 124. 
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vulnerable to the flaws of these two paradigms; it offers a one-sided viewpoint and 
ignores differences between Africans. 
The Post-structuralist approach focuses less on researcher ontology and epistemology but 
looks towards 'the text' in constructing meanings and exercising power. In other words, 
the language used in a piece of writing, an oral exchange, artwork, play or presentation is 
deconstructed to produce a multiple of meanings and identities ' 33 As a methodological 
approach, Asanti argues that Afrocentrists must focus on the terminology '34 and language 
used by Eurocentrists in constructing dominance. However, unlike Afrocentrists, post-
structuralists resist speaking for others in a way that imposes the researcher's interests on 
their subjects in the drive for emancipation, because they believe that knowledge and 
identities are constantly changing. 135 
Used jointly, these three paradigms invite the researcher to interpret, critique and look 
below the surface for hidden meanings. Unlike the positivism paradigm, these three 
recognise the importance of subjectiveness. This mixed methodological approach works 
hand in hand with the notion of mixed government. In particular the support for the 
' state-behind-the-state' or the traditional domain is difficult to measure mathematically 
because it is based on an intangible form of authority. Thus, subjective methodologies are 
vital in understanding the interactions between the modern and traditional realms 136 
Intuition and the exercise of judgement based on participant observation or other reliable 
sources is indispensable. The extreme version of Afrocentricity is greatly flawed, but 
used moderately as a form of relativism it "requires the social scientist to represent the 
attitudes and values of human subjects faithfully regardless of their deviation from 
presumed universal norms". 137 Thus, as a methodological approach it holds great value in 
any study of Africa. Furthermore, Afrocentrism introduces a new range of research 
opportunities, which have previously been denigrated by Eurocentric scholars. One such 
133 Lather, "Gelting Smart", p. 14. 
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issue is the role of chiefs in modern states, who were previously regarded as a spent force 
in the era of modernisation and democratisation. 
In the next chapters the history of traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape Province of 
South Africa will be traced from 1900 to the present day. Although no chapter has been 
set aside to account for pre-colonial traditional forms of rule, these social structures will 
be referred to in discussion throughout the thesis, so as not to make Hegel's mistaken 
assumption that Africans are without history. Utilising varied secondary resources as well 
as primary resources in the form of archival documents, government publications, 
hansards, African National Congress CANC) and South African Communist Party 
CSACP) documents, newspaper articles and a number of unstructured interviews, I 
attempt to provide a sensitive and accurate account of the interactions between the state, 
chiefs and the people, concluding with a political analysis of contemporary events and its 
implications for democracy. Attention will not only be given to discourse at the national 
level to highlight the forces that condition the state' s behaviour to the chiefs, but also to 
local developments and cultural factors in order to understand the people's attitude to the 
chiefs. These overlap at times but emphasis will be placed on distinctions between 
provinces, and areas within provinces, in order to show that although chiefs possess 
"remarkable resilience enabling them to adapt to socio-cultural change and to play a 
crucial role in future social, economic and cultural transformations at regional and 
national levels,,, I38 they are largely subordinated by the current ANC-led Eastern Cape 
provincial government. 
138 E.A.B Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "Chiefs and States", p.41. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESERVES AND CHIEFLY AUTHORITY 
Segregationist Discourse 
Prior to 1910, colonial rulers manipulated the concepts of direct and indirect rule as a 
means of controlling the indigenous population of South Africa. This control aimed to 
secure not only a docile and obedient population, but also a secure and regular labour 
force for the mining and agricultural sectors. In so doing, colonialists made a number of 
intrusions into rural society. In order to understand how these intrusions were justified it 
is necessary to address the segregationist discourse at national level. It will be shown that 
the language of separate development gradually undermined concepts of direct rule in 
favour of a more indirect approach, which placed the institution of chieftainship at the 
fulcrum of colonial oppression. 
Indirect rule as devised by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria and other British 
administrators such as Sir Donald Cameron J39 was an administrative system in which 
indigenous rulers were used to control the local population. This form of rule was usually 
applied when limited resources (money and manpower) were available. Furthermore, the 
local context played an important role in its application; Northern Nigeria for example 
was suitable for indirect rule because its authority was highly centralised and functionally 
specific. This form of rule was seen as an instrument of change from "the entire decay of 
such tribal authority as may previously have existed" 140 In other words, change was 
enacted through the medium of traditionally recognised authorities, even if the authorities 
had to be artificially created on the model of centralised chiefdoms. Cameron formulated 
the main purpose of indirect rule namely, the education of the 'natives ' in the art of self-
government and administrative methods and procedures. In many ways, indirect rule was 
139 Sir Donald Cameron was the Governor of Nigeria and Tanganyika, and was a pupil of Lord Lugard. He 
advocated Lugard' s principles of indirect rule in his "Principles of Native Administration" issued to his 
staff. However, unlike Lugard who did not state clearly the ultimate political objectives of indirect rule, 
Cameron stressed the socio-economic development functions of Native Authorities and the importance of 
educating the natives in the art of self-government and administration. See Cameron, My Tanganyika 
Service and Some Nigeria. Washington: University Press of America. 1982 (1939). 
140 FD . Lugard, Th e Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. 
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used to justify military and economic ventures that may have led directly to confrontation 
with indigenous rulers. 141 Confrontation was avoided by ensuring that "the Native Chiefs 
are regarded as an integral part of the machinery of Government" through salaries and 
other benefits but were not deemed mere civil servants. In general, indirect rule was 
based on the thesis that residents/colonialists should "maintain and develop all that is best 
in the indigenous methods and institutions ... We must utilise the existing machinery and 
endeavour only to improve it, but always 'ruling ' through the chiefs and not simply 
'governing' by advice and consent,, 142 In theory, the main precondition of indirect rule 
was acquiescence by the people concerned; without acceptance, indirect rule constitutes 
direct rule. In contrast, a dual process usually enacts direct rule: first, conquer and 
second, exercise authority through a government, not traditionally recognised agents. 143 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone (1845-76) applied Lord Lugard ' s indirect rule to the 
indigenous population in Natal. The tribal system was initially blamed for the shortage of 
labour; however in the 1880's traditionalism became viewed as a vital element of racial 
domination. After crushing Zulu might, Theophilus Shepstone set up a House of Zulu 
controlled by field agents of the government. Due to the impact of missionary schools 
and the absorption of Africans into the cash sector of the economy, a westernised, 
educated class was formed which were potential economic and political rivals. Hence, 
traditionalism was seen as a 'cocoon'; a means of 'protecting' the Africans from forces 
that would lead them to question the colour-caste system. Natal segregationists such as 
Maurice Evans argued that in order to conserve the aesthetic qualities of African 
traditional life, it was vital that Africans develop separately as far as possible. Such 
arguments facilitated the development of reserves in which Africans were ' allowed' a 
degree of local self-government but were ultimately under the control of whites. 144 The 
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report of the South African Native Affairs Commission found that "the abolition of the 
tribal system and chieftainship is being left to time and evolution towards civilization, 
assisted by legislation where necessary". It concluded that it "was not desirable to 
dispense with the administrative use of chiefs". 145 
In contrast, the Transvaal (TVL) and Orange Free State (OFS) were particularly 
intolerant of tribal institutions. In 1891 President Reitz asserted that chieftaincy and the 
tribal system must be abolished in order to civilise South Africa. The trekkers regarded 
the tribe as a military and economic threat, and a direct counter to its Calvinist morality. 
However, Britain 's occupation of the TVL in 1877 ensured that a number of Natal 's key 
principles in African administration were applied. These included the recognition of 
traditional laws, habits and customs, which were deemed consistent with the general 
principles of civilisation. Local tribal authorities administered tribal funds and their 
submissiveness was a prerequisite for a degree of autonomy in local affairs. The 
realisation that they could only entrench themselves if they cooperated with government 
policies ultimately converted traditional leaders into government appointees. 146 
As in the former Boer Republics, the Cape colony placed emphasis on assimilation and 
the erosion of traditionalism. Native administration attempted to crush the power of the 
chiefs particularly the Xhosa and aimed to integrate the African indigenous population 
into the mining and industrial economy. In British Kaffraria, the policy as advocated by 
Sir George Grey was based on attempts to undermine the authority of the chiefs by 
introducing magistrates and by substituting customary law with Cape colonial law. This 
policy appeared plausible as traditional social structures had been substantially 
undermined by the cattle killing of 1857.147 Furthermore, the increased alienation of land 
145 Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission. Cape Town: 1943 -5. Paras 218, 233 ,296,308 
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and large-scale settlement of white farmers ensured that the potential threat of African 
mohilisation around the chiefs had been reduced. However, in 1883 it was clear that the 
chiefs and headmen continued to wield influence and customary law retained its 
authority. In addition, the Transkeian territories and British Bechuanaland, which were 
annexed to the Cape in 1895, appeared resistant to British attempts at recreating a 
'civilised ' identity due to the continued strength and presence of large cohesive tribes 
under powerful chiefs. Whites feared that these tribal entities were potential threats to 
security. Although "chieftainship was seen as the focal point around which disaffection 
might unite" , it was believed that any attempt to abolish the institution of chieftaincy 
would lead to a revolt. 148 As concluded by the Cape Government Commission on Native 
Laws and Customs "many of the existing Kafir laws and customs are so interwoven with 
the social conditions and ordinary institutions of the native population, especially in the 
recently annexed Territories, that any premature or violent attempt to break them down or 
sweep them away would be mischievous and dangerous in the highest degree, besides as 
experience has shown, defeating the object in view". 149 However, chieftainship was still 
regarded as an institution from which the Africans must be freed; hence, attempts were 
made to civilize the Africans through measures such as non-racial parliamentary 
franchise. 
Thus, the Cape colony attempted to control these new territories by means of indirect 
rule; Mfengu chiefs in particular, served as useful allies against the resistant chiefs of the 
Gcaleka, Mpondimise, Grigua, Thembu and Sotho in the various frontier wars l 50 
However, indirect rule was soon abandoned in favour of direct rule utilizing a council 
system under magistrates and headmen, much to the chagrin of a number of British 
colonialists. Lieutenant Governor Andries Stockenstrom in a letter to the Secretary of 
State for Colonies argued, "Every measure tending to lower the importance of the chiefs 
is calculated to weaken the hold we have on the people". At a meeting with the 
148 Welsh, "The Cultural Dimension",p. 35-36. C.C Crais, While Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-
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Lieutenant Governor, Stockenstrom argued that Britain must "gain the confidence of the 
chiefs and they, with the power of the Government and the efforts of the missionaries will 
influence the masses .. . These two forces combined (church and government) will not 
civilise unless they make the native chiefs the principal levers in the operations on their 
people". 151 
After the South African War and Union in 1910 attempts were made to exercise a more 
centralised and elaborate form of social control over the Africans in a common 'native 
policy' so as to cater for the booming mining industry. Gold, which was discovered in 
1886 and diamonds in 1867 fuelled a labour-intensive industry, which stimulated the 
steady growth of manufacturing. It is in the context of this labour shortage that 
segregationist discourse gained force. Segregationists argued that Africans must develop 
separately as far as possible, thereby placing restrictions on the permanent settlement of 
Africans in white areas and facilitating the development of reserves. The reserves had 
two main functions namely, to act as reservoirs oflabour and to provide standing excuses 
for withholding civic rights from Africans. These strategies were intended to eliminate 
squatting and to elicit a greater supply of labour for white agriculture while 
simultaneously undermining the foundations of peasant production and potential 
competition to white farmers. By overburdening the reserVes, Africans were forced to 
seek employment outside these areas in order to subsist, in so doing facilitating a cheap 
labour supply. 
In addition, segregation laid down measures whereby the flow of African labour was 
regulated and induced for example via pass laws, Cape Masters and Servants Law and the 
191 1 Native Labour Regulation ActlS2 Furthermore, it was assumed that segregation 
would counter calls for racial equality, as different people could not expect to be equal. In 
the 1917 parliamentary debates Prime Minister General Louis Botha rejected racial 
equality on the grounds that Africans could develop on their own lines, and vote in their 
151 Cited in I.B. Tabata, The All African Convention: The Awakening if A People. Johannesburg: People's 
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own territories on matters directly affecting them. Nationalist Party leader General J.B.M 
Hertzog described the educated African who tried "to force his society on the white man" 
as "nothing but a traitor to his own kith and kin". 153 
In 1910 the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was created with the merger of three of 
the four colonial agencies (OFS had abolished its NAD in 1905). The NAD became the 
main government agency responsible for native administration. Although it was weak and 
fragmented it had extensive autonomy under the South African Coalition government 
(South African Party and Unionist Party). Initially English speaking officials from the 
Cape dominated the NAD; as a result, its members regarded themselves as secular 
missionaries responsible for protecting Africans as wards of the state. This liberal 
segregationist trend was reflected in the Native Affairs Act of 1920, which created an all-
white Native Affairs Commission to advise authorities on matters involving Africans. In 
addition, it created a Native Conference at which government-appointed Africans from 
rural and urban areas met annually to discuss matters relevant to Africans. Furthermore, 
this Act extended Local Councils, as envisaged by the Glen Grey Act of 1894, beyond 
the Eastern Cape. In the urban areas, Africans were given a location advisory boards 
through which they could voice their grievances. 154 
These consultative structures were the way in which the government responded to the 
growing crisis in the rural and urban areas. After World War One rising food prices, low 
wages and increasing job discrimination temporarily galvanised African workers, 
particularly on the Witwatersrand. In the countryside, the population suffered from 
outbreaks of smallpox, typhoid, cholera, drought, plant and animal diseases and threats to 
food and stock production. In other words, the central government attempted to use 
moderate African nationalists as intermediaries to offset the rising tension and resistance; 
the various African councils and conferences facilitated dialogue at local level to 
moderate racial tension, and provided opportunities for Africans to lobby for limited 
153 Cited in Welsh, "The Cultural Dimension",p. 40. 
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political and economic rights. 155 However, these reforms were an inadequate means of 
solving the racial conflict that was flourishing in the urban areas between white and black 
unskilled labourers competing on a limited labour market. 
Increasing urbanisation among the black population raised the levels of radicalisation and 
militancy particularly amongst the youth, which found expression in Clements Kadalie's 
Industrial and Commercial Worker' s Union (lCU). In the 1922 Rand Revolt, white 
workers placed pressure on government to enact legislation that guaranteed their superior 
position on the labour market. Increasingly these developments led politicians to regard 
traditionalism as vital in controlling the youth and maintaining the master-slave 
relationship, which had previously informed all racial relations . In 1924 at the Governor 
General's Native Conference Mr Dube argued, "Nowadays the Chiefs are figureheads 
with no authority and the parents had still less authority over their children ... The only 
way to enable parents to control their children was by adjusting the relations between the 
people and their Chiefs".156 The South African Native Economic Commission of 1932 
reiterated this conclusion: " ... in the larger matter of youths absconding from their homes 
and going to towns, against which the Natives complain bitterly all over the Union, the 
Chief could again fulfil a similar useful purpose ... this evil can only be cured by co-
operation between the administration and the Native Chief and his Council" . 157 
In general, politicians divided Africans into two distinct classes. As Senator Roberts 
argued in the Select Committee on the Native Bills, "There is the old native living in his 
tribal ways with very little of the goings or moving of the political or outside world. He is 
quite content, so long as he is left alone, to live his life decently and quietly. Then there is 
'SS Ibid, p. 243. 
"6 Document 39b: "Proceedings and Resolutions of the Governor-General's Native Conference" (1924). 
published in S. Johns, "Volume 1: Protest and Hope 1882-1934" in T. Karis and G.M Carter (eds), From 
Protest to Challenge. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1977: 168. Dube was the founder and editor of the 
first Zulu newspaper, Jlanga and he became the first chairman of the ANC in 1912. He also served on the 
Native Representative Council. He was concerned with the issue of chieftaincy because the ANC was using 
the chiefs as a means of mobilising popular support and financial aid (See next chapter). Dube also had a 
p,ersonal interest in the issue of chieftaincy as he was a royal member of the Ngcobo tribe. 
57 Cited in M. Neocosmos. Towards a History a/Nationalities in Southern Africa. Working Paper. 
Denmark: Center for Development Research. 1995: 10. 
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the educated native, the detribalised native, the town native ... "IS8 Educated Africans 
were described as "detribalised, Europeanised, chockfull of ideas and emotions which are 
quite alien to the ordinary native, seeking progress entirely on the lives of the 
European ... Many of these people have drunk very deeply of the wine of European 
demagogy, and they spew it all over the country to unsettle the native mind". He further 
argued that the integrationist Cape tradition had "forced the native in the Cape to take a 
far greater interest in politics. There he follows the footsteps of the white man, whereas in 
Zululand his political view is in another direction altogether and will be so for a hundred 
years to come".IS9 These sentiments were echoed in the parliamentary debate on the 
Native Administration Bill in 1927. The tribal system was described as a stabilising force 
among the Africans. Regrets were expressed that past policy (particularly Cape policy) 
had weakened the power of the chief and it was hoped that chiefs would be reinstated to 
positions of dignity and utility. 
The 1927 Native Administration Act provided qualified recognition to African law and 
custom including customary courts, marriage rites and the lobolo system. In addition, 
chiefs were re-empowered and the Governor General was vested with the powers of the 
Supreme Chief over all Africans. In other words, the governor-general could rule by 
proclamation and decisions were not subject to challenge by the judiciary. 160 Custom in 
the official sense was "interpreted by the courts to mean the custom of the most 
reactionary sections of the community and to reject the formation of more progressive 
(and less narrowly tribal) customs born of changed living patterns". 161 It was emphasised 
that traditionalism must be conserved to protect Africans from the ' demoralizing' force of 
social change; however, the fact that social change had already undermined the socio-
economic base oftraditional society was ignored. 
This Act had two mam functions : first, to refurbish African traditionalism with an 
emphasis on ethnic and cultural separatism and second, to reverse the assimilationist 
158 Cited in Welsh, "The Cultural Dimension",p. 41. 
159 Ibid, p. 42. 
160 H. Rogers. Native Administration in the Union of South Africa. South Africa: Government Printer, 
1949:18-1 9. 
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trend of gradually accepting urban Africans into western industrialised society.162 As 
argued above, this notion of segregation served the interests of capital by providing it 
with labour whilst simultaneously attempting to appease the white sector by reversing the 
process of urbanisation. In general, whites had their bread buttered on both sides: "they 
received the benefit of African labour but spurned Africans as potential co-equals in a 
common society, justifying this repudiation with an ostensible concern for their 
traditions". 163 
Despite the expressed intent of the government, little was done to accord greater 
recognition to the chiefs. Chiefs were re-empowered officially by the 1927 Act, but in 
reality they were still largely excluded from the local system of administration. 
According to one observer, the government's reluctance to give further power to the 
chiefs was "probably owing to the fear of giving Bantu nationalism such free play that it 
will refuse to be reconciled with European interests" 164 Although a direct system of rule 
was still in place, the discourse of indirect rule was gaining force. Chiefs were gradually 
drawn into the state structure through informal alliances with the petty bourgeoisie and 
state officials against an increasingly volatile peasant population. Furthermore, chiefs 
were increasingly invited to act as representatives of the African voice in conferences and 
. . h h 165 meetmgs Wit t e government. 
Nevertheless, the Native Administration Act signalled a new era as most liberal 
segregationist measures were abandoned. Annual Native Conferences were virtually 
abandoned after 1927, although one was held in 1930 and several regional gatherings 
were held in 1935 to consider the Hertzog Native Bills. The all-white Native Affairs 
Commission was internally divided by the 1920's and had little impact. Urban Advisory 
Boards had no power to affect changes. No more local councils were established between 
1920 and 1926 although more were established after the council's authority was curtailed 
1' 1 Neocosmos, "Towards a History",p. 10. 
1'2 Neocosmos, "Towards a History", p. 19. 
163 Welsh, "The Cultural Dimension",p. 43. 
164 Ibid, p.44. 
165 W. Beinart and C. Bundy. Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987: 
216. 
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by Act 27 of 1926. The Liberal segregationist NAD was rejected in favour of a more 
centralised, bureaucratic NAD under a Minster of Native Affairs. As a result, it was 
restructured into an agency of social control to repress dissent, promote cultural ethnicity 
and to distance Africans from the white political and legal system. In general, the NAD 
was "stripped of its Cape legacy and reorganised to meet the needs of a segregationist 
state" 1 66 
It is important to note that the Cape politicians refused to forfeit their liberal legacy. Cape 
Africans remained on the common voters' role, and hence had a degree of political clout. 
Furthermore, they did not have to carry passes, could buy property anywhere in the 
province and were not subject in theory to regulations imposed on Africans in segregated 
rural and urban locations. 167 Africans in the Cape were not subject to the' Supreme Chief 
proclamation under the 1927 Act because the policy of the Cape government (except as 
regards British Bechuanaland) was to break down rather than perpetuate the tribal 
system. Consequently, African chiefs were never officially recognised as possessing any 
special administrative or judicial powers over their tribesmen. Hence, in these 
circumstances it was believed that it would give rise to difficulties and complications if 
the executive powers enjoyed by the governor-general as Supreme Chief were to be 
extended to the Cape Province. 168 
However, Cape Africans were denied the vote and forbidden to buy land outside the 
reserves by Hertzog' s Representation of Natives Act and Native Trust and Land Act, 
which were finally enacted after several failed attempts in 1936. The Native Trust and 
Land Act created a new department namely, the South African Trust, which could 
purchase and maintain control over all land obtained exclusively for Africans. In 
addition, it enlarged the reserves in theory by 7.25 million morgen (15.33 million acres) 
until they constituted 13.7% of South Africa's total land area. Lastly, it envisaged a more 
166 Switzer, "Power and Resistance",p. 221. 
167 Ibid, p. 196-199. 
168 Rogers, "Native Administration",p. 18. 
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active role for the central government in terms of land conservation and resettlement in 
the reserves. 169 
In 1934, Smuts and Hertzog formed the United Party Government in which Hertzog fIlled 
the role of Prime Minister and Smuts became his deputy. However, this alliance 
dissolved over the issue of entry into World War Two. Hertzog's neutral stance was 
rejected by parliament with the result that he resigned from the position of Prime Minister 
and merged with dissident Afrikaner nationalists under Daniel Malan to form the 
opposing Reunited National Party in Jan 1940.170 Under Smuts, the South African 
government gradually adopted a reformist trend . Although social welfare and educational 
benefIts remained unequal, leading politicians including PM Smuts, Minister of Native 
affairs Colonel Deneys Reitz and Minister of Finance, J.H. Hofmeyer questioned the 
basic tenets of racial policy. The proposition that Africans should develop on their own 
lines in their own areas was described as ' that worn out expression' . The Social and 
Economic Planning Council's report rejected the artifIcial perpetuation of traditionalism 
and insisted that areas "must not be held back from progress through inertia or a mistaken 
desire not to intervene where a Chief is a defInite hindrance to progress" . 17l 
Consequently, segregationist policies were gradually relaxed; government approved the 
Atlantic Charter, and began to recognise African trade unions l72 However after the 
defeat of the Smuts government in 1948 it was clear that the reformist trends would be 
reversed and indirect rule reinvigorated. 
1925-1935 was the 'heyday' of Indirect Rule in Britain ' s African territories, which was 
seen as a pragmatic response to administrative needs, but the rise of African nationalism 
forced Britain to abandon this policy. In contrast, the National Party utilised indirect rule 
to suit its own racial and capitalist needs. After 1948 elective forms of local government 
were replacing Indirect Rule across Africa, but in South Africa it was being entrenched 
through the chiefs as a means of neutralising rising African political militancy. In order to 
169 Switzer, "Fower and Resistance",p. 199. 
110 Southall, "South Africa's Tnmskei",p. 30. 
111 Welsh, "The Cultural Dimension", p. 44. 
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understand the factors at local level that prompted this move to indirect rule, it is 
necessary to look at the changing dynamics of peasant communities in response to 
increased state intrusions. 
State Intrusions in the Eastern Cape 
The history of the colonialists in the Eastern Cape is one characterised by ignorance of 
chiefly power and tradition. In 1772 southward-moving Xhosa met northward moving 
colonialists from the Cape across the Fish River. Major General Dundas acting as 
governor at the end of the eighteenth century, attempted to end hostilities "by conciliatory 
means, by ambassadors, by presents, and by promises, to endeavour to impress the king 
or great chief of the Kafir nation with confidence that the government wished to maintain 
peace". 173 This plan was repugnant to the chiefs because each chief was an independent 
ruler and the power relationships between the chiefs were relatively equal and not based 
on subordination or super-ordination. In 1817, Lord Charles Somerset made the same 
mistake by acknowledging Ngqika as the supreme authority through whom internal 
control could be established. This 'blunder' led to the fifth frontier war. 174 
A further strategy involved enlisting the support of Mfengu chiefs against hostile 
Rharhabe chiefs in exchange for protection and land. Once again, this plan demonstrated 
ignorance of the value placed on land and territorial independence. Former chiefly allies 
were paid a salary and were allowed to rule the indigenous population according to 
custom but they remained accountable to a magistrate. In 1846 Lieutenant General 
Peregrine Maitland announced that "no chieftainship shall hereafter be recognised in 
British Kaffirland". On. 23 December 1847, Harry Smith l75 proclaimed British Kaffraria 
a British Sovereignty in the presence of all the chiefs in the area. He made each chief 
173 Theal cited in D.M. Groenewald, "The Administrative System in the Ciskei" in Charton (ed), Oskei: 
Econimics and Politics a/Dependence in a South A/rican Homeland London: Hurst & Co. 1980: 83. 
174 D. M. Groenewald, "The Administrative System in the Ciskei", p. 83. 
175 Harry Smith (28.6.1787 - 12.10.1860). After serving in South and North America he was sent to the 
Cape of Good Hope in 1829. At the outbreak ofthe Sixth Frontier War in 1834, he was sent to the Eastern 
Cape. He was placed in charge of the new province of Queen Adelaide with headquarters in King 
Williamstown. (Standard Encyclopedia o/Southern A/rica. Vol 10. South Aftica: Nasau Limited. 1974: 9-
10). 
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touch the staff of peace or the staff of war or kiss his foot. On 7 January 1848 he made 
them take another oath promising to cease the practice of witchcraft, abolish polygamy 
and obey all the orders of the High Commissioner in his capacity as Great Chief and 
representative of the Queen. In 1850 Harry Smith deposed Sandile, the Chief of the Gaika 
and replaced him by a European, Charles Brownlee, yet again leading to chiefly 
resistance. Such 'follies ' fuelled eight frontier wars. 176 
Prior to the mid 19th century the lands across the river Kei, north of the Cape colony and 
south of Natal were viewed as belonging to ' independent' chiefs such as Kaku and 
Hintsa. From the 1850's, the Cape began to extend its influence into this territory as well. 
Initially this occurred indirectly as missionaries and agents encouraged trade or 
intervened in chiefly disputes. However, from the 1870's direct attempts were made to 
conquer and capture land for the colony. Fingoland, which was populated by the Mfengu, 
was confiscated from the Gcaleka chief after the 1856/7 cattle killing. Gcalekaland, 
Thembuland, Emigrant Thembuland, East Griqualand and Pondoland were annexed in 
the years that followed. Unlike British Kaffraria, which was annexed to the Cape colony 
in 1866, the Transkeian territories were administered separately from the Colony proper. 
The local council system, which was explicitly designed for these territories, became the 
basis ofa system of 'indirect rule'. This was motivated by the Cape colony'S inability or 
unwillingness to admit the Transkei into the full colonial system, the segregationist 
policy of freezing African areas in the form of reserves and local resistance177 Earl Grey 
argued with regard to the Gold Coast (Ghana) that it was best "to preserve whatever is 
capable of being rendered useful in the existing customs and institutions of the people" 
and in Western Pondoland the best policy was "to govern the several Kafl[ 
tribes . .. through their respective chiefs,,178 Although the chiefs received salaries the 
176 D.M. Groenewald, "The Administrative System in the Ciskei", p. 83-84. c.C.S Holdt, "Constitutional 
DeVelopment" in Ciskei: A Bantu Homeland-A Generol Survey. Fort Hare: Fort Hare University. 1971 : 
200-204. 
171 An example of this segregationist policy is the Royal/Crown reserve. It was a six hundred square mile 
triangle of land from King Williamstown to the Amatole Mountains in which Africans were forced to live 
in villages of not more than two hundred huts (Crais, "White Supremacy and Black Resistance" ,po 197). 
Beinart and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles" ,po 5-6. 
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governor did not aim to erode the existing power of chiefs nor 'suddenly' attempt to 
"anglicise his whole system of Government ... but rather to respect the Chief and "hold 
him responsible as a vassal of the Crown". Until 'civilization' had spread through 
Western Xhosaland, it was best "to govern the chief and his people through him" . 179 
Hence, the British colonialists used African allies to secure control, rather than by 
directly appropriating land. In the first half of the 19th century, Xhosa groups were 
defeated on the settler frontier. During the period of 1877 -81 armed resistance was led by 
chiefs from the Mpondimise, Griqua, Thembu and Sotho tribes with support from the 
independent Eastern Mpondo paramount. The continued resistance forced colonialists to 
seek out intermediaries who came in the form of Mfengu chiefs. In the 1860' s the 
Mfengu collaborated with the British in exchange for land formerly under Gcaleka's 
control. After the 1877-81 rebellions, the Mfengu received new locations and their chiefs 
were promoted to headmanship positions. The rebels on the other hand, had land 
confiscated and their chiefs were removed. 180 
However, at the turn of the century the political balance in Transkeian territories began to 
shift and former 'allies' were no longer favoured. As colonial rule became more 
extensive and bureaucratic, individual alIiances with 'loyal' chiefs were no longer 
necessary. Furthermore, as colonial policy became more direct and structured in order to 
increase and regulate the supply of migrant workers to the mines, peasant agriculture 
declined due to the rise in taxes, shortage of arable plots and restricted access to 
markets. 181 With regard chieftaincy, the policies of Sir George Grey l82 dominated both 
British Kaffraria and the Transkeian Territories. Sir George Grey was a committed 
reformist; he believed that direct rule, which abolished 'barbarian' customs would 'save' 
179 Crais, "White Supremacy and Black Resistance" ,p. 199. 
180 Beinart and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles",p. 7-9. 
1'1 Ibid, p.9-10. 
182 Sir George Grey (14/4/1812 - 20/9/1898) became the Cape Governor in 1854. He was allegedly highly 
esteemed by the Maori chiefs while he was the Governor of New Zealand (1845). He used this experience 
to pacify the chiefs in the Eastern Cape and in the Orange Free State. He mediated between President 
Boschoff of the Orange Free State and Moshesh, the Basotho chief. Britain eventually lost faith in him after 
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the African. He tried to 'civilise' British Kaffraria by establishing schools and missions, 
encouraging the growth of an African working class and by undermining the role of 
chiefs. Under Grey' s policies, only the senior son of the royal house was assured of 
becoming a chief. In 1858 Grey specified that only eleven chiefs would receive salaries. 
Furthermore, payment of councillors no longer went via the chief but were modified in 
the form of direct payments, thereby, destroying the chiefs ability to engage in patronage 
politics and undermining the practices of redistribution and reciprocity in pre-colonial 
societies. In general, former chiefs found themselves degraded into 'petty headmen' . 
According to Crais, "not only did Grey's policies greatly curtail the expansIOn of 
chieftainship ... Chiefs now had far less control over the economic activities of 
commoners. This loss of control chipped away at their power, but it also threatened the 
issues of consent between a chief and his adherents" .183 However, it will be shown that 
although chiefs lost official power, their popular legitimacy increased as rural dwellers 
rallied around them to offset the effects of increased state interventions. As Beinart and 
Bundy argue, "the colonial state had considerably hemmed back certain of the tributary 
powers exercised by chiefs - powers which had not always been willingly accepted by 
commoners. Nevertheless, some of the political processes and notions of legitimacy 
surrounding chieftaincy remained firmly embedded". 184 
Although class boundaries were neither rigid nor clearly defined, at this stage four 
different social groups dominated African society in the Cape. First, members of the 
educated elite who were placed in leading positions in mission churches, and received 
high salaries and secure positions. This elite stemmed mainly from the petty bourgeoisie, 
which in the Cape included members in key professions (ordained ministers, qualified 
teachers, physicians, Nurses, journalists and lawyers), students in mission schools and at 
Fort Hare college, certain categories of wage earners (especially court entrepreneurs, 
policemen, skilled clerks and artisans), some self-employed persons (owners of lodging 
houses, affluent traders etc), semi-commercial and fully commercial farmers and others 
with access to wealth and power. These people were mainly members of the voting 
183 Crais, "White Supremacy and Black Resistance",p. 203. 
'84 Beinart and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles",p. 16. 
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community, who maintained alliances with the state, sought the extension of the franchise 
and assumed Britain would intervene in South Africa in their favour. 185 
Second, members of old loyal communities, often Christians, peasants, transport riders 
and workers in small towns who had to sustain a highly commoditised lifestyle but were 
unable to sustain production due to restricted markets and increased taxation. Third, 
traditional leaders, hereditary chiefs and headmen, who were internally divided as a 
group. Some became members of the new elite, were educated and increasingly brought 
into a collaborationist relationship with the state. Others became symbols of resistance to 
their communities. Fourth, the majority of the rural dwellers in the Transkei districts 
(except Fingoland and Emigrant Thembuland) who were cautious traditionalists . They 
rejected assimilationist ideology and regarded cattle, land and chieftaincy as symbols 
against an increasingly intrusive state. 186 
By the 1920's Cape rural society was riddled with high poverty, growing unrest, and 
large-scale labour migrancy. As headmen had become greatly delegitimised and rejected 
by their communities, they could no longer contain the resistance in their communities 
and could no longer exact a regular labour flow to the mines. Hence, the magistrates 
attempted to reformulate their control in their districts by effectively co-opting chiefs into 
the council system. In other words, "finding that the people were obedient to their chiefs, 
the government permitted the chiefs to remain, but it has attempted to changed the work 
of the chief, so that, instead of being the father of his people, he has become the 
policeman of government". 187 The development of the Bungal88 and the restitution of 
certain powers to chiefs during the segregationist era of the 1920's and 1930's led to the 
185 Switzer, "Power and Resistance",p.247. The development of this emerging elite can largely be 
attributed to the high levels of education in the Eastern Cape. In 192034.9% of the African population in 
the Cape Province was educated. The cape government earmarked 76.5% of government aid for African 
schools. Furthermore, the cape Province contained 59% of African schools, 60.9% of African pupils and 
63.5% of African teachers in South Africa. The curriculum in white and black schools was virtually the 
same although at the lower primary level instruction was in the vernacular. 
186 Beinart and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles" ,p.ll. 
187 Document 66: A.M Maliba. "The Conditions of the Venda People," pamphlet issued by the nm District 
Committee of the Communist Parly. Dec 1939. Published in South African Communists Speak. London: 
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emergence of a coalition of chiefs, semor headmen and educated commoners as 
bureaucratic elite. As will be shown this alienated the institution of chieftaincy from the 
liberation movement around which it had initially rallied . 
In order to understand the shifting and often ambiguous role played by the chiefs, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the nature of the state intrusions into Cape rural society 
based primarily on an extensive administrative structure. 
Local Administration 
In 1866 British Kaffraria became an integral part of the Cape colony. Thereafter only 
colonial laws received official recognition to the exclusion of Native law and custom. In 
1877, the Transkeian territories were annexed. Although the policy in this area was to 
gradually replace Native chiefs by European magistrates, Native custom and law was to 
be always used in civil cases. In 1886 this was replaced by a special Transkeian Penal 
code, which was applied to both blacks and whites. 189 
Ciskei (British Kaffraria) was chosen as the site of an experiment in detribalisation and 
local administration, which came in the form of the Glen Grey Bill, although Cecil 
Rhodes emphasised that he hoped to extend this bill to the Transkei up to the Zambezi 
River because "it is a Native Bill for Africa. You are sitting in judgement of Africa" . 190 
This bill was formulated to provide Africans with district councils "to employ their minds 
on simple questions in connection with local affairs ... to remove them from a life of sloth 
and laziness (and to) teach them the dignity of labour,,191 The Glen Grey Bill had three 
main concerns namely taxation, land tenure and local administration. By introducing a 
new ten-shilling district rate and a ten-shilling labour tax alongside the hut tax, Rhodes 
hoped to relieve the Cape government of the cost of administrating the African territories . 
In addition, this Bill attempted to introduce individual land tenure in order to limit the 
'" The Bunga was the United Territories General Council formed in 1931, which had its roots in the 
Transkeian Territories General Council established in 1903. For further details see next section. 
'" I.L Evans. Native Policy in Southern Africa: An Outline . . Cambridge:Cambridge University. 1934: 4. 
190 Cited in Beinan and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles", p. 139. 
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class of food producers and to force others onto the labour market. These two tenets were 
met with great resistance and were finally abandoned. In contrast, the local administration 
system was enforced until the 1950' s in the face of great peasant resistance. In 
In 1894 the first District Council was formed in Glen Grey. In 1897, district councils 
were created in the districts of Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo, which were 
united in the Transkeian General Council. In 1899 the district of Kentani entered the 
system. This system was further extended to seven districts of Tembuland and East 
Griqualand in 1903 and the name of the larger body was changed to the "Transkeian 
Territories General Council" which met annually in Umtata. Eventually the Transkeian 
Territories General Council included the districts of Butterworth, Elliotdale, Engcoba, 
Idutywa, Kentani, Matatiele, Mount Ayliff, Mount Fletcher, Mount Frere, Mqanduli, 
Nqamakwe, Qumbu, St. Marks, Isolo, Isomo, Umtata, Umzimkulu, Willowvale and 
Xalanga. In 1911 the district system was extended to Libode, Ngqueleni and Port St 
Johns in Western Pondoland then to Bizana, Flagstaff, Lusikisiki and Tabankulu in 
Eastern Pondoland. In 1931 , the United Transkeian Territories General Council was 
formed. This council included one hundred and eight members, thirty of whom were ex 
officio members and the remainder were elected. The ex officio members included 
twenty-six magistrates, three Paramount Chiefs from Thembuland, Eastern and Western 
Pondoland. Officials felt that the Transkeian Bunga had been reasonably successful in 
controlling African expression so in the face of increased conflict in the urban areas after 
World War One, it was deemed desirable to extend the council system. The Native 
Affairs Act of 1920 provided for the extension of the council system to all African 
communities. District councils were established in the Tamacha district of King 
Williamstown and in Middledrift in 1926, and in Peddie and Victoria East in 1927. In 
1928, they were established in Keiskammahoek, followed by Herschel in 1930 and East 
London in 1932. In 1934 the Ciskeian General Council was formed. 193 
191 Cited in Tabata, "The All-African Convention",p. 106. 
192 Beinart and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles",p. 139. 
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Districts were divided into locations. Each location was placed under the control of a 
board of four people, which included three nominated members and a headman. Each 
group of locations nominated one person who sat on the District Council, which was 
overseen by the Magistrate. The role of the Magistrate was to collect taxes, supervise 
welfare payments, dispense justice according to law, link districts and departmental 
authorities, supervise the allocation of land, arbitrate boundary disputes, quell unrest, 
report disruptive elements to higher authorities and supervise the headman. 194 
In this system of direct rule, headmen were key figures. The cattle killing of 1855-57 led 
to the imprisonment of leading chiefs. Only those chiefs who were conspicuously loyal to 
the colonial state were appointed as headmen, such as Toise, Tshatshu, Siwana, Tyali, 
Anta and Kama. Headmen were generally appointed with a link to the chiefly hierarchy. 
According to Lewis "it is therefore impossible to draw a line between traditional leaders 
and paid headmen" 195 However, although many collaborative chiefs came to constitute 
the office of headmanship the institution of chieftainship remained largely untarnished, as 
it was still associated with resistance against the colonial overlords. In contrast, headmen 
were regarded as the instrument of alien control and vital actors in the conquest and 
consolidation of colonial rule. Hence, the office of headmanship "was always regarded as 
distinct and separate from the structure of chieftaincyn l96 
In terms of the consolidation of colonial rule, headmen were instrumental in extending 
the power of the Cape government into the rural areas. In the council system, headmen 
were in theory elected by the people but this was subject to ratification by the white 
authority, which also had the power to dismiss recalcitrant headmen. Headmen were the 
only officials in the village who were recognised and paid by the Department of Native 
Affairs. Their duties included surveillance over land and hut occupancy, livestock 
movement, tax registration and collection, soil rehabilitation, demarcation, forest 
194 Groenewald, "The Administrative Syslem",p.86 . Southall, "South Africa's Transkei",p.88. 
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maintenance, dispute resolution and policing. 197 In general, headmen constituted an 
alternative local agency to the chief and an unofficial police force. In other words, 
headmen "formed the front-line echelons of Transkeian administration ... without them 
the implementation of the policy of direct rule would have been impossible, or at least 
extremely difficult".198 In the Ciskei General Council debates, a headman was described 
as "the man in the location. If he was living in town we would call him the Mayor of the 
town". 199 
In general, headmen were deemed the arm of government in the rural areas, but were also 
expected to represent the people. This ambiguous role is clear in Councillor Mahonga's 
testimony that 
"government headmen occupy a very responsible position, and the Government 
looks to them in many matters. They represent the magistrate of Native 
commissioner of a district in many respects, particularly in matters affecting the 
people with whom they reside, matters in which the Native Commissioner can do 
nothing or very little unless he has the support and advice of the headmen. That 
applies equally to the people who cannot do anything except through the headmen 
to be in attendance with those people at the office,,200 
In other words, the role of the headmen is to act as "a medium of our own colour between 
the people and the government,,201 It is clear that this placed headmen in an ambiguous 
position; they were expected to enforce unpopular state policies amongst the people they 
represented and were directly subject to. As one headmen complained, "If there is some 
instruction from Government that I must make known to my people, they always suspect 
me of working together with the Native Commissioner and of being in sympathy with the 
Government and opposed to their interests" 202 It will be argued that this position 
ultimately favoured the chiefs. Many chiefs exploited local disputes to activate popular 
197 For an extensive list of headmen's duties see Monica Wilson, Selma Kaplan, Therasa Maki and Edith 
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opinion in their favour and against the headmen. This is evident in Qumbu in 1912 and 
1913 where fighting broke out against the local headman. In Fingoland, Elliotdale and 
Kentani districts "the people have denounced the headmen as men who have sold 
h I fi ·· ,, 203 t emse ves to government or an Illcrease III pay . 
In the Transkei, the emerging elite initially perceived the council system as a threat to 
their interests. For example in Qumbu, Tsolo, Glen Grey, Xalanga and Idutywa 
opposition was voiced mainly by Christian, educated and relatively prosperous members 
of society between 1902 and 1906204 In response the state made strategic allowances. In 
1906 it allowed for wider electoral participation. Ratepayers (mainly landowners) in each 
electoral ward met to elect three representatives. These representatives would meet with 
men from other wards to select four of their number to accompany two government 
nominees on the District Council. Finally, they would elect three representatives to sit on 
the Bunga. Hence, the council system favoured men of local affiuence and influence2 05 
As a result, the council system gained the support of the middle class in both the Transkei 
and Ciskei. In the Ciskei educated men welcomed the council system because they 
believed that great benefit would accrue from the local ten shilling tax paid by all in the 
shape of much improved local services in terms of roads, dipping facilities, hospitals, 
agricultural extensions and schools206 According to Groenewald, the council system was 
regarded as legitimate because the councils accommodated the educated elite, there was a 
high rate of delivery and the long period of subordination to the colonial authority and 
economy had rendered traditional authorities redundant. 207 
However, the council system did not receive the support of the peasants because they 
could not afford the additional tax, believed that better services would be monopolised by 
progressives and believed that the council was a 'puppet government' or a 'dummy 
203 Beinart and Bundy, "Hidden Struggles",p. 127,145. 
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council,' which would further intervene into rural life208 They were not opposed to 
change but wanted some control over the nature and pace of this change. The new elite 
attributed this conservative attitude to the negative influence of the chiefs. This is evident 
in J. Tengo Jabavu's testimony before the Select Committee on Native Affairs on 15 June 
1920. He argued in favour of the councils "because they will help to improve the 
conditions of the natives, because they will be managing their own affairs". He thus 
argued that the councils should be imposed upon the people if need be because they were 
overly influenced by the chiefs who "think they are going to lose power, and I know that 
they have that fear. It was always the fear from the beginning that certain powers would 
be taken away from them" 209 
In general the district councils and the Bunga were ineffective administrative bodies. 
They had limited control over matters affecting public health, sanitation, hospitals, 
afforestation and education and were further hampered by insufficient finances 210 In 
general, these bodies were unable to cope financially and politically with the problems 
arising from the increased impoverishment of the reserves and the consequent resistance 
from the people and the chiefs. 
The Impoverishment of the Reserves 
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According to Unterhalter, "the exercise of power flows from the conquest of land,, 211 For 
the Africans, conquest had three main consequences namely, loss of national autonomy, 
deprivation of the more productive portions of their land and encapsulation in reserved 
areas. Prior to the 20th century, many Africans in the Eastern Cape were forced to live in 
the Royal/Crown Reserve. In the 20th century the boundaries in the reserves were fixed 
by two main pieces of legislation namely the 1913 Natives Land Act and the 1936 Native 
Trust and Land Bill. The 1913 Native Land Act scheduled existing African areas as 
reserves and prohibited Africans from purchasing land outside the scheduled territory. In 
addition, this Act extended territorial segregation from the Cape and Natal to the Orange 
Free State and Transvaal. In total, 7.3% of the total land area of the Union was set aside 
for African occupation. 
Cape Africans were theoretically excluded from the provisions of the Land Act but the 
size of the reserves was still determined by government-appointed bodies. Between 1913 
and 1936 Africans could buy land anywhere in Cape because property transactions 
between blacks and whites were still legal. Nevertheless they lost more land than they 
acquired; Africans in debt were forced to sell farms to white farmers in districts like 
Cathcart, Kangha and Stutterheim. In 1922 a further seven and a half morgen (2.12 acres) 
of land were released, and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act allocated 13 .7% of the 
Union land surface for African occupation. This Act amplified anti-squatting provisions 
and established a Native Trust to buy up land in 'released areas ' to be occupied and 
farmed by Africans under stringent conditions. This Act restricted Cape Africans from 
buying land outside African reserves. By 1949 only about 43 197 morgen (91 578 acres) 
of land were still owned by Africans in the Ciskei; 37% of what they had owned in 
1916.212 By restricting African ownership of the land, these legislative measures not only 
stunted black agricultural development but also reduced the size of the population that the 
land could sustain, thereby increasing the proletarianisation of the peasantry. 
211 D.Unterhalter, "Legitimate Expectation and the Law of the Chiefs" in Christina Murray and Catherine 
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Numerous taxes, commoditisation and nSlllg poverty assisted such legislation in 
accelerating proletarianisation. Taxes such as the hut tax which placed a ten shilling tax 
on all married men, were imposed during or immediately after a series of ecological 
disasters during the 1890's and early 1900's; these included drought, locusts, famine, and 
a rinderpest epidemic (1896-97). As cattle was the embodiment of wealth, the rinderpest 
epidemic in particular, led to the mass bankruptcy of African societies. Hence, it became 
socially necessary to work for money to restock herds, as a substitute for cattle in 
bridewealth payments and to pay the taxes. The Native Tax Act of 1925 placed a tax on 
all married men eighteen years and older; this included a twenty shilling general tax and a 
ten shillings local tax each year for each residence owned or occupied. Increased 
commoditisation heightened the need for people to purchase consumer goods thereby 
reinforcing the need for Africans to leave the reserves in search of employment. In the 
face of a desperate need for money, contracts and recruiting agencies, Africans had little 
choice but to join the throngs of migrant labourers heading to the Transvaal, Orange Free · 
State and Northern Cape in search of gold and diamonds213 
The original function of the reserves was to subsidise the costs of mine labour and to 
provide a reservoir of labour from which migrant labourers could be produced. This 
benefited capitalist and European administrators in a number of ways. First, for the 
employer it kept the working class fragmented and unorganised. Second, migrant 
workers ' wages were set below the minimum needed for subsistence as their families 
could in theory continue to subsist in the reserves. It further removed the responsibility 
for employers to pay pensions or social welfare costs. Lastly, for officials it ensured that 
at least some money was brought into the rural areas to help sustain village life. 214 
In reality, the wages brought home were insufficient to cater for the subsistence needs of 
a single family. A family needed at least £60 in order to survive one year. In 1910 farm 
labourers and domestic workers earned £3 to £18 a year. Male labourers in town earned 
£15 to £28 annually. Semi-skilled and skilled labourers earned between £24 to £48 
213 Switzer,"Power and Resistance",p. 225, 203. Vail, L. "Introduction" in Vail (ed), The Creation of 
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annually. The situation was exacerbated by the reduction of household production. In 
Victoria East in 1925 the cash income from production was 22% of what it had been in 
1875 but the portion spent on food rose from 20% of the total income in 1875 to 64% in 
1925.215 Worsening access to the market undermined peasant production; Africans did 
not reap the benefits of favourable legislation, state subsidies and reduced rail rates. 
Furthermore, production was hampered by depleted natural resources signified by the 
absence of firewood and spreading soil erosion. In addition, the migrant labour system 
left the elderly, women and children responsible for peasant production. As a result, the 
sale of wool and grain did not provide enough money to purchase food and commodities, 
and pay taxes. This led to high indebtedness to traders who would buy grain at lower 
prices, store and import more grain and finally sell the grain back to the Africans at 
higber prices in times of hardship such as drought21G Starvation was accompanied by 
malnutrition, disease and infant mortality. 
At the Ciskei General Council, the Secretary of Native Affairs, Dr Mears provided an 
acute summary of the poverty rife in the reserves ofTranskei and Ciskei : "The prolonged 
and widespread drought has brought in its train many hardships and deprivations. Disease 
and illness in various forms have prevailed, food has not been plentiful; many water 
supplies have failed; the veld has perished and stock losses have been serious".217 He did 
not however acknowledge that the problem could be attributed to insufficient land, which 
was unable to cater for the growing population. The situation was compounded when 
individuals were turned off white farms on which they had been previously squatting. 
Between 1911 and 1951 , natural population growth combined with the effects of rising 
unemployment in the urban areas, forced removals and segregationist legislation led to an 
increase in Ciskei's total population by 45.7%218 
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Nor did Mears recognise or acknowledge that such poverty was plainly in the capitalist's 
interests to reduce Africans "from a state of self-sufficiency to one of sub-subsistence,,219 
By reducing the rural dweller to a condition where he was no longer able to support 
himself, he was forced to become dependent on wages earned in white industrial regions 
and farms. By the 1930's South Africa had a dual economy based on the core areas 
characterised by material development, and the periphery from which migrant labourers 
emerged220 However, a confidential report on the conditions in the Transkei and Ciskei 
commissioned by the Chamber of Mines concluded, "semi-starvation is a very insecure 
basis from which to build a permanent labour supply,,221 Part ofthe 'insecurity' of such a 
labour force is its increased tendency to engage in radical resistance in response to 
desperate impoverishment. Macmillan described Herschel as "desperately impoverished" 
and "seething with discontent,,222 In the 1928 session of the Transkeian Territories 
General Council, councillors were warned of the breadth and depth of local resentment, 
which was conditioned by the struggle for economic survival. 223 Resentment against all 
aspects of government control and intervention took the form of resistance around a 
particular issue from which the government would come under attack ideologically and 
physically. Ironically, it was the government's attempts to relieve aspects of this 
impoverishment that carne under the most attack, particularly since these efforts aimed to 
relieve only the symptoms as opposed to the structural causes of this poverty, as IS 
evident with regard government's dipping, betterment and rehabilitation schemes. 
East Coast fever, a tick borne cattle disease, moved southward down the East Coast of 
Africa and reached the Northern Transvaal in 1904. Veterinarians recommended that the 
only way to avoid the devastation caused by the rinderpest in 1897 was by regular and 
universal dipping of livestock. This exercise required tanks, supplies, veterinary staff and 
dipping supervisors, which were very costly. These costs were administered through the 
Glen Grey Council system and direct charges were placed upon cattle owners who were 
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subjected to the council general tax rate, stock levies and dipping fees. Work commenced 
in 1906 but was started properly in 1910. It involved stringent measures such as the 
construction of a border fence between Pondoland and Natal, and between Pondoland and 
East Griqualand, in order to restrict cattle movement. By the 1911 Stock Diseases Act, 
regulations were more severe; dipping was enforced and some cattle shot. In 1912, 
dipping was extended to the Transkei and was made compulsory, more frequent and more 
expensive. District Councils adopted a rate of half a penny per head per dip224 Even 
officials were critical of this procedure; W. T Brownlee argued, "These officials pursued 
the ideals of veterinary Utopia wholly regardless of the practical conditions of Territorial 
life,, 225 Rural dwellers were subject to these 'impracticalities'. Their income was affected 
because they could not sell stock or move stock and other agricultural commodities for 
the purpose of trade, and the dipping fee was onerous for the average household. It also 
disrupted pasture usage, the cattle loan system and customary practices that involved the 
passage of stock. In general, dipping contributed to economic hardships that resulted 
from a drought in 1912, poor food harvest and a slump of wool prices in 1914226 The 
result was widespread opposition. 
At public meetings commoners rallied around chiefs against the dipping scheme. Using 
dipping as a platform they attacked the council system and white governance and 
interference. It was feared that this interference was simply a plot to drive out cheap 
labour, weaken the cattle and diminish the milk supply. Dipping constituted the most 
intense intervention into peasant society since annexation. The fact that it involved cattle 
heightened the resistance. Cattle not only represented a source of meat and food but also 
played a vital social and cultural role. It was an indispensable feature of marriage, was of 
aesthetic and sentimental importance and played a central role in the relationship between 
the commoners and the chief For the chief, cattle represented his main form of wealth 
and the primary way of showing and keeping power. It was inherited from his father, 
received at his inauguration, received as gifts from rich subjects and constituted the 
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proceeds offines and confiscations227 Hence, any colonial influence that bore directly on 
cattle was likely to produce deep-seated reactions from both the chiefs and the 
commoners. In December of 1914 and 1916 in Matatiele and Mount Fletcher, resistance 
took on a violent form. Stores were looted and destroyed, dipping tanks and sheds 
attacked and burned, dips boycotted and picketed, individuals operating the dips were 
threatened and manhandled, homes were destroyed, tax collectors and court messengers 
harassed, telegraph wire torn down and other aspects of government control and 
intervention attacked 228 
In the 1930's resistance abated because the system of labour migrancy had become 
entrenched, the council system established and dipping reluctantly accepted. In addition, 
there had been a short-lived agricultural recovery. However, by the 1930's it was clear 
that the reserves were unable to provide sufficient food for the African population. 229 
The government was forced to concede that the reserves no longer provided the 
subsistence needs of its inhabitants and responded with massive reorganisation. 
Authorities linked the decline in food production to what they perceived as poor peasant 
farming methods and misuse of land. This emphasis on development must be seen in the 
context of rising poverty and unrest in the countryside resulting in increased urbanisation 
in the 1940' s. In 1943-44, Ciskei's grain supplies were less than half of the reserve' s 
subsistence requirements230 The inability of the reserves to provide for the subsistence 
needs of the growing reserve population resulted in increased labour migrancy to 'white' 
urban areas; by 1936 about 63% of Ciskei's able-bodied men were engaged in migrant 
labour. The permanent African population in the urban areas doubled from 1.2 million in 
1936 to 2.4 million in 1951.231 In the face of pressure from white unskilled workers to 
entrench their favourable position in the market and in the face of increased white fears 
of black encroachment, government was forced to take action. The 1930-32 Native 
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Economic Commission concluded that state intervention was necessary "to enable the 
Natives to develop their Reserves so as to make these sufficiently productive and 
attractive to stop the present compulsory migration to the towns". 232 
The 1936 Land Act proclaimed so called betterment locations and divided the ground 
into residential, arable and grazing areas with regulations to limit stock and offset rising 
soil erosion. The first scheme involved the culling of stock, because according to the 
official position, overstocking limited population density, ruined the land, weakened the 
cattle and reduced the milk yield that was a crucial supplement to maize. Ciskei was 
deemed the most overstocked reserve; officials warned that if something was not done 
"the Transkei and the Native Areas in the rest of the Union will be tomorrow what that of 
the Ciskei is today,,233 Using the Ciskei as a test case, Livestock Control and 
Improvement Proclamation No 31 of 1939 was introduced in the Tamacha District of 
King Williamstown. Although the culled stock was mainly diseased or ill, by reducing 
the number of cattle by fifty percent officials not only reduced an important means of 
economic survival but also violated custom in which cattle represented wealth, savings 
and security. The failure of stock culling was inevitable because "the real problem of the 
people is not that they have too many cattle but that they have too little land" 234 
Nevertheless, in 1945 the state attempted a new policy in which focus was directed to 
population resettlement. Anticipating the prospect of absorbing a flood of returning 
soldiers after World War Two and tenants who were displaced from white farms, the new 
'Rehabilitation scheme' divided populations into permanent farmers and migrant wage 
labourers. Full time farmers were allotted a single plot of arable land and subject to 
regulations imposed in Betterment locations. The non-farming population, which 
consisted of peasants who were not given arable land, landless peasants and urban 
refugees, were to be resettled near existing centres of industrial employment. The 
Transkei Bunga approved the Rehabilitation scheme in April 1945 and the Ciskei Bunga 
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approved it in September. However, the peasants were not consulted. 235 As Professor Z.K 
Matthews observed, 
"Admirable as the scheme appears on paper, it has rightly or wrongly come to be 
looked upon by the people as a further encroachment on their already limited land 
rights and a further encroachment of the system of migratory labour, and in spite 
of its acceptance by such public bodies as the United Transkeian Territories 
General Council and the Ciskeian General Council, it has not aroused that 
enthusiasm among the common people which alone can guarantee its success".236 
In general, in the fight against betterment and rehabilitation schemes, councillors and the 
council system came under attack. As the Secretary of Native Affairs proclaimed, "It is 
with dismay that I have learned that the Natives in several districts are being influenced 
by protagonists to have nothing to do with the council system. Councillors are described 
as being the 'catspaws' of the Administration".237 The Department of Native Affairs 
deemed it the council's responsibility to enact and finance the schemes and to "make the 
people realise that what is being done is for their benefit and in their own interests and 
that of their children, out of whose mouths we should not take their bread by destroying 
the land which is their heritage".238 However, councillors failed in their attempts to ' sell' 
the scheme to the people. The peasants rose in revolt; they cut fences, set fire to 
commonages, threatened land surveyors, boycotted cattle-dipping facilities, refused to co-
operate with agricultural field workers from the Native Affairs Department and aired 
protest at public meetings sponsored by the Native Trust. In Middledrift and 
Keiskammahoek, three policemen were killed239 The radical nature of the umest was 
largely transported from the urban areas by migrant labourers. As Councillor Petini 
argued, "The doctrines come from agitators hailing from the big industrial centres. When 
such people visit our location they come to set up a fight and endeavour to prove that 
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they express the views of the local people,,24o However, the main source of the unrest lay 
in the impoverishment ofthe reserves, which state intrusions served to ignite. 
The Chiefs and Popular Legitimacy 
In the face of growing resistance to state encroachments the popular legitimacy of chiefs 
increased. Hence, as they were not part of the administration responsible for instituting 
the unpopular measures highlighted above, chiefs were insulated from popular 
dissatisfaction unlike the bureaucratically appointed headmen. Furthermore, many chiefs 
overtly resisted the council system. The motives of these chiefs were mixed. In Qumbu, 
chiefs reacted against the councils due to popular pressure from below. In Mount 
Fletcher, the chiefs feared that their powers would be diminished by the council system; 
they wanted absolute control over the land and wanted to dominate the people without 
interference from the magistrate. In this area, Chiefs Scanlen Lehana and Johannes Zibi 
became effective leaders and symbols of opposition. Scanlen was cited as objecting to the 
word 'headmen' , "I would have preferred the word chiefs. If a term headmen is used, he 
has the same right as myself who is the chief of this location". In this location, the 
stubbornness of the chief and the dislike of the council system led to an effective boycott 
forcing the magistrate to attend the General Council alone without representatives. 
Furthermore, chiefs dominated various delegations, which sought release from the Glen 
Grey proclamation241 In other words, the failure of the council system could largely be 
attributed to the popular legitimacy attributed to the chiefs. 
As segregation and proletarianisation advanced, so too did the popularity of chieftaincy. 
The institution of chieftaincy allowed for mass participation and provided a recognised 
system of justice to those who were excluded from or not accepted by the colonial courts 
and law. In addition, chieftaincy lineages with a history of militant resistance were able to 
attract support in a growing atmosphere of resistance. Furthermore, people had a real 
need for traditional values represented by the chiefly figure in this context of rapid social 
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change; these values provided a sense of psychological comfort and a measure of control 
in different situations in a society in flux. 'Control' was vital for a migrant labourer 
removed from the land and from his family. Chiefs emphasised control in the name of 
custom and further exercise a degree of surveillance over women and the land242 The 
land was the key to chieftaincy' s continued influence as "traditionalists found in the 
chieftaincy a means to define their rights to land,,243 According to Vail, those who fought 
against the erosion of their positions, "land, and access to land, came to stand at the very 
centre of their consciousness" 244 This is unsurprising as lack ofland stood at the root of 
their impoverishment and more land remained their ultimate means of survival. For the 
chiefs land was the key to their continued power over the commoners. As their material 
base had been eroded by the ability of subjects to acquire cattle independently through 
their access to wages or sale of agricultural produce and by the chiefs' inability to 
confiscate cattle from recalcitrant subjects, cattle was "displaced from the centre of 
ideological discourse by land" 245 The formation of the reserves strengthened the chief's 
powers of land allocation. As land was limited, it became a vital resource in a form of 
power that was increasingly based on patronage politics. The relationship of chiefs to the 
land was defined by the nature of land tenure in the reserves of the Transkei and Ciskei. 
Communal tenure revolves around the institution of chieftaincy. Early observers argued 
that "the land occupied by a tribe is regarded theoretically as the property of the 
paramount chief, in relation to the tribe he is a trustee holding it for the people, who 
occupy and use it in subordination to him, on communistic principles" and that "the 
individual must live wherever he is placed by the chief or his own headmen,,246 In other 
words, it was argued that the chief owns the land. According to Letsoalo, this argument 
confuses the concepts of administration and ownership; one needs to look at the rights 
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and obligations, which this 'control' defines247 In reality, chiefs did not own the land 
personally but merely administered it and allocated it to suit the needs of individual 
families. This was often enacted "through a subordinate authority" such as a headman. 
After the harvest, individual ownership of arable land lapsed temporarily and was used 
for communal grazing for the winter season. The chief set apart land for his own personal 
use, it was ploughed by the tribe and the harvest was kept in the chief s place. This 
formed part of the chief s income; it was not a salary but a sign of respect. It was further 
used to feed visitors and the poor248 Thus, "the property of the chief was a common fund 
of the tribe from which help could be obtained in times ofmisfortune,,249 
Individual tenure, which effectively meant one man one lot, was applied to the Ciskei on 
a limited scale in 1849; here, some of the Mfengu were given plots in the Smith-
Calderwood location of Victoria East. In 1856, Sir George Grey attempted to reduce 
social stratification and to pack as many people as possible on the land by granting farms 
on the basis of freehold tenure250 The Cecil Rhodes Act (or Glen Grey Act) of 1894 
attempted to extend individual tenure in the face of high opposition from both 
commoners and chiefs. In 1916, the Supreme Court ruled that the Glen Grey Act should 
not be applied to the Cape because it would jeopardise African franchise rights. Africans 
who owned property could qualify for the vote, but it would be difficult to meet this 
condition if they were subjected to the Glen Grey clauses in the Land Act251 However, 
the 1916 Beaumont Commission and 1918 Cape Land Committee concluded that the only 
way to solve the overpopulation problem was by extending the Glen Grey Act and by 
limiting each household to one plot of land. But, efforts at extending individual tenure 
and land surveying were met with high opposition. It was believed that individual tenure 
would give them less security than communal tenure. If one held individual allotments 
one would have to pay a quitrent that was five shillings more than the hut tax while those 
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who were officially landless (i .e. a household head who had not been allotted residential-
cum-garden plots) would still have to pay the hut tax.252 
From 1921 management of pasture land was increasingly subject to control through the 
Native Commissioner of the district and officers of the Agricultural Division of the 
Native Affairs Department whose expressed aim was to give as many men as possible a 
piece of arable land to combat erosion.253 Although Transkeian Territories' officials 
recognised communal tenure they attempted to regulate it by Notice 833 of 1921 ; this 
proclamation provided for an investigation of all existing arable and household 
allotments by the Superintendent of the Native Locations. 254 The people once again 
resisted such interventions because "experience has taught Africans to suspect the 
government's intention towards them in these plans; they see them as part of the 
withholding of land which they so desperately need, the land which once belonged to 
them and which they still regard as rightly theirs" .255 Defensive communalism seemed 
the best hope for rural families who were attempting to defend their access to rural 
resources. A major factor in the failure of individual tenure in the Cape was that 
communal tenure worked in the government's favour because it disguised the growing 
landless population who had no access to reserve subsistence and were dependent on the 
sale oflabour for their livelihood. 256 In general, between 1913 and 1950 individual tenure 
was only adopted in nine of the fourteen districts in the Ciskei region and in seven 
districts in the Transkei. Hence, communal tenure remained firmly entrenched under the 
power ofthe chief. 257 
Increasingly however, the chief s powers to allot land were coming under threat as seen 
in the 1942 case of Nzama v Nzama, The respondent began to clear land for cultivation 
and the appellant objected that he was entitled to cultivate the land. He complained to the 
chief who enquired and allotted a portion of the land to each party. The Respondent in 
m Switzer, "Power and Resistance", p. 204. 
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turn appealed to the Native Commissioner who reversed the chief s decision and allotted 
the land to the respondent. According to the official view, the chiefs powers of allotment 
could be forfeited as punishment or expropriated in the 'public' interest.2l8 Gradually 
people realised that the land really belonged to administration, which "could do what it 
liked with the land and the people living on it,,259 
Nevertheless, the institution of chieftaincy was associated with rights and land. The 
power of the institution of chieftaincy was also evident in the millenarianism movements 
that gained force during this period. In the 1920's the Israelite movement under Enoch 
Josiah Mgijima called for restored and rejuvenated chiefship. Although Prophetess 
Nonteta focussed on the purity of Christian life, she treated the chiefs as honoured guests 
and urged her followers to obey their chiefs. The Wellington Movement not only fought 
for African Christianity, separate schools and 'communal tenure' but also for the 
restoration of chieftaincy, which became a central theme in its fight against the council 
system and the commoditisation of rural relations. Women were active participants in 
these movements particularly since they bore the brunt of economic hardships in the 
reserves260 Evidence also suggests that they supported the traditionalist political 
ideology; this highlights the ability of the institution of chieftaincy to neutralise the 
memory of a political and social order in which women had less independent power and 
authority. 
Ethnic ideology stressed the historical integrity of land, sanctity of family and its right to 
land. As both rights and land were found to be lacking in the overcrowded locations, 
security, which lay in the expanded access to communal resources was symbolised by the 
institution of chieftaincy. Evans writing in 1934 argued, "the institution of chieftainship 
has certainly suffered something on an eclipse during the forty years or so of British rule, 
but it nevertheless remains the pivot of Native society. This fact does not seem to have 
received official recognition as yet, and its importance is hardly apparent in recent 
258 Kerr, "The Native Common Law", p.14. 
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administrative reports,,261 In general, as the state no longer offered the same protection or 
preference to previous allies, chiefs and traditionalists were given scope to assert 
themselves262 The popular legitimacy of the chiefs was also clear in Bunga debates. 
Councillor Jabavu argued, "We should appreciate the services of the Chiefs who are 
highly respected by the people ... we all know how the Government can assert its 
authority when it likes, but if the Chiefs defy such authority they are going to advise their 
people to throw themselves in,, 263 In order to understand the depth of chiefly opposition 
to government, it is necessary to understand their relationship with the liberation 
movement. 
261 Evans, "Native Policy", p.126. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CHIEFS AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE, 1900-1950 
As the power of the chiefs was checked and their functions removed by European 
administrators, African organisations, which sought a new role in the economic and 
political dispensation, began to appear. Hence, the fall of the chiefs opened up the 
political space for the development of an African liberation movement led by the petty-
bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie were largely drawn into the state structure as 
councillors in the council system but, as discrimination and repression at all levels 
increased, more Africans on the fringes of the lower middle class descended into the 
ranks of the impoverished proletariat. For example, the 1913 Land Act restricted the 
ability of black landowners to increase their landholding and thereby undermined their 
attempts to accumulate resources. Even the most educated African white-collar workers 
were unable to emulate the lifestyles of their European counterparts. Consequently, in 
periods of crisis alienated factions of the petty bourgeoisie began to defy the status quo 
by forming or joining liberation organisations. In the Eastern Cape, these organisations 
included the Native Vigilance Association in the Transkei, Imbumba, the Bantu Union, 
the Ciskei Native Convention, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Unions and the 
South African Native Congress264 
The new elite retained a polite respect for the chiefs, especially Sillce tribal affairs 
provided the main issues around which the people mobilised. However, there was a 
general acceptance and growing respect for the European government, parliamentary 
'" L. Switzer, "Power and Resistance", p.243, 251. P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South 
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African National Congress) and the South African Communist Party because of the centralized structure of 
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liberalism, the Crown, Cape and wider South African society beyond the scope of the 
' tribe'. Many organisations posed themselves as Christian alternatives to the heathenism 
of chieftaincy265 Gumede argued that the goal of Natives should be "release from the 
retarding influence of their chiefs,,266 Martin Luthuli, the chairman of the Natal Native 
Congress and an affluent cane grower employing tenants and wage labourers267, argued 
with reference to the issue of individual and communal land tenure that "they (the chiefs) 
would like to have the land for themselves and we call that greediness,, 268 With regard to 
land, there was clearly a clash of material interests; both the petty bourgeoisie and the 
chiefs needed the land to entrench their power either by accumulation or by utilising their 
powers of allocation. 
However, members of this new 'modern ' elite did recognise that the people regarded the 
chiefs as legitimate representatives, and that land was an important element of that 
legitimacy. As Martin Luthuli stated, "At the present time those who have their own land, 
under their own chiefs, do recognise their chief,269 Jabavu who once denounced the 
conservative attitude of the chiefs towards the council system echoed Luthuli ' s 
sentiments and highlighted the importance of enlisting the chiefs' cooperation. As the 
South African Native National Congress was weak in the Eastern Cape, Jabavu attempted 
to create his own movement on the lines of the United Races Congress, which became 
known as the South African Races Congress270 At its opening on the 2 April 1912, 
Jabavu stated, 
"At the stage reached the controlling and governing power is the Chiefs. But in 
their earlier history the power of the Chiefs was modified by its delegation to the 
Councillors, and thus, even in our rude and crude state we, as people had realised 
the important principle which in more civilised countries is comprehended in the 
265 Walshe, "Rise of African Nationalism", p. 4, 10. For descriptions of the black activists mentioned see D. 
Owen, Ubukhosi Neenkokeli: A Directory of Eastern Cape Black Leaders, from c. 1700 to 1990. 
Grahamstown: Albany Museum. 1994. 
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268 Document 8a: Testimony of Martin Luthuli of the Natal Native Congress before the South African 
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saying that 'the king can do no wrong'. It means that in practice councillors are 
responsible for any mistakes that occur in the government of the people, and not 
the chief It is earnestly to be hoped that in the development of their people the 
chiefs will ever bear this in mind and not think that they, as Counsellors are, or 
can be their rivals, but that they would regard them as what they really are - their 
servants and protectors". 271 
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In other words, Jabavu attempted to undo the damage caused by the council system to the 
petty bourgeoisie ' s relationship with the chiefs. A further explanation for the alliance of 
the 'modern' elites and traditional elites was a common fear of socialism as promoted by 
the Communist Party of South Africa, which had the potential to undermine the material 
basis of their power. John Dube complained that the victory of socialist doctrines 
"would mean the breaking down of parental control and restraint, tribal 
responsibility and our whole traditions, the whole structure upon which our Bantu 
nation rests ... We have got to maintain ... the sense of paternal and tribal 
responsibility by Bantu traditions with all its obligations of courage, honour, truth, 
loyalty and obedience for all we are worth . .. don't think for one moment that I am 
not progressive. I am as anxious as any man would be for the development of my 
people, but on the right lines".272 
The founders of the South African Native National Congress (now known as the ANC) 
also recognised the importance of the chiefs. Reverend Walter Rabusana, Tengo Jabavu, 
Reverend John Dube, and Sol Plaatjie together with Chief Dalindyebo were in regular 
contact with South African liberals. ChiefDalindyebo attended the 1911 Universal Races 
Congress in London with Rabusana, Jabavu, Moffatt and Schreiner. Alfred Mangena was 
a legal adviser to Chief Dalindyebo. He was very popular among the educated members 
of society and although he envisaged an African unity above tribalism he sought to 
encompass chieftaincy within the new movement. Reverend John Dube had many 
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connections with the Zulu Royal House. Rabusana was an adviser to Dalindyebo. Jabavu 
was in regular contact with Transkeian chiefs.273 
Pixley ka Seme sought the support of the chiefs, was the legal adviser to the Queen 
Regent of Swaziland and married the daughter of Dinizulu, the Paramount Chief of the 
Zulus. He had great interest in the 'warrior chiefs' Dingiswayo, Tshaka and Cetyewayo. 
He ultimately aimed to bring all the tribes under Zulu sway to create a powerful nation of 
Africans. At a later stage he claimed to be a nephew of Umqawe, one of the most 
powerful chiefs in Zululand. Seme described the gathering in Bloemfontein on 8 January 
1912as 
"a gathering of tribes that had never met before except on the battlefields. It was a 
gathering of Chiefs who had never seen each other before. And they had come 
from the four provinces and the High Commission territories. It was a gathering of 
educated Africans who had never exchanged views before. It was a gathering, if I 
may say so, of the departed spirits of the African race, among whom were such 
men as Sandile, Tshaka, Moshoeshoe, Cetyewayo, Moroka, Khama, Sekhukune, 
Sotshangana and Ramapulana,,274 
At a later stage he argued that "the foundations of the ANC was laid at the great 
Conference where all the principle chiefs and nearly all the chiefs in the land were 
represented. Although I had the honour to be the initiator of the Conference, Chiefs 
Maoma, Sayso, Molembo, Sekhukuni and others were men who really created the 
Congress".275 
Seme, seconded by Alfred Mangena, established the South African Native National 
Congress while Reverend John L. Dube was the first president. Apart from Seme' s 
attempts to invoke Zulu nationalism, the founders of the SANNC were determined to root 
out tribalism. Chiefs in turn endorsed the anti-tribal , anti-ethnic, pro-unity stance of the 
early ANC. In an article written by Seme, a great Paramount chief was cited as arguing 
"that whilst the objects and aims of a Congress appear to be good and reasonable, much 
273 Walshe, "Rise of African Nationalism", p. 31. 
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of the success depends on the attitude of the members ... They should set their faces 
strongly against the jargon of racial feeling, the ebullition of the Xhosa-Fingo element, 
and the excessive display of political partisanship" 276 
The constitution ofSANNC was initially rejected in 1915 but finally passed in September 
1919. Heading the committee to establish the constitution, George Montsioa suggested 
that seven paramount chiefs be appointed as Honorary Presidents of SANNC. An upper 
and Lower House were established. In the Upper House the following chiefs could be 
found: Chief Dalindyebo of the Tembus, Montsioa of the Barolong, Lewanika of 
Barotseland (part of Zambia), Khama of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Marclane of 
Pondoland, Moepi of Bakgatla, Dinizulu and Letsie II of Basutholand (now Lesotho), 
who was elected President of the Upper House.277 The term 'chiefs ' did not include 
headmen or induna and was referred to "all kings, Princes, Paramount Chiefs and Chiefs 
by heritage and other persons of Royal blood in the direct line of succession among the 
various tribes of the Bantu races in South Africa".278 Chiefs had the right to attend the 
meetings of the associations either in person or by representation in a "separate place of 
honour and respect". Furthermore, it was proclaimed that "no motion, resolution or 
decision of any of the branches of the Association, either in the Provinces or in the 
Territories, which in the opinion of the President for the time being is hostile to the 
interests of the Chiefs and people, or in direct conflict with the expressed desire of the 
majority of the Chiefs shall be considered valid and operative". Chiefs affected thereby 
could appeal through elected Representatives directly to the President of the National 
Congress or to the Chairman of Provincial Congress. All matters affecting Chiefs were 
referred to Chiefs themselves to consider the matter in a separate session presided over by 
the President or Deputy President; the decisions that were made were final. Chiefs within 
the provinces were honorary vice presidents in all districts and local branches and were 
delegates for districts in meetings of the Provincial Congress with a separate place of 
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honour and right of preference to an audience. In each district within a Province the chief 
would approve the selection of representatives to attend the provincial congress279 
Hence, in the constitution of SANNC, the chiefs were honoured in accordance with 
African tradition. 
This favourable attitude towards the chiefs was conditioned by four factors. First, as the 
people deemed the chiefs as legitimate, they could serve as an important means of rural 
mobilisation. Second, the chiefly tradition of resistance automatically wedded the chiefs 
to the liberation movement. Third, the democratic tradition embodied in chieftaincy 
provided sustenance to the ANC' s calls for democracy. Lastly, their involvement in the 
ANC provided a significant source of financial aid. 
As shown in the previous section, chiefs were not only regarded as protectors of Mrican 
cultural heritage but were also regarded as the bulwark against state intrusions; 
consequently, the people rallied around the institution of chieftaincy in resistance to the 
colonial state. Hence, by giving the chiefs an honorary position, SANNC was attempting 
to form an alliance between the peasants and the young intelligentsia. The presence of a 
chief at the Congress signified the incorporation of his tribe in the national organisation. 
The chiefs thus "represented' the rural masses who were the majority of the people at the 
time and the section most affected by land robbery,,280 Therefore, the constitution 
attempted to mould a unity using the chiefs as a means of rural mobilisation in order to 
establish a ' mandate from the people. ,281 
An element of the chiefs ' legitimacy was their tradition of resistance against the colonial 
overlords. As Luthuli stated, 
"Our history is one of opposition to domination, of protest and refusal to submit to 
tyranny. Consider some of the great names: the great warrior and nation-builder 
Shaka, who wielded tribes together into the Zulu nation; Moshoeshoe, the 
279 Docwnent 23 : "Constitution of the South African Native National Congress" September 1919. in S. 
Johns, "Protest and Hope", p . 77 -8J. 
280 MeH, "South Africa Belongs to Us", p. 39 
statesman and nation-builder who fathered the Basuto nation and placed 
Basutoland beyond the reach of the South African whites; Hintsa of the Xhosas 
who chose death rather than surrender his territory to white invaders. All these and 
other royal names, as well as other great chieftains resisted manfully white 
intrusion" .282 
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Chiefly resistance had not been limited to violent protests against the colonial overlords, 
but had taken a number of different forms. A petition to Queen Victoria from the Native 
Inhabitants of the Location of Oxkraal in July 1881 was signed by Chief Zulu Zimuna of 
the Abambo Tribe and by Chief Hayimpi Kakoza of the Amabele Tribe.283 In August 
1883 Nehemiah Tile organised a meeting at the Paramount Chief, Ngangelizwe' s Great 
Place where the chief and his three sons adopted a petition requesting that all but one 
magistrate be removed from Tembuland. In the early mine hardships, this legacy of 
resistance continued. On 8 Jan 1902 Asaph Moruthani who was the secretary to the Pedi 
chief Sekukuni, was sent to accompany a work party to the gold fields to report on the 
conditions of service. Consequently, Sekukuni refused initially to supply workers to 
private industry284 In general, the chiefly tradition of resistance, which continued into the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century, allied the chiefs with the liberation movement. 
A further aspect of the institution of chieftaincy that allied chiefs with the liberation 
movement was its democratic tradition. In 1906, Colonel Maclean noted that when one 
talks of despotism one could point to the rule of Moshoeshoe, the chief who allegedly 
boasted that when he spoke the mountains moved, or of Shaka who allegedly ordered his 
people to catch a hippopotamus alive, unarmed. However, he argued that these examples 
form the exception and not the rule as tribal chiefs were not unchecked autocrats.285 
Chiefs had many attributes of a monarch in the sense that the "chief is looked upon as 
incapable of doing wrong" but if the chief contravened the law, his subjects may transfer 
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their allegiance to another chief or engage in civil war286 Furthermore, chiefs did not rule 
alone. The chief required the support and advice of his councillors who were often 
nominated or were related by blood to the royal house. This inner circle of advisers 
protected the people's rights and ensured that no body of opinion could be ignored. 
Furthermore, the chief was expected to consult the tribe in a regular forum of adult males 
before decisions were made287 In general, the powers of the chief were essentially 
nominal: "He gives the signal for the fruit to be gathered by tasting the first offering, but 
he can perform this ritual gesture only as the precise moment when the elders decide that 
h c: .. . ,,288 t e 1rult IS flpe . 
This democratic tradition continued into the early part of the twentieth century. At the 
South African Native Affairs Commission on 28 May 1904, Mr. Samuelson questioned 
Martin Luthuli of the Natal Native Congress about the power of the chiefs. He replied 
that even now "the Chief, unless the man is going against the law, cannot do as he likes 
with him,,289 In 1930, the South African Communist Party attested to the democratic 
nature of chieftainship. "Although the chief was not elected - the throne passing from 
father to son - there were indirect restrictions on the powers of the chief, and so much 
power was retained in the hands of his subjects that the system was almost democratic .. 
An unpopular chief soon became a weak chief, with few subjects under him"290 In 
general, the liberation movement drew on continuity and the process of social change in 
order to justify its call for a democratic parliamentary system. In other words, as the 
system of chiefly rule was bound by checks and balances like the parliamentary system, 
the two institutions were automatically wedded together. Therefore, those who support 
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the chiefs necessarily support the liberation struggle as they were based on the same 
tenets 291 
A further reason for SANNC's favourable attitude towards the chiefs was that their 
involvement would provide a considerable source of fmancial aid. In the constitution, it 
was stated that each territory through its Chief should contribute a fixed sum to the 
Association. Each district should through its Chief, contribute a sum not exceeding £50 
per annum according to the size and proportion of the district. Each chief was to pay an 
honorary membership fee to the Association of one guinea. In addition, each chief was to 
provide £5 to the provincial funds. Paramount Chiefs were expected to pay £25 to the 
provincial coffers and £25 to the national funds. Furthermore, each territory via the 
paramount was to provide £ 1 00 to the national funds . Over and above these fees, the 
Swazi Regent funded the official congress newspaper Abantu Batho and chiefs 
contributed a large portion ofthe special funds required for the delegation of 1914 (£560) 
and 1919 (£1500)292 
In general, the early ANC enjoyed considerable support from the chiefs until World War 
One. They benefited from the emphasis on land issues and the high regard in which the 
ANC placed them. The 1913 Land Act raised widespread concern from the chiefs. This is 
evident in Chief Zibi's testimony at the Governor-General's Native Conference in 1926 
where he argued that in the Transvaal "they really had Paramount Chiefs because they 
really owned the land; in the Cape the Natives might be described as paramount 
squatters,,293 In 'Natives and the Land Act of 1913', ChiefZibi further argued, "Natives 
living in reserves and locations are merely occupiers, not owners, of the land. The 
Government is the owner. How can they improve themselves is a difficult question,,294 
This fear was based on mixed motives, a dual concern for their own power and for that of 
291 Ironically the government used the same argument to elicit support for the homeland system. Walshe, 
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their people. Hence, the widespread emphasis placed on the land issue by the ANC 
bonded the chiefs to the liberation movement. 
Furthermore, congress held the chiefs in high regard. This is not only reflected in its 
constitution but also in its official newspapers. Abantu Batho argued for equal rights and 
for the "just recognition of Native Kings, Princes and Chiefs under the Supreme 
Sovereignty of His Majesty the King".295 The general political and social judgement of 
the Congress favoured the chiefs as "congress leaders were not intent on the discriminate 
destruction of their past heritage, nor were they in favour of suddenly uprooting their 
people from the tribal environment. Chiefs were expected to playa major stabilising role 
in an evolving society,,296 Largely excluded from the state structure, chiefs pragmatically 
played an important role in the early years of the struggle. This not only insulated them 
from popular disaffection but also allowed them to entrench their authority, which was 
based on popular support from below. 
Declining Participation 
Despite their early connections with the ANC, the chiefs' participation in the Congress 
declined significantly after World War One. Few chiefs attended the conferences and by 
the late 1920's the policy of having a Council of Chiefs sitting on a platform behind the 
National Executive Council ceased. There was no open clash between the chiefs and the 
commoners but the upper house faded away and the limited funds provided by the chiefs 
diminished rapidly. In the 1923 national conference, of the thirty-three attendants there 
were only eight chiefs. 297 This declining participation must be seen in the context of 
increased chiefly collaboration with the state and reduced popular legitimacy, 
conditioned by the burgeoning segregationist discourse at the national level and the 
growth ofradicalised African politics. 
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At the national level, there were increased calls to restore power to the chiefs to aid the 
retribalisation of the African in order to offset the radicalisation of the worker and to 
reverse increasing African urbanisation. At the local level, the headmen were greatly 
delegitimised by allegations of corruption and inadequacy. In the Ciskei General Council 
headmen were described as "old fossils who are unable to carry on the job properly" and 
criticised because "they cannot keep to the truth, and they do not stick to the Government 
either. ,, 298 Continued popular resistance was further attributed to the failures of the 
headmen: "A short while ago we were getting no co-operation in that settlement. The 
people were against what we were trying to do, so we finally decided that it must be this 
so-called Headmen who was not doing his work correctly". 299 Hence, in the context of 
poverty, growing unrest and a need for large-scale labour migrancy, magistrates 
attempted to reformulate their control by co-opting the support of the chiefs. During the 
segregationist era of the 1920's and 1930's a coalition emerged of chiefs, senior headmen 
and educated commoners as the bureaucratic elite. Chiefs were placed in a position where 
they could be both controlled and act as intermediaries3 00 
Increased chiefly collaboration was the product of a number of direct restraints placed by 
the government on the chiefs as well as by the chiefs' desire to secure a material base for 
their power. In terms of restraints, as shown above, the power to allot land was 
manipulated by the state to punish belligerent chiefs and in so doing, to secure their 
allegiance. A further restraint came in the form of the Native Administration Act of 1927 
and the ' Supreme Chief' provision. Section Two of this Act enacted the provision that 
"the Governor-General may recognise or appoint any person as a chief or headman in 
charge of a tribe or location and may depose any chief or headman, and is authorised to 
define their powers, duties and privileges" 301 These duties included notifying the Native 
Commissioner of any unrest, unlawful activity, unlawful meetings, and the dispersal of 
riotous assemblies. In addition, chiefs were forbidden from participating in the affairs of 
"any association whose objects are deemed by the Minister to be subversive of the 
298 Ciskei General Council. 20/0911938; 23/09/1943. 
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constituted government or good order,,302 In other words, the Native Administration Act 
placed chiefs in a position directly at odds with the liberation movement whose activities 
were generally considered by the state to be subversive. In exchange, the chiefs received 
official recognition, protection and paid allowances. 
Hence the chiefs ' political authority, which was derived in the past from descent and the 
consensus of their subjects, was now validated by outside approval. This undermined the 
checks and balances that were part and parcel of the institution of chieftaincy. 
Chieftaincy was based on hereditary rule, but chiefs were restrained by the politics of 
rival claims, the councillor system and by the ability of unhappy subjects to withdraw 
their allegiance. This Act distorted these checks and balances by making chiefs subject to 
the rule ofthe state over and above the people; thereby undermining the democratic basis 
of chieftaincy and a primary basis of their legitimacy. The Minister of Native Affairs 
argued in response to the complaints made by the deputation from the ANC in May 1939 
that "the Department does try to appoint the best man, but always with one regard to 
Native Law and Custom, and there is therefore no cause for complaint on this point,,303 
However, in the case of Sibasa vs Ratsialingwa and Hartman in 1947, the state prosecutor 
argued that "under the very wide arms of the subsection it is legally competent for the 
Governor-General to appoint as chief of a tribe a stranger to the family in which the 
hereditary chieftainship lies, or even a non-member of the tribe" 304 Thus, according to 
the 1927 act, custom afforded no basis for entrenching rights to a chieftainship. 
After this Act was enacted, Congress called a special session attended by twenty-one 
chiefs to refute the official claim that the Act was conforming to the pattern of tribal 
government. Shaka and Dingaan were used as precedents, but in reality this conflicted 
with the tradition of consultation and limited chiefly powers. In his presidential address 
on 14 December 1941 Dr.A.B Xuma argued, 
302 Ibid, p. 13. 
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"There can be no Supreme Chief in Native law and custom who acts without the 
advice of other chiefs; who does not express the wish and will of the people. The 
most controlled person in African society is the chief. He is controlled by his 
family, his councillors, headmen, and sub-chiefs and finally by the people. The 
people express their will first and the chief speaks it out for them. He is their 
mouthpiece. This distortion of Native Law and Custom was copied by Europeans 
from the rule of Great Shaka. He was a dictator and a despot. He was not deposed 
because there is no deposition in African custom. He went the way such 
uncontrolled Chiefs go in African society. He had his head cut off". 305 
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The chiefs ' movement away from the liberation organisations towards the government 
must not be seen solely in terms of the restraints placed by the government on their 
activities, but must also be seen in terms of the changing nature of the liberation struggle 
and the failure of this struggle to act in the chiefs ' material interests. The Congress failed 
to accrue more land for the chiefs and the people. In addition, the ANC adopted new 
issues after World War Two, which chiefs did not support enthusiastically such as the 
emphasis on socialism and worker consciousness. The ANC's links with the Soviet 
Union had increased significantly, leading one chief to proclaim, "The Tsar was a great 
man in his country of royal blood like us chiefs and where is he now? . .If the ANC 
continues to fraternise with them (the Communists) we chiefs cannot continue to belong 
to it". Another chief reiterated these sentiments and stated "it will be a sad day for me 
when I am ruled by the man who milks my cow and ploughs my fields" . 306 Furthermore, 
the predominant causes championed by the ANC involved the abolition of the colour bar 
and the pass laws, both of which were urban irritants. In addition, the ANC's focus on 
education represented for many chiefs the decline of traditional authority and respect. 
The Congress had not expected chiefs to become prominent national spokesmen and thus, 
had not elected them to its executives and seldom invited them to participate in 
deputations. Lastly, the chiefs gradually realised that the ANC's connection with Britain 
305 Document 25a: "Presidential Address" by Dr. A.B Xuma at ANC Annual Conference on 14-16 
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was merely symbolic and they thus regarded it as more expedient to rely on the Native 
Affairs Department and to decamp from the ANC307 
Chiefs had a history of resistance against the colonial overlords, but this was always 
marred by a history of collaboration. As shown above, the collaboration of the Mfengu 
chiefs against the Rharhabe was met with official recognition and access to material 
resources in the form of land. Thus, the chiefs "were, from the outset, tied to the colonial 
state which dangled the carrot of prestige and patronage of officially sanctioned powers 
and brandished the stick of swift retribution, demotion and being cast out of they 
withheld compliance with Colonial overlordship,,308 Collaboration continued in the 
Twentieth century. In Pondoland the administration used the chiefs to halt the protest 
against dipping tax increases in 1909 and 1914309 This ' help ' can be further seen in 
World War One when chiefs supported the war effort. In the petition sent to King George 
V by SANNC on 16 December 1918, it was argued that compensation for those injured 
or killed in war during employment was extremely inadequate, "and yet the Chiefs 
continued to hold meetings throughout the country exhorting people to remain quiet and 
loyal during the war, and also encouraging the recruiting of our men for labour, and 
expressing the insistent desire to be allowed to bear arms and fight as soldiers of Your 
Maj esty" 3 10 
In addition, the South African Government used the chiefs to offset the burgeoning 
worker consciousness and resistance. In the face of SANNC's passive resistance 
campaign in 1913 the Chamber of Mines in co-operation with the Government felt it 
necessary to bring Chiefs into the compounds in an attempt to insulate mine labour from 
Congress activity. In the 1920 mine strike chiefs were almost lynched. Two thousand 
Africans gathered at Vrededorp on Sunday 30 March and resolutions were passed against 
chiefs who issued a public statement that Congress did not have a mandate to speak for 
Native miners who they claimed were "satisfied with their lot". The so-called 
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' traditional' induna system was further used to control labour on the mmes and to 
reproduce ethnic divisions there311 
Chiefs were further drawn into the state apparatus by conventions and conferences with 
state officials. Chiefs such as Councillor Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinizulu, Councillor Chief 
Victor Poto, and Councillor Chief Maserumule were members of the Native 
Representative Council. 312 At this stage the Congress regarded chiefs as legitimate 
representatives of the people. In the resolutions of the annual Conference of the ANC in 
May 31 1924, it was stated that the Congress "appreciates" the action of the Union 
government in summoning periodical conferences of Chiefs for the purpose of 
ascertaining sentiments of Bantu peoples in regard to legislative measures.313 However, 
the chiefs' presence at these conventions and conferences was soon used to exclude or to 
justify the exclusion of the African people from these consultative bodies, and the 
opinion that they espoused was often antithetical to the view of the Congress. At the 
Governor-General's Native Conference in 1924 in a discussion about immorality, 
criminality and pass controls Mr Roos said that many of the "wiser Chiefs in the country 
view this evil very anxiously indeed, and desire that by proper control it should be 
lessened and stamped out,,314 
The retribaJisation of Ciskei gained momentum during the 1930's. Government began to 
recognise Xhosa and Mfengu chiefs and Ciskeian chiefs began to hold annual meetings in 
King Williamstown. Councillors urged that subsidies paid to chiefs and headmen be 
increased.315 In a letter from the Department of Native Affairs it was argued that "as 
chiefs serve their own people as much as their Government, the Chiefs should not only be 
paid by the Government but ways and means should be found of establishing or 
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increasing Councilor Tribal Funds from which Chiefs may be subsidised,,316 Councillor 
Haya moved that it "now appears that Government is pleased to recognise Chiefs and the 
subsidy given them should be compatible with that recognition". 317 In addition there were 
increased calls to accord chiefs greater influence. According to Councillor Maci, "A child 
of the Great Place, however small, must know about the laws and customs of his people. 
The presence of the chiefs at the Bunga would, in my opinion, be of great help in this 
movement".318 In general, councillors echoed the segregationist thinking at national level. 
As Councillor Jabavu argued, "It is a mistake to think that the Ciskei Native reserves 
have become so detribalised as to cause the Chiefs to lose most of their influence. From 
my observations, I think the Chiefs in the Ciskei are more influential in certain cases than 
those in the Transkei, for the reason that they have been able to suppress the warlike 
instincts in their people who come here from warlike tribes. ,, 319 
In reality however, growing chiefly collaboration correlated with the declining popular 
legitimacy of the chiefs. At the local level, rural dwellers argued that they "do not want a 
chief who is a sapling. Our chiefs have always been men. We do not want war with the 
Europeans; but even less do we want 'Ja-baas' chiefs, who are merely the Native 
Commissioner's Voice,,320 This attitude was reflected in increased attacks against chiefs, 
who as in the case of East Griqualand were deemed as having "sold them (the people) to 
the government without their consent". 321 No longer were chiefs seen as the bulwark 
against state intrusions but were seen as the main agents of these intrusions, acting 
against the interests of the peasants and migrant labourers. This was exacerbated by the 
fact that the power of the chiefs were further bolstered by wealth derived from the sale of 
wool on the external market322 Consequently, a fundamental divide emerged between the 
people and the chiefly elite. At the All African Conference chieftaincy was described as 
one of "stumbling blocks" to the progress of the people and as part of the scheme to 
create and recruit cheap labour. Thus, "it is not surprising that the Herrenvolk have a fund 
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for maintaining vanous chiefs all over the country. They are a cog in the vast 
administrative machinery for the control and oppression of the Black man,,323 
Revival 
Even though the institution of chieftaincy experienced a decline in popular legitimacy, 
certain individuals in the ANC such as Pixley ka Isaka Seme, Alfred Betini Xuma and 
Reverend James Arthur Calata attempted to revive the links with the chiefs. When Seme 
became the president of the ANC in 1930, he attempted to regain the support of the chiefs 
and tried to establish a national fund for business by uniting the ' modern ' educated elite 
and the chiefs. In a pamphlet 'The African National Congress - is it dead?" issued by 
Seme in 1932 he argued that the "Chiefs and their uneducated people are despised and 
forsaken by their own educated tribesmen .. .I wish to urge our educated young me and 
women not to lose contact with their own tribes. You should make your Chiefs and your 
tribal councils feel that education is really a good thing. It does not spoil their people nor 
detribalise them.,,324 Furthermore, he attempted to rebuild the second house of the ANC 
inhabited by chiefs. He stated that by 
"departing from this foundation, the African National Congress has been made to 
lose its former influence, when we used to invite all our great Chiefs to attend the 
Congress .. .It is time that our Chiefs came to realise that their office of Chiefs has 
very important duties attached to it. They must lead their people and their tribes 
unto salvation. Our chiefs must realise that their people today in the country, as 
well as in the towns are face to face with the grim and difficult times ... The Chiefs 
today should realise that their forefathers won these positions of honour and high 
esteem by fighting for the salvation of their people and not by lying down and 
322 Southall, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 87. 
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seeking personal comforts and pleasures ... As your chosen leader this year, I 
hereby appeal to you and to every Chief to come out and help build up the African 
National Congress. I must depend on your financial assistance and patriotism. I 
depend upon every Chief in South Africa to help me in the difficult task of 
inviting the African people to come into their own inheritance and become a 
nation.".325 
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I have quoted at length to highlight the important themes that initially bonded the ANC to 
the chiefs; these include a history of resistance, fmancial aid and a mobilising function. 
The 1943 ANC constitution abolished the remnants of the Upper House but Xuma who 
was the president general of the ANC from 1940 to 1949, continued to seek the support 
of the chiefs. This dedication to the chiefs can largely be attributed to the fact that he was 
born into an aristocratic family in Engcobo in the Transkei. On the other hand, it also 
stemmed from a pragmatic attempt to increase the number of ANC's rural supporters by 
recruiting over 500 000 members through the chiefs. Working through his provincial 
presidents and his own personal contacts he tried to gain their informal assistance in 
holding meetings and gaining donations. Writing to the Zulu paramount, Mshiyeni ka 
Dinizulu he asked his 'chief and friend ' to bring in people from Natal and Zululand.326 In 
a flyer "To all Africans and Friends of Justice" (1947) he outlined the minimum 
programme by which the ANC could organise and educate public opinion; this included 
"the re-establishment of the Status of the African chief in our national affairs". 327 
Calata, who was the Provincial President of the Cape branch of the ANC from 1930 and 
later the Secretary General of the ANC, reiterated these sentiments. He argued that "the 
powers of our chiefs need strengthening. I am sure we all welcome the granting of the 
right to try civil cases to Chief Matanzima. Chief Matanzima has led the way for 
education among the chiefs and the government in thus recognising him has taken a step 
325 Ibid. 
326 Walshe, "Rise of African Nationalism", p. 386. 
321 Document 40: "To All Africans and Friends of Justice". Flyer issued by Dr. A.B Xwna. (21 March 
1947) in Karis, "Hope and Challenge", p. 273 . 
88 
in the right direction".328 In May 1949 on a deputation to Dr Jansen, the Minister of 
Native Affairs, Calata is reported to have said that "the fact that he (the paramount chief) 
has no fixed home lowered his status and had a bad psychological effect on the 
Gaikas ... To a large extent detribalisation could be prevented if the Gaikas knew that their 
chief had permanent headquarters where they could go periodically to renew their tribal 
bonds" 329 
Such individuals were joined by moderates like Mahabane, Thema and Baloyi in their 
opinion that hereditary chieftaincy could still fulfil a useful role amongst tribal Africans 
and in the national movement. This was motivated largely by the fact that the decline of 
the participation of the chiefs contributed to the general organisational and financial 
malaise experienced by the organisation. As Mweli Skota, the Secretary General of the 
ANC stated in 1930, "Chief Mandlesilo Nkosi is the only chief who rendered financial 
assistance. Lack of funds prevented officers to tour for the purposes of organising and 
collecting funds,,3 30 In addition, the absence of the chiefs contributed to the loss of 
support from rural dwellers. In general, in the interwar period the Congress was fragile, 
deeply fragmented, poorly administered and funded with the result that alienated African 
nationalists turned to the Communist Party of South Africa, the Independent Industrial 
Commercial Workers Union, the Pan Africanist Congress, various African-American 
movements and to millennial religious movements in the countryside. Hence, the ANC's 
attempts to revive links with the chiefs must be seen as a desperate attempt to end its 
increased isolation from the majority of workers and peasants. 
When the Hertzog Bills were published, the ANC national congress of January 1927 
called a special separate 'Convention of Bantu Chiefs ' in order to revive their 
participation. On 15 April 1927, twenty-two chiefs met under this Convention of Chiefs 
and urged government to withdraw the land bills, Coloured Person' s Rights Bill and 
Representation of Native in Parliament Bill. These chiefs met again the following year to 
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oppose the Native Administration Act.331 The All African Conference was formed in 
Bloemfontein in 1935 by Professor Jabavu and Pixley ka Isaka Seme largely as a 
response to the Hertzog Bills. The AAC was an umbrella organisation within which all 
existing African political groups were linked including ANC leaders, ICU personalities, 
chiefs, church dignitaries, and professionals.332 In its policy statement it argued for "the 
improvement of status and financial allowances for African chiefs and headmen in view 
of their serious responsibilities in maintaining law and discipline in extensive and 
populous districts".333 At the rural local level, James Theale established a permanent 
ANC branch in the Western Cape in 1928. Local issues included the council system, 
access to communal land, threat of dipping, power of progressive headman and the 
. f I h' ft· 334 Importance 0 popu ar c Ie amcy. 
In the context of increased pressure to militarise, the ANC Youth League also used the 
chiefs as a means of mass mobilisation with particular focus on their active and violent 
tradition of resistance. This is clear in its policy document, which states that "Africans 
must honour, venerate and find inspiration from African heroes of the past: Shaka, 
Moshoeshoe, Makana, Hintsa, Khama, Mzilikazi, Sekhukhuni, Subhuza and many 
others".335 In the 1950-52 Joint Action and Defiance Campaign chiefs were constantly 
referred to in attempts to inspire united action. In an ANC Youth League document it was 
argued that " if Makana, Dingaan, Khama and Sekhukhuni had defended their country 
jointly, Africa would have been saved for posterity,,336 In an urgent call for unity, 
Reverend Skomolo argued in a letter to Professor Matthews on 16 June 1950, "We are 
dividing the nation into two or several hostile camps. Chiefs under the jackboot of the 
ruler set against the urban labourer and the end will be that Congress will stink in the 
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nostrils of the whole nation" .337 Hence, through the chiefs the ANC was hoping to extend 
its influence from the urban areas to tribal Africans and consequently to the whole nation. 
In general, the ANC's attempt to renew its relationship was prompted by the efforts of 
individuals, who had an ideological or pragmatic motive for doing so. In terms of 
expediency, these efforts were an attempt to revive the ANC, and in so doing mobilise 
the nation in united action against the government. 
These efforts were met with limited success. Xuma maintained contact with Paramount 
Dinizulu. The Natal Congress under Champion continued Dube's practice of maintaining 
informal contacts with chieftaincy. Through the influence of Dr Bokwe of Middle drift in 
the Eastern Cape, the Amagqunukwebe came to accept the Congress as their national 
organisation in 1943. In 1945 the Swazi Paramount agreed to establish a Congress branch 
in its territory. The Bakwena-ba-Magoba also allowed the presence of an ANC 
Committee. Through the efforts of the chiefs, the ANC was able to re-establish its 
presence in Rustenberg and Pietersberg areas of the Transvaal and Sekhukuniland. In 
general however increased militarisation put strain on the relationship of the chiefs and 
the ANC. The Native Affairs Department placed great pressure on the chiefs and once the 
National Party came to power and the Program of Action was adopted, chiefly 
participation declined sharply.338 In addition, factions of the liberation movement became 
highly critical of the chiefs and the ANC's favourable attitude towards the chiefs. The 
AAC described chieftainship as undermining the liberation of the people and criticised 
the ANC's policy of "staking a claim for democratic rights and in the same breath asking 
for the very negation of democracy". 339 
At this time, the ANC was not alone in its attempts to use the institution of chieftaincy as 
a means of reviving itself. In 1928-9 the ICU was crippled by leadership disputes, 
factionalism and financial and organisational disarray. The Independent ICU based in 
East London was a successor faction, which saw the value of rural chiefs in the 
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mobilisation of workers. The majority of East London's labouring population were 
migrant workers with a dual concern for immediate issues such as wages and living 
conditions as well as issues involving land, livestock and crops. The rural slums were still 
very important for migrants because they represented their long-term futures; where they 
would eventually return when work was completed340 
Factions in the IICU argued that chiefs would undermine the national struggle by 
introducing particularistic loyalties and that chiefs were representatives of rural 
backwardness. However, a larger faction argued that it was a 'political reality' that if 
chiefs were hostile to the IICU it would be difficult to recruit their followers as members. 
This conflicting attitude is evident in reports on the one hand that "Your native chiefs 
will not build you into a strong nation, but the ICU will" and "They are paid servants of 
the government ... they are selling us to the white people,,341 On the other hand, chiefs 
were welcomed if they expressed an interest in the tenets of the IICU and its national 
approach; this is evident in the links established by the IICU with senior Transkeian 
chiefs such as Poto and Dalindyebo. Chiefs themselves made calls for IICU support; 
Chief Mweto of Peddie requested the IICU's support in a protracted resistance campaign 
against government land policies. Chief Mgcwezulu of King Williamstown travelled to 
East London "to meet the committee to request them to send a man amongst my people to 
organise them .. I like this Independent ICU because it unites our people" 342 
Rural areas which showed the greatest enthusiasm for the IICU were among the more 
traditionalist country areas especially in King Williamstown and Kentani districts. The 
IICU rallied around the figure of Hintsa who was the last independent Gcaleka chief who 
was tricked and killed during the war of 1835. In the strike of 1930 the IICU capitalised 
on its links with the chiefs. The chiefs provided gifts of grain and cattle, which were used 
to feed the strikers; the chiefs denounced scab labour; and the chiefs represented rural 
solidarity. On the first day of the strike Kadalie promised that "the Native chiefs 
throughout the country have no time for government: they correspond with me privately; 
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we are now going to get cattle from these chiefs to feed you" 343 The Gcaleka chief 
Pakamela from Kentani echoed these sentiments when he told a large crowd in East 
London that "Hertzog can no more depend too much on the loyalty of the Native 
chiefsn344 In turn the lICU supported numerous grievances in rural villages where they 
had constituents; defending the rights of landholders, condemning the method of mine 
recruiting and low wages paid to farm workers, and supporting beer drinks, initiation rites 
and other traditionalist pursuits. 345 But like the ANC' s attempt to mobilise the rural 
dwellers through the chiefs, this strategy was short-lived as more chiefs were drawn into 
a collaborative relationship with the state from the 1930's. 
A further reason for the failure of attempts to revive the liberation movement's 
relationship with the chiefs is the increased detribalisation of the African peasantry. At a 
meeting of the NRC Chief Poto argued, "I want to say that even in regard to the people 
who are in the urban areas who may be regarded as detribalised, they still have a great 
regard for their chiefs" 346 This was true of migrant labourers who held a dual concern for 
events in both the rural and urban areas. However urbanisation meant that people's 
allegiances were transferred away from the tribe to either the developing black political 
institutions in the cities or to the cultural values of their white overlords. As Campbell 
argued, "Detribalisation, therefore, was a concomitant of the proletarianisation of the 
peasantry,,347 Evans writing in 1934 argued that 
"although tribalism is still a living institution in most of the reserves, its authority 
is very much on the wane amongst the great mass of Natives living on European 
land, while, in the urban areas, it is dying fast, if not already dead. It is obviously 
impossible to work through Native institutions, where they have ceased to exist, 
and, even in predominately tribal areas, there are a certain number of individuals 
who have adopted a European mode of lifen348 
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However, as shown above, discourse at national level increasingly revolved around the 
retribalisation of the African. The National Party in particular attempted to reverse the 
process of detribalisation in the form of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 
The Bantu Authorities Act sounded the death knoll for the popular legitimacy enjoyed 
previously by the chiefs. As will be shown in the next chapter this act had disastrous 
consequences for chiefs relationship with the people and consequently their relationship 
with the liberation movement. As Dr. Matthews of the ANC rightly prophesised, 
"The Bantu Authorities Act is intended to bluff the African chiefs into believing 
that it restores to them the original powers they enjoyed before the coming of the 
white man. In real fact it prevents any democratic system being extended to the 
Africans in the reserves and places the Chiefs into the position which must 
necessarily provoke the antagonism of their people and undermine their prestige" 
94 
CHAPTER 4: BANTUSTANS AND CHIEFLY AUTHORITY 
From Reserves to Bantustans 
In the face of growing pressures from progressive forces inside and outside South Africa, 
the Nationalist Party applied the 'cardinal rule of colonial administration' namely, 
"wherever and whenever possible, arrange for power to be handed over to the most 
conservative local leadership available", namely the chiefs349 As Mbeki argued, 
"The government has no option but to work through the Chiefs who, like the 
Nationalists, have a mortal fear of change and the will of the common peasants. 
Conservatism is the lifeblood of the chieftainship system, and change threatens the 
positions of power that the Chiefs and the government enjoy. Chiefs and 
government, therefore, have common aims: to resist movements advocating multi-
racialism and modern-social developmentn350 
As was shown in the last chapter, historically chiefs enjoyed a large degree of popular 
legitimacy but this faded towards the 1950's as chiefs were increasingly drawn into a 
collaborative relationship with the state. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Dr W.W .M 
Eiselen admitted that chieftainship had not kept up with the requirements of the times and 
that it was "rapidly losing its grip on the people", but he dismissed the local council 
system as a failure as it had not "developed in a natural way out of the tribal system,,351 
He later argued that the "councils in the rural areas have not been able to convert the 
Native population to a more progressive mode of life. We find more deterioration than 
progress. We must, therefore, ask the question whether the council system, based largely 
on Western concepts of social organisation, is a suitable instrument for guiding and 
controlling the development of the Bantu people". 352 The bantustan policy based on the 
rule of the chiefs was regarded as a means of resolving these shortcomings. 
349 D.A.J. Campbell, Radical Resistance to Minority Rule in South Africa, 1906-1965. PHD Thesis. 
Buffalo: State University of New York. 1975: 233. 
350 G. Mbeki, South Africa: The Peasants Revolt. England: Pengnin Mrican Library. 1964: 145. 
3;] Cited in D. Welsh, The Cultural Dimension of Apartheid. Seminar Paper. University of Cape Town: Abe 
Bailey Institute for Interracial Studies. 1972: 46. 
352 Ciskei General Council: 1711011951. 
95 
At a basic level the bantustan programme was a means of enacting a policy of divide and 
rule. By redefining Africans into ten ethnic minorities, which were given substance in the 
territorial form of homelands, the National Party attempted to counter the effects of 
urbanisation and proletarianisation. In other words, attempts were made to counter the 
heightening political consciousness of the African masses and to slow down the surge of 
African nationalism. Socio-political tensions were directed into 'manageable' ethnic 
channels, which were ruthlessly controlled and diverted from the 'white' urban areas to 
the countryside where they constituted less of a threat.353 Complementary to ethnic 
differentiation was the revival of chieftaincy, which formed the basis of indirect rule as 
formulated by Lord Lugard. By basing political institutions on indigenous auxiliaries 
white officials hoped to divert tension and anger away from themselves by enacting their 
policies through the chiefs. This not only provided the appearance that blacks were ruling 
themselves but provided a standing excuse for excluding the new modern African elites 
from political power. In other words, the homelands were designed to prevent the passing 
of power to black politicians, workers and intellectuals by reinforcing the power of the 
chiefs354 Thus chiefly rule was used to justify the exclusion of Africans from full 
participation in the political system. Furthermore, the bantustan program removed the 
economic and social burden of caring for Africans particularly the elderly, sick and 
economically unproductive. On the other hand, it also removed the employers' 
responsibility for providing housing and social welfare to workers who were housed in 
resettlement areas such as Mdantsane, just inside the border of the homeland and 
employed outside the homelands, in industrial centers located for example in East 
London. In so doing, this policy attempted to reverse the flow of urbanisation while 
securing a stable labour force for the growing manufacturing industry.355 
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These motives were masked by the Nationalist Party's renewed emphasis on cultural 
segregation and separate development. This was consistent with Afrikaner Nationalism, 
which was based on the basic tenet that cultural diversity was a God-given phenomenon, 
which must be cherished and fostered. Separate development was regarded as necessary 
to accommodate otherwise irreconcilable differences among various national groups. 
This notion of cultural pluralism was initially utilised in the Afrikaner's cultural struggle 
for survival in an anglicised South African society but in this context it was used to 
entrench the subordinate position of black people. The white group was seen as the most 
technically advanced and upon which other groups were dependent for economic and 
political leadership356 It was argued that 'Bantu culture' required chieftainship while 
western government institutions belonged exclusively to 'white culture'. In other words, 
whites regarded chieftaincy as a symbol of non-competition. As chieftainship was by 
definition limited to the 'tribe' it could never be used to control whites whereas equal 
participation in white governmental institutions would pose a threat to white domination. 
Hence whites supported chieftaincy in order to avoid the "competitive scheme of race 
relationsn357 Therefore, the issue of chieftaincy became the center of the rhetoric on 
cultural segregation and separate development. 
As Pieres argues, "ideology does not dictate political action, but political action can 
always legitimate itself through an ideological rationalization or another" 3 58 In this case, 
the development of bantustans was legitimated by the ideology of cultural segregation. In 
1953 Dr Verwoerd, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development argued at the 
first session of the Ciskeian Territorial Authority that development and culture "cannot be 
transplanted to a community as a pre-fabricated product. There is so much in our Bantu 
system which with heart and hand merits sound development and on which your 
forefathers have built for ages, that it is my policy to build a future for the Bantu on this 
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national foundation" 359 At a later stage he insisted that government policy should be 
seeking to 
"restore tribal life as far as possible by seeing to it that the chiefs and the whole 
tribal government adapt themselves to the exigencies of our times and thereby 
automatically regain the position of authority, which they forfeited to a large extent 
through their backwardness ... the natives of this country do not belong to the same 
tribe or race. They have different languages and customs. We are of the opinion 
that the solidarity of the tribes should be preserved and that they should develop 
along the lines of their own national character and tradition. For that purpose we 
want to rehabilitate the deserving chiefs as far as possible, and we would like to see 
their authority maintained over the members of their tribes. Suitable steps will be 
taken in this direction" 360 
The first step came in the form of the Bantu Administration Act of 1951, which abolished 
the Native Representative Council and the council system. In its place it established a 
three-tiered hierarchy of administrative authority namely a Tribal and/or Community 
Authority at local level consisting of chiefs and councillors, a Regional Authority (two or 
more tribal authorities) and a Territorial authority at national level. Chiefs dominated all 
three levels. This Act was not enforced immediately because it was enacted a year prior 
to the ANC Defiance Campaign of passive resistance. Thus officials opted to apply it 
gradually in order to avoid provoking further resistance in the rural areas. In 1955 the 
South African government eventually persuaded the Transkei Territories General Council 
to abolish itself and accept the new tribal government.361 
The next step involved abolishing black representation III parliament while making 
provision for the recognition of eight national units based upon linguistic clusters. This 
came in the form of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which adopted the 
rhetoric of national self-determination and created the framework within which political 
35' Ciskei General Council: 2711011953. 
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development in the homelands could proceed. Legislative assemblies and executive 
councils were established but these bodies had no power to amend or repeal South 
African legislation. Verwoerd declared that "if the various Bantu national units show the 
ability to attain the required stage of self-sufficiency, they will eventually form a South 
African Commonwealth, together with White South Africa, which will serve as its core 
and as guardian of the emerging Bantu states". In 1961 Verwoerd further argued that the 
government would have to create "separate Bantu states ... thereby buying for the white 
man his freedom and right to retain domination in what is his country, settled for him by 
his forefathers,,%2 He argued that he was prepared to pay a price for retaining white 
man's domination, namely by giving the Bantu full rights to develop in their own areas. 
Thus he simultaneously promised black people that this policy was a stepping stone to 
eventual independence whilst promising white people that this policy would entrench 
their control and guardianship over the black race. 
Transkei was the first homeland to bear the brunt of this policy. The Transkei Self-
Government Act of 1963 replaced the Transkei Territorial Authority by the Transkei 
Legislative Authority. Sixty-four chiefs outnumbered forty-five elected members in this 
legislature, which according to officials was a means of 'wedding the ancient tribe to the 
modern democracy'. The homeland legislature had limited powers as white authorities 
controlled the major spheres of finance, defense, foreign affairs and internal security and 
the State President could veto all legislative matters passed by the Assembly363 
The 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizen Act enacted a dual-type of citizenship for Africans; 
Africans could be citizens of the homelands while remaining citizens of the Republic 
under international law. In reality one could not simply divide blacks and whites 
particularly in terms of geography and economy; Africans constituted over two thirds of 
the South African labour force and over fifty percent of the African population lived 
outside the homelands. However, every attempt was made to separate them culturally and 
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politically. For example, the Bantu Education Act of 1953 dictated that schools would 
transmit cultural values and children would be taught in the vernacular thereby leading to 
the racial and ethnic stratification of education. Officials entertained the fantasy that 
Africans in the 'white' areas were foreigners or temporary sojourners. Tribal 
ambassadors were appointed to represent the 'chiefs' in the towns. The Urban Bantu 
Council Act of 1961 ensured that Africans in the urban areas were placed under a 
modified form of the Bantu Authorities364 Furthermore, interactions between culturally 
distinct areas were to be monitored efficiently by an extensive pass law system, which 
Verwoerd justified with reference to "the well-ordered traditional Bantu life" where 
traditional laws govern the movement and behaviour of individuals to serve the 
. 365 
communIty. 
The next step in the politics of cultural segregation moved beyond Indirect Rule as 
defined by Lugard. This was the National Party's pragmatic response to international 
criticism, vacillating western policy and increased internal resistance. Africa was 
characterised by increasing decolonisation as indigenous rulers were granted 
independence from their colonial overlords. Within South Africa resistance from the 
black population was met with growing state repression and consequently, increased 
international criticism. On the 21 March 1960 police opened fire on members of a PAC-
organised campaign against pass laws, killing sixty-seven people and injuring one 
hundred and eighty-six others, in what became known as the Sharpville massacre. This 
led to a wave of stay-at-homes, riots and marches across South Africa. In response, the 
government banned the ANC and PAC under the Unlawful Organisations Act. This led to 
an international outcry; Britain and USA voted against South Africa at the United 
Nations and foreign investors fled the country. Consequently, the ANC and PAC saw 
violence as the only option. Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) was formed in 
December 1961 and was crushed in 1963 in Rivonia. POQO, affiliated to the PAC, was 
smashed by force in 1961. The government appeared to have restored its control over the 
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African population, but in the face of international pressure it sought to show that the 
separate development was more than a policy of repression366 
By the 1971 Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, the State President was empowered to 
establish by decree a legislative assembly for any homeland. The 1972 Bantu Laws 
Amendment Act transferred control of prisons, motor-transportation, traffic regulation 
and licensing of road vehicles to the Transkei government. The Bantu Laws Amendment 
Act of 1973 granted these various powers to other homelands at the discretion of the 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. Consequently, the size and scope of 
homeland bureaucracies increased, thereby enhancing the development of a petty 
bourgeoisie highly dependent on the homeland state for its material prosperity This class 
was to complement the chiefs' efforts in maintaining the National Party' s control over the 
homeland populations. Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Lebowa assumed self-government 
status in 1972 and were followed by Gazankulu and Venda in 1973, and Kwazulu and 
KwNgwane in 1977. Accompanying these legislative developments general elections 
were held in the self-governing homelands: Bophuthatswana (1972 and 1977) Ciskei 
(1973 and 1978) Lebowa (1973) Gazankulu (1973), Transkei (1973 and 1976), Venda 
(1973 and 1978), KwaZulu (1978) and Basutho Qwa Qwa in 1975 and 1980367 
The final step in this National Party policy was a form of "quasi-decolonisation" which 
culminated in the granting of independence to Transkei in 1976. This "involved the 
modernising of South Africa' s colonial structural pattern by upgrading it to the more 
effective, and more acceptable internationally, neo-colonial pattern, converting the centre 
or white core area's direct physical domination over the black periphery to a situation 
where the centre assumes a posture of indirect imperial domination of a string of 
politically independent, economically powerless satellites,,368 In other words, by granting 
political 'independence' to the homelands, the National Party masked the homeland's 
economic dependence on the South African economy. This dependence effectively 
ensured that by holding the purse strings, the National Party could exercise effective 
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control over the bantustans and hide this continued domination behind the rhetoric of 
cultural segregation. 
In reality however, cultural segregation was "part of the technique of domination. 
Ideologically it rationalizes the hierarchical ordering of society; practically it aims at 
inhibiting the process of social change among Africans and ensuring that change is 
directed into channels that make it politically harmless from the white's point ofview,,369 
The chiefs formed the fulcrum upon which this domination was based. By increasing 
their powers the Nationalist Party government sought to strengthen its hold over the black 
population, as these compliant functionaries would be less responsive to the demands of 
the people than elected councils. Chiefs were placed in the forefront of political 
competition and local governance. They were vital in the consolidation of undemocratic 
regimes, which relied on their assistance for electoral manipulation, military and judicial 
control as well as for extending the chain of dependency into the reserve population. 
However, in so doing "chiefs seemed to the people to be turning into stooges of 
government, rather than into masters of the people,,37o Mayer questioned whether the 
new policies have "breathed new life into the tribal elite, or have sealed its fate with a 
kiss of death".371 It will be shown that chiefs lost all remnants of the popular legitimacy 
that they had previously enjoyed. No longer were they regarded as the bulwark against 
the state but were regarded as part of the latter's intrusions. Hence rural resistance that 
was initially quelled by the late 1960's rose again in the 1980's against the chiefs and the 
bantustan system as a whole. Chiefs formed the key to the National Party's oppression of 
the black people in the reserves; thus, the fall of the chiefs symbolised the beginning of 
the end for Apartheid and its oppressive policies. 
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Political Footballs 
"The issue of chiefship in the Ciskei (and Transkei) is a prime example of the way in 
which ideological argument may be used as the language through which the real stuff of 
politics - competition for power - is conducted and, at the same time, concealed"-372 In 
the National Party' s attempts to rationalise chiefly authority and to assimilate this 
patrimonial system of authority to bureaucratic principles, opportunities arose where the 
issue of chieftaincy became the 'political football' around which political competition 
proceeded in the territorial authorities and legislative assemblies. The weight given to 
chieftaincy in the rhetoric of cultural segregation and separate development ensured that 
chieftaincy became a valuable resource which emerging political parties vied for and 
manipulated. At the national level, the paradoxical role of the chiefs came to the 
forefront; no longer were they accountable to their people over whom they were 
supposed to abide; they were rather accountable to the government to whom they owed 
their recognition and material status. The numerical majority accorded to them in the 
homeland legislatures was vital for a party seeking power and seeking to consolidate this 
power. This is evident in the rise of Kaiser Matanzima' s Transkei National Independence 
Party (TNIP) and Sebe's Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP). 
Transkei . 
Transkei was deemed perfect for Verwoerd's purposes of demonstrating the success of 
separate development. It was a large contiguous territory, ethnically homogenous, largely 
rural and inhabited by a large number of hard-line pro-government chiefs such as Kaiser 
D Matanzima. 373 The constitution of this new self-governing state was designed to ensure 
that an Assembly wholly composed of chiefs did not undermine international approval 
and a wholly elective Assembly did not hinder popular support. Verwoerd 's solution 
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came in the form of a 'hybrid' assembly justified as a "unique synthesis of African 
tradition and western democracy,,374 Paragraph twenty-four of Transkei's new 
constitution proposed that the new legislative assembly be composed of sixty-four (64) 
chiefs and forty-five (45) elected members. 375 
This was however met with opposition from some members of the Transkeian Territories 
General Council who argued that that the elected element should be increased and chiefly 
element reduced or moved to a second chamber based on a bicameral parliament. They 
argued that it was necessary to cater for the principle of popular representation. It was 
argued that "there are a number of people more intelligent than chiefs" and thus elected 
members had a superior claim to legislate.376 They further highlighted the advantages for 
chiefs who would not be exposed to conflict "caused by having to mediate the commands 
of an irresistible government to an unwilling people" . 377 In other words, by forfeiting 
their opportunity to legislate, chiefs would not be negatively influenced by the failure of 
the modern legislature; their failure to co-ordinate their 'fatherly ' leadership role with 
that of a modern legislator in terms of representation and accountability; their failure to 
reconcile their dual roles as legislators and administrators and their failure to combine 
their traditional ' aloof stance with that of an active deliberator. Many members of the 
TTGC further argued that chiefs should be elected378 In response it was argued that 
because chiefs and headmen "are leaders by birthright or by tribal law, then there is no 
need to elect them to position which they already hold".379 Nevertheless, after discussion 
for a day and a half all amendments were withdrawn or defeated and paragraph twenty-
four was passed (70-3). As a result, chiefs came to dominate the territorial authority. In 
many ways this debate was the turning point for the chiefs. No longer were they 
responsible and accountable to their people but could "generally be relied upon to toe the 
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government line because they are officials of the Republic ' s government, responsible to 
that government and not to the Transkeian citizen,,38o 
The Transkei Constitution Act (No 48) was finally passed in 1963. Transkei had a 
measure of autonomy, was self-governing and had a parliament, flag and national anthem 
to prove it. The executive cabinet was led by the Chief Minister who was also responsible 
for finance and was constituted by five other ministers responsible for justice, the 
interior, education, agriculture, forestry, roads and works. The Cabinet was chosen by the 
members of the Legislative Assembly. Thus, political rule was partially contingent on the 
outcome of the elections. Elections were held on 20 September 1963 in an environment 
greatly affected by a State of Emergency, which placed a ban on all meetings of more 
than ten people, placed severe penalties for statements ' disrespectful to chiefs ' and 
permitted indefinite detention without warrant or trial. Alistair Sparks of the Rand Daily 
Mail described the elections as characterised by "an oppressive condition of fear 
everywhere - fear of government action, fear of police action, fear of the action of 
chiefs".38J Many town dwellers did not vote and many urban elite did not stand as 
candidates partly due to the perception that the election was a fraud entrenching the 
notion of 'separate and inferior' as opposed to 'separate but equal'. One hundred and 
eighty (180) candidates stood for forty-five (45) seats in nine electoral districts. Most 
candidates were rural elite such as teachers and wealthier farmers drawn from an 
emergent modern elite. Chiefs were the ex-officio majority in the assembly but many 
opted to compete directly with the rural modern elite in the elections382 Unsurprisingly, 
chieftaincy was the overt focus of the elections and the issue around which political 
competition took place. 
Two main figures, each representing different facets of chiefly rule, competed for the 
position of Chief Minister, namely Chief Kaiser Matanzima and Chief Victor Poto. 
Matanzima was the Paramount Chief of Emigrant Thembuland who owed his position to 
government support. He was initially a minor chief who administered the St. Marks 
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district, after which time he was handed Calanga, then Lady Frere in the Glen Grey 
district. He was then made a paramount chief and given Emigrant Thembuland in a 
deliberate move by the government to 'encourage' support from recalcitrant chiefs such 
as Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo and Chief Botha Sigcau, who opposed the 
homeland policy3 83 Consequently, Matanzima became a "frantic supporter of Bantu 
Authorities, and the whole Bantustan fantasy" 384 He was a university graduate, a lawyer 
and a member ofthe urban modern elite. 
In contrast, Chief Poto was a member of the rural modern elite; he had no university 
education, had great experience in Transkeian local government, had been a paramount 
chief since 1918, a member of the Native Representative Council since 1937 and was a 
conservative who saw the need to unite traditional values and liberal democratic values in 
a multiracial state. He thus questioned the issue of separate development, in particular the 
role of the chief in the new dispensation. He argued that in order to preserve the dignity 
of chiefs as the Transkeian aristocracy, it was necessary to place the chiefs in a second 
chamber and leave politics largely to the elected legislators.38S He stated, "The two 
houses of parliament are an attempt to save the chiefs from a dangerous position. We 
want them to stay clear of the conflicts and tribulations of the lower house, where there 
will be hot verbal exchanges. Let them take their position of dignity in the upper 
house" 386 At a meeting in Butterworth he stated, "I came out of my womb so that I 
should be a chief. .. Knowing my background you will not doubt me when I tell you that I 
shall perpetuate the institution of chieftainship in the Transkei till my dying day" 387 In 
contrast, Matanzima argued that in order to perpetuate the institution of chieftaincy chiefs 
must dominate a single-chambered legislature. In these debates, Poto emerged as a 
symbol of the' good chief who had a traditional claim to authority and who sides with 
the people against the white government. He was seen as independent of government: 
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"Personally, I don't fear the government because it is not my God. If your chieftainship 
was given to you by God, what is there to fear? ,,388 On the other hand, Matanzima was 
seen as the 'bad chief, lacking traditional sanction to authority and a ruthless and violent 
representative of the white government.389 
The older educated elite supported Matanzima while the younger members rallied behind 
the less educated Poto. Poto was supported by thirty-eight (38) elected members, while 
Matanzima received the votes of forty-seven chiefs (47) who were greatly pressured by 
government and saw the material benefits of supporting him. In total Matanzima received 
fifty-four (54) votes to forty-nine (49) and was consequently placed in the position of 
Chief Minister. This once again marked a decisive step in moving the chiefs further from 
their people and closer to the government. Legitimacy granted from above was regarded 
as more important than that bestowed from below390 
Following the elections Poto and his aides formed the Democratic Party, which 
denounced Apartheid. In response, Matanzima formed the Transkei National 
Independence Party, which called for separate development. Both parties championed the 
institution of chieftaincy though offering the chiefs contrasting interpretations of their 
role and future in the new self-governing Transkei. The objectives of the Democratic 
Party heralded both modernity and tradition by calling for a "government of the people 
for the people and by the people" and arguing that the institution of chieftainship should 
be "maintained and perpetuated". In the TNIP's 'programme of principles' it was stated 
that "chieftainship is the traditional form of authority among the Bantu of the Transkei 
... forms the framework of political structure" and the "party is pledged not only to 
'preserve ' the office of chieftainship but also to preserve the ' chiefs' automatic 
membership in the Transkei Legislative Assembly.391 
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In the first few months, former Poto supporters crossed the floor and Matanzima faced 
little opposition because chiefs found it difficult to argue against government decisions 
particularly since it may have meant a loss of status and material wealth. The TNIP was 
not effectively challenged in the elections of 1968, 1973 and 1976. The Democratic Party 
was harassed by the Transkeian police and was the victim of electoral malpractices, 
which forced it to rely on political patronage and chiefly resources. Its main support lay 
in Ny and a and Dalindyebo regions where it was backed by the respective paramount 
chiefs. However, in 1976 both paramount chiefs quit the party. Tutor Ndamase succeeded 
his father to the Nyanda Paramountcy in 1972. He crossed to the ruling party allegedly 
because the TNIP had adopted a multiracial policy and the Pondo were in favour of 
independence. Dalindyebo left the DP because of its new leader, Guzana. In 1972, the 
party's Thembuland and Border Regional Committees urged Dalindyebo to oust Guzana 
and assume leadership. Although Dalindyebo declined, the rift in the party persisted and 
culminated in Guzana's replacement in January 1976, by young, Hector Ncokazi. 
Ncokazi 's alignment with radical forces (South African Student Organisation and the 
Black People's Convention), forced Dalindyebo to leave the party and sit in the 
Assembly as an independent, in order to safeguard his paramountcy from Matanzima' s 
threats of deposition. 392 
With the support of the chiefs who dominated the legislative assembly, Matanzima was 
able to entrench his position as the chief executive393 In general, it will be shown that 
this chiefly support sounded the death knell for the chief s long-term survival. "In 
rejecting the Poto solution the chiefs rejected the opportunity of climbing down 
gracefully, of translating the chief s ancient dignity and elite prestige - though not his 
ancient power - into terms compatible with the demands of modern politics". 394 
Ciskei 
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Ciskei received self-governing status much later than Transkei because it consisted of 
distinct black reserves interspersed with pockets of white owned farms and towns. 
Headmen had largely replaced hereditary chiefs, there was great opposition to the Bantu 
Authorities Act in the towns and ethnic rivalries threatened the narrow ethnic nationalism 
advocated by the National Party. The issue of chieftaincy was central to this ethnic 
rivalry. In brief, the Rharhabe Xhosa descended from the first Bantu-speakers in the area. 
'Mfengu ' was the collective name given to distinct groupings of clans who fled from 
Zululand and King Shaka's wrath. The cultural differences between the Rharhabe and 
Mfengu faded but were outweighed by the events of 1835 where the Mfengu deserted 
their Xhosa patrons and sought colonial protection in exchange for land and official 
recognition of their chiefs in the form of headmen. As a result, they became the better 
educated and more European oriented group and came to fill elite positions. However, the 
Bantu Authorities Act threatened this elite status. Long discarded Rharhabe 
chieftainships were re-instated and validated by documents that government ethnologists 
had rediscovered. In addition, the Rharhabe paramountcy returned to the Ciskei from 
eighty (80) years of exile beyond the Kei.395 
In the discourse on separate development, the "politics of chieftaincy intersected with the 
politics of ethnicity,,396 The Ciskei Territorial Authority was established in 1961. It 
consisted of the chairman of the constituent regional authority and 2 members appointed 
by each regional authority. The Paramount Chief of the Rharhabe was designated 
Chairman. Chief Velile Sandile occupied this position until 1968. The Mfengu chief 
Justice Mabandla was aware that the new dispensation played into the hands of the 
Rharhabe and as a result he issued the 'Fingo Manifesto' in 1968 in order to protect the 
elite status previously enjoyed by this group. In the manifesto he requested that the 
Mfengu be regarded as entirely independent of the Rharhabe and the legislature be 
structured on ethnic lines. This request was enacted in the New Deal arrangements 
395 Anonymous, "Ethnicity and Pseudo-Etlmicity in the Ciskei" in Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in 
Southern Africa. London: James Currey. 1989: 398. 
396 Peires, "Continuity and Change", p. 138. 
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outlined in Proclamation R143 of 1968 in which the legislature was to be constituted on a 
ratio of two Mfengu, two Rharhabe, one Sotho and one Thembu. 397 
At the opening of the new legislative authority on 14 November 1968, M. C Botha, the 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development stated, 
"At times criticism was expressed by ill-disposed persons and newspapers in 
regard to the chiefs and the role which they played in the service of their 
respective tribes. Nevertheless, during these years of greater responsibility they 
again proved that the system of chieftainships and tribal authorities, as recognised 
by law, is the system of government accepted by you and that, adapted to the 
demands of a modern society, it can in practice function effectively as an 
. f " 398 mstrument 0 government . 
Chiefs were ex officio members of the legislature and dominated it by constituting 
twenty-nine out of forty-nine seats. This was met with opposition from elected 
councillors who called for increased popular representation. Councillor Qali argued, "I 
would like to give an example of what is known as democratic rule. Our position is still 
different from the Chiefs that no one will interfere with them at any time. I think that it 
would be better if the chiefs were elected by the people" 399 This was repudiated by the 
Commissioner General who argued, 
"The whole tribal system is vested in the chief as the chief administrative officer 
of that tribe. If it is required of chiefs to be elected by popular vote it would mean 
the whole foundation of chieftainship would be dropped from under the 
chiefs ... we all know in the tribal system chiefs are in high regard and respected by 
the people. Therefore, if it was determined that the chiefs must be elected by 
popular vote it would be an entire diversion and carmot be tolerated in terms of the 
Bantu authorities Act" 400 
391 C. W Manana, "Ethnic Relations in the Ciskei" in N. Cbarton (ed), Ciskei: Economics and Politics of 
Dependence in aSoufhAjrican Homeland. London: Hurst and Co. 1980: 105-106; Anonymons, "Ethnicity 
and Pseudo-Ethnicity" , p. 399. 
398 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 17/0411972. 
399 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 1710411972. 
'00 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 17/04/1972, p. 46. 
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Ciskei achieved self-governing status on 1 August 1972. Chief Mabandla was designated 
Chief Executive while Sebe was given the position of Minister of Education. With the 
support of some chiefs and businessmen from Port Elizabeth, Zwelitsha and Mdantsane, 
Sebe represented the Rharhabe. Initially his group called themselves the Broederbond as 
they, like Afrikaners aimed to protect and preserve a particular culture. Not long 
thereafter, the decision was made to expand their membership under the new name 
Ikhonco (link) to symbolise the unity of the Ciskei. In response Mabandla's group called 
themselves Imbokotho (,grinding stone or missile); "Symbolic of unity, of grinding out 
tribalism" in line with the South African government's ethnic nationalist policies. Thi s 
did little to hide the ethnic rivalry at the core of Ciskeian politics. Mabandla accused Sebe 
of holding secret meetings and plotting against the government. Sebe accused Mabandla 
of ethnic favouritism and blocking applications of Rharhabe chiefs for government 
recognition. In 1973 Sebe formed the Ciskei National Independence Party and increased 
its membership by focussing on ethnic divisions; he frequently asked, "Why should we 
be ruled by the Fingo?" In so doing he awakened the historical and material grievances of 
the Rharhabe4 01 
The 1973 elections resounded this ethnic tone. Sebe' s group won a convincing majority 
of thirteen to seven elected seats and Sebe was elected Prime Minister by a small margin 
of twenty-six to twenty-four votes. On resuming his new position, Sebe stated, "The 
reason why I now find myself in his post is the fact that we belong to different tribes. 
Chief Mabandla is a Fingo and I am a Rharhabe. My tribe is bigger than his, therefore it 
was just a question of time before there was a change of premiership" 402 Although 
greatly assisted by South Africa, Sebe realised that he could only strengthen his party by 
establishing new chieftainships. The perfect opportunity to resuscitate several old 
Rharhabe chiefships came in the form of the South African government's attempts to 
consolidate the Ciskei. This involved attempts to confer geo-political unity on the Ciskei 
by removing black spots, selling white farms and adjusting Ciskei ' s borders. This led to 
401 N. Charton and G.R KaTywakadi, "Ciskeian Political Parties" in Charton (ed), Ciskei: Economics and 
Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland. London: Hurst and Co. 1980: 124-5; Anonymous, 
"Etlmicity and Psuedo-Ethnicity",p . 399. 
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an influx of displaced persons into the Ciskei and the rapid creation of resettlement 
camps403 Government ethnologists such as A.O Jackson indicated that aspirant chiefs 
needed to fulfil two main practical requirements, namely "the claimant's rights to be 
regarded as a chief must be demonstrated genealogically. He must have a sufficiently 
large following and his following must have its own territory in which it lives" 404 
Among the Xhosa all sons of chiefs become chiefs. For example Ngqika generated five 
chiefly lineages, thus genealogical demonstration was not a problem. Resettlement camps 
provided the territory over which the new chiefs could abide and facilitated an increase in 
the chiefs' income as they were paid according to the number of subjects below them. 
Altogether eight new Rharhabe chieftainships and one new Mfengu chieftainship was 
created. All of these new chiefs were Sebe supporters; for example, Tanana, the leader of 
Sebe loyalist on Mdantsane City Council, was made chief of Anta's people, the 
amaGwelane, ahead of the recognised chief living in the Transkei. Claims from 
Transkeian chiefs too closely associated with the Paramount Chief Anta who had an 
antagonistic relationship with Sebe, were overlooked; for example, Mnyanda who was 
the headman of Qugqwala location (King Williamstown District) and regarded as a chief 
by the surrounding location was turned down. Hence chieftainships were granted on 
political rather than ethnographic lines. Most of the chieftainship applications were 
written up by S.M Burns-Ncamashe who also wrote up one for himself on the basis of an 
old Hleke lineage. This was met with opposition from the existing amaHleke clan. Burns-
N camashe then influenced a "timid and illiterate" headmen of the Gwali lineage into 
recognising him as the head of the amaGwali in the Ciskei. This claim was also met with 
opposition as he was remembered as a member of the non-royal Kwayi clan405 Ironically 
at a later stage he opposed a chieftainship application in the Ciskei Legislative Assembly 
' 02 Charton and kaTywakadi, "CiskeianPolitical Parties", p. 126. Fur further details of this election see W. 
Le Roux, "First Ciskei Election" in Bullelin. Vol. XI (3). Africa Institute. 1973: 122-124. 
,o3 By 1989 at least 160 000 of Ciskei 's population had resided there for less than ten years, with an 
average influx of population of about 15 000 a year. Anonymous, "EtJmicity and Pseudo-EtJmicity", p. 
395 .. 
'04 Cited in Peires, " Continuity and Change", p. 137. 
,o5 Peires, "Continuity and Change", p. 138; Anonymous, "EtJmicity and Pseudo-EtJmicity" , p . 400. 
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on the grounds that "chieftainship is not just given to anybody, chieftainship always 
belongs to a certain dynasty" and that "the white ethnologist is not my ethnologist,,406 
This issue of chieftainship was once again the means through which political competition 
was played out. Sebe argued that Mabandla's opposition to the granting of these 
chieftainships showed that he did not respect and support the institution of chieftainship. 
Mabandla responded by pointing out that the Rharhabe Paramount Mxolise Sandile was 
his supporter. Before the Legislative Assembly was about to elect the Prime Minister, 
Sandile and two other pro-Mabandla Rharhabe chiefs appealed to chiefly solidarity by 
arguing that if Sebe, a commoner, was elected "the whole structure of chieftainship 
would collapse". 407 In response Sebe condemned the Paramount for getting involved in 
party politics because the CNIP believed that "in any country, the King or Paramount 
Chief was above party politics" 408 
Sebe then proceeded to grant himself chiefship. Although he was part of the royal 
Tshawe tribe he was not a chief In March 1977 Sebe declared that Chief Phatho had 
awarded his great-grandfather a chieftainship position because of his heroism in 1847 in 
the War of the Axe. Historically this was possible but it meant that Sebe was ranked 
junior to the biological descendents of ChiefPhatho. Later in 1977 Sebe claimed to be the 
descendent of chief Tyarha who lived in the middle of the eighteenth century. The fact 
that literally nothing was known of him did not bother Sebe. Consequently, Sebe became 
the chief of Fetters farm (later Ndevana resettlement camp), which he visited once during 
his first three years as its chief In general, the appointment of nine pro-Sebe chiefs 
turned Sebe' s small majority of between twenty-four (24) and twenty-six (26) in the 
Ciskei Legislative Assembly into a comfortable margin. 409 
In 1976 the CNIP government met with a vote of no confidence from the Ciskei National 
Party moved by Chief Mabandla on the basis that the "government has no respect for 
40' Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 30105/1979. 
40' Daily Dispatch: 0310411973 . 
• 08 Daily Dispatch: 1811011972. 
' 09 Anonymous, "Ethnicity and Pseudo Etlmicity", p. 401; Peires, "Continuity and Change", p. 138-139. 
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chiefs and chieftainships,,410 because it has "lowered the dignity of our chieftainship" by 
sending the message that one must "take no notice of this Chief of yours - you bring all 
your problems to my Office" 411 Furthermore, the government was "sowing seeds of 
dissension" by influencing people in their choice of headmen when this was exclusively 
the prerogative of the chief and his people. In addition, Mabandla described the 
government as racist because chiefs were mainly installed from the Rharhabe tribe and in 
particular, from the Tshawe clan.412 "Instead of claiming more land for the sons of the 
approved and recognised chiefs, they go on to confiscate land from a ruling chief because 
he happens to be of another clan, and secondly because the said chief does not support 
the ruling party. They put another chief there".413 He argued further than the CNIP used 
its new chiefs as "voting robots" because "there are none of them up to now, who have 
land with defined boundaries in spite of the promises made to them that they would be 
given land. Some have no tribal authorities either. They have no authority to try cases. 
They have no headmen either under them, and have no duties to perform. All they do is 
vote".414 
The funeral of Rharhabe Paramount Chief Bazindhlovu who died on 5 April 1976 is a 
further example of how the institution of chieftainship became the centre of political 
competition. The Gcaleka paramount Xolilizwe Sigcau (Transkei based king of the 
Xhosa) attended this funeral to announce that Bazindhlovu's widow would carryon as 
Regent for her minor son Maxhoba-Ayakhawuleza who was in his early twenties and had 
not yet been circumcised. This was met with great opposition from the CNIP who saw the 
opportunity of replacing a hostile paramount with one who was more pliable and 
enthusiastic towards CNIP policies. CNIP supporters formed the 'Rharhabe Tribunal' and 
elected a Jingqi chief, Chief Maqoma to the regency position until 1978. The CNP 
faction, who backed Maxhoba, called itself the 'Rharhabe Privy Council.' Pretoria sided 
with the CNIP and the Republican State President in his capacity of Supreme Chief of the 
Bantu approved Maqoma's appointment from 26 August 1976. In response the CNP 
410 This paragraph is gathered from the proceedings of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly, 06/0511975 . 
411 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 06/0511975, p. 17. 
412 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 06/0511975, p. 18. 
m Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 06/0511975, p. 19. 
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faction quickly circumcised Maxhoba-Ayakhawuleza but the Chief Minister and Regent 
argued that his elevation to this position was contingent on his being married. In 1987 
Maxhoba had not yet been installed as he was deemed a threat to Sebe.415 As Pieres 
argues, "Once the democratic basis of chiefship was removed and the opinion of 
councillors and people had ceased to matter, the contest was bound to be fought on the 
level of official recognition, because it is precisely on this basis that chiefship now 
rests".41 6 
Official recognition was further used by Sebe as a means to undermine chiefly support 
for Mabandla's Ciskei National Party. In Section 17(3) of Proclamation 110 of 1957 
amended in July 1958, it states that "the chiefs shall not become a member or take part in 
the affairs of any association whose objects are deemed by the Minister to be subversive, 
or physically constituted against government law and order',.417 If chiefs contravened this 
law they could be deprived of their chieftainship. A letter to IMVO signed by Mr. Qunta, 
the National Secretary of CNP placed chiefs who were associated with the CNP in a 
precarious position. This letter alleged CNP connections with the banned liberation 
movement and concluded by commending the CNP "because in its kraal there are ANC, 
PAC and AAC sheep, but all pulling together under the non-racialism preached by the 
CNP". Sebe described this as subversive, thereby placing pro-CNP chiefs at risk.418 
Consequently, a number of chiefs crossed the floor to the CNIP. This phenomena 
increased as various laws entrenched the powers of the chiefs such as the Ciskeian 
Administrative Authorities Act and the Ciskeian Authorities, Chiefs and Headman Act of 
1978. The Ciskeian General Law Amendment Bill placed the duty on chiefs to disperse 
riotous assemblies and penalised any person who disobeys, hurts or injures a chief or 
headman.41 9 
414 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 29/0411976, p. 30. 
415 Peires, "Continuity and Change", p. 139. 
416 Ibid, p. 139. 
417 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 06/0511975, p. 108. 
418 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 06/0511975. 
419 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 1978. 
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The CNIP won the 1973 elections as it had packed its party with chiefs. In 1978 most of 
the opposition was in detention or in hiding thereby ensuring that the CNIP won yet 
another election. At this stage all members of the opposition including Chief Mabandla 
crossed the floor. Ciskei was effectively a one-party state and Sebe was proclaimed 
president for life. This allowed him to attempt to broaden his support by now 
downplaying ethnic rivalries as he sought to construct an artificial Ciskiean ethnicity. The 
institution of chieftaincy was once again the key factor in this policy. He placed pro-Sebe 
Rharhabe chiefs into vacant Mfengu positions. He suppressed the annual Fingo 
emancipation and Nsikana Day Ceremonies on the grounds that they divide the nation. 
He constructed the 'Temple' or 'national shrine' at Ntaba Ndoba in dedication to a united 
Ciskei and to the chiefs who were to be buried in Heroes Acre420 
One such chief was Chief Maqoma who had perished in 1973 on Robben Island. With the 
assistance of the South African government, his bones were returned to the Ciskei and 
reburied on 13 August 1978. This symbolised that "Maqoma was not 'taken to his 
ancestors' on their land, but laid to rest in a spot chosen to symbolise Xhosa or Ciskeian 
nationalism, one already identified to some extent with the CNIP" 421 In addition, this 
much-publicised burial occurred at the same time as the funerals of Steve Biko and 
Robert Sobukwe who were symbolic of African resistance. By returning Maqoma to 
Ciskei with the Apartheid government's support, the funeral purported to signify that 
negotiation was more effective than confrontation. However, this funeral highlighted the 
contrast between Maqoma's noble birth and Sebe's suspect ancestry. It emphasised the 
popularity of Chief Lent Whyle Maqoma who was also present at the funeral. Sebe 
recognised a potential threat, dismissed Maqoma from the cabinet, stripped him of his 
chieftainship and exiled him from the Ciskei422 
420 Anonymous, "Ethnicity aud Pseudo Etlmicity", p. 402. The opening ofNtaba Ndoba was attended by 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha and his wife; both were garbed in traditional chiefly attire. (pretoria News 
28/04/1986). 
421 M.G. Whisson and C.W. Manona, "Maqoma and Ciskeian Politics Today" in Charton (ed), Ciskei: The 
Economics and Politics of Dependency in a South African Homeland. London: Hurst and Co. 1980: 225. 
422 Ibid, p. 225 . Anonymous, "Ethnicity and Pseudo Etlmicity", p. 407. 
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As is evident in both the Transkei and Ciskei homelands, competing parties regarded 
chieftaincy as a valuable resource in gaining political power. Its value was derived from 
the weight given to it by the South African government in their discourse on separate 
development and was reflected in the hybrid legislatures. The support of the majority of 
chiefs was a necessary prerequisite for taking power. As a result, the institution of 
chieftaincy was manipulated to serve the interests of the respective parties. Parties placed 
direct and indirect restraints on the chiefs and played with notions of ethnicity as a means 
of accruing increased chiefly support. Thus, chieftaincy became a 'political football ' 
around which political competition was carried out. However, the importance of 
chieftaincy extended beyond its numerical majority in the legislature, to its ability to 
consolidate the power of the respective parties at the local level. 
'The New Jockeys' 
"Though the whip has remained in he hand of the White government, it has been the 
Chiefs, the new jockeys riding the reserve horse, who have applied the spurs. The chiefs 
are now well in the saddle".423 Chiefs were able to apply these spurs because they 
dominated not only the homeland legislatures but also local governance. In this position 
they wielded inordinate control over key resources and key administrative and judicial 
sectors thereby giving them the power to ' engineer consent' amongst an impoverished 
and desperate homeland population. As chiefs were a vital resource in consolidating 
power, their institution was bureaucratised so as to ensure that they, as salaried 
functionaries, continued to act in the interest of the respective ruling parties in the Ciskei 
and Transkei homelands. 
By Proclamation No 18011956 the Bantu Administration Act was applied to the Transkei , 
thereby abolishing the council system in 1957. This Act established territorial, regional , 
district and tribal authorities. At the top of the pyramid the territorial authority could be 
found; as already noted this was later converted into a Legislative Assembly. The 
Regional Authority represented groups of districts; for example Matatiele and Mount 
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Fletcher comprised the Maluti Regional Authority. It consisted of the paramount chief in 
the area, the chief or headman of any tribal authority, the chairman of a community 
authority and one tribal representative designated by each tribaVcommunity authority. In 
total nine regional authorities were established in the Transkei. The functions of the 
regional authority hitherto had been primarily administrative and advisory. In 1982 these 
functions were widened by the Regional Authorities Court Act, which gave regional 
authority courts jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases. The district authority was 
comprised of the head or chief of the dominant tribe in the district as well as at least eight 
other members nominated by the head, the Bantu Commissioner and all appointed chiefs 
in the district. District authorities were disestablished by the Transkei Authorities Act of 
1965 in favour of increased supervision and assistance by the magistrate in whose office 
a local bureau was established. By 1959 the Republican government had established three 
hundred and twenty four Traditional Authorities across South Africa of which one 
hundred and twenty three existed in the Transkei; twenty-six District Authorities, all of 
which were established in the Transkei; sixteen Regional authorities and one Territorial 
Authority. 424 
At the local level the Tribal Authority (T A) was comprised of the head and a number of 
councillors including the paramount chief and every chief residing within the area of 
jurisdiction of Tribal Authority. The councillors were appointed by the head and the 
paramount chief, and a number were elected by registered voters in the area. The latter 
could however not exceed one third of the total number of councillors. Subhead men were 
expected to attend but were not paid. Quarterly public meetings were jointly attended by 
magistrates, chiefs and headmen, and people were encouraged to approach the magistrate 
with problems provided that they were accompanied by the chief and headmen.425 
423 Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt" , p. 109. 
4" J. Segar, Fruits of Apartheid: Experiencing Independence in a Transkeian Village. Bellville: Anthropos 
Publishers. 1989: 31. D.A. Kotze, "Rural Local Goverrunent Trends in the Transkei, Lesotho and 
Rhodesia" in South African Journal of African Affairs. Vol. 2. 1972: 60-1. Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt", p. 41. 
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118 
All members of the T A were men and were advanced in age. In the traditional authority 
of the Arnatola Basin, the average age of members was sixty-eight years. Furthermore, 
members were largely uneducated426 because chiefs were not chosen on the basis of 
education: "When we have to choose a Chief we look for somebody of royal blood. Even 
if that particular individual has never been to school he shall be installed as chief' 
because "if one is born a chief, therefore he is a man of brains,,427 Due to ignorance and 
lack of education, corruption and malpractice became rife. In the Ciskei Territorial 
Authority, members complained that the Chief "cannot make head or tail of the 
regulations. Where the Chief should perhaps be guided by the Tribal Authority you find 
that he wants no guidance from them despite his ignorance and he says, 'I have appointed 
my men at a particular place and I have used my prerogative as chief ,, 428 Attempts were 
made to resolve this problem. Lectures and courses were given to chiefs at Fort Cox 
Agricultural College in Keiskammahoek District, the Freemantle School in the Glen Grey 
District and at a school for chiefs in the Tsolo District in Transkei . Furthermore bursaries 
were given to sons of chiefs and headmen429 
In these circumstances it is not surprising that tribal authorities were conservative bodies, 
which excluded the younger and better-educated members of society. This ensured that 
tribal authorities were unable to deal efficiently with administrative matters. Furthermore, 
they were unable to adapt to change and did not articulate the diverse interests of 
societies in flux. By excluding women Tribal Authorities failed to live up to societal 
developments in which the migrant labour system had forced women to take an active 
and leading role in society 4 30 Thus, "the ideological dilemma of such conservative 
traditional leaders lies therein that the political values which they pursue no longer 
426 Chiefs were generally advanced in age. In the Amatola Basin Traditional Authority, two chiefs were 83 
and 82 years old; eight chiefs were in their seventies; ten chiefs were in their sixties, and two chiefs were in 
their fifties. 111e average age of a chief in the Traditional Authority was 68 years old. Furthennore, chiefs in 
this Traditional Authority were generally uneducated except for one who was a qualified teacher. Seven 
chiefs passed Standard I; ten passed Standard 2/3; one chief passed Standard 4 and only three passed 
Standard 6. See C. Manona, "Local Government and Service Delivery: The Amatola Basin in the Ciskei" in 
Reality. Jan-March 1990: 43. 
'21 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 17/0411972, p. 43. 
42' Ciskei Territorial Authority: 1963, p. 55. 
'29 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 1963, p. 32. 
430 Manona, "Collapse of Tribal Authority System", p. 11-12. 
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synchronise with all the values of all the sectors of society that they are supposed to serve 
and lead" 431 
This was of little consequence to the government, provided tribal authorities delivered the 
required funds to maintain party costs, crushed opposition to the government and 
advocated government policies. This was enforced by a number of direct and indirect 
restraints placed on chiefs in the process of bureaucratisation. Bureaucratisation involved 
two main steps: first, the appointment and dismissal of chiefs became subject to 
procedural mechanisms and second, chiefs became dependent upon and thus accountable 
to the state as salaried functionaries. 
The appointment and dismissal of chiefs was made into a bureaucratic endeavour led by 
the Department of Native Affairs. Each chieftaincy was created by separate decree 
mentioning the size of the chieftaincy and the number of councillors in the Tribal 
Council. This was in theory allocated in accordance with genealogical evidence. 
However government ethnologists often faced numerous problems which led them to rely 
on the dictum' co-operative headmen become chiefs and uncooperative chiefs receive no 
official recognition.' These problems included internal dynastic quarrels432; location 
boundaries did not necessarily coincide with chiefly allegiances433 ; and there were often 
an insufficient number of chiefs to fill the positions and carry out the duties required by 
the tribal authorities434 Meanwhile, new chieftainships were established in three possible 
ways. First, members of a certain location would reject their officially recognised chief 
and invite a new chief; for example, the Rharhabe of Gqumahashe in Victoria East 
campaigned for the return of their old Tyhali chieftainship to supersede the authority of 
Chief Mabandla. Second, aspirant chiefs would claim former-white farms, which were 
431 W.T. Breytenbach, "Chiefship and Political Development in the Homelands" in African Institute 
Bulletin. Vol xiii. No.9 & 10. 1975:331. 
432 For example, Pirie Location in King Williamstown was divided into two sides each rallying behind a 
different chiefly claimant. 
433 For exanlple, in the Peel ton Location imiDange and imiNgqalasi chiefdoms intermingled and in Victoria 
East district scattered pockets ofRharhabe tribesmen lived under Mfengu chiefs and headmen and vice 
versa in King Williamstown. 
434 For example, in the Keiskammalloek District there was not a single recognised chief but many 
chieftaincy claims. 
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allocated for black resettlement as their ancestral home; for example, Mr. Fetter's former 
farm, which was turned into the Ndevana resettlement camp, was claimed by President 
Sebe as his lost ancestral land. Third, squatters or tenants without permanent land rights 
would band together under an ethnic banner and claim to be a single tribe; for example, 
in Nyaniso, Peddie district newcomers were incited by an aspirant chief with a ' fake 
pedigree' to declare themselves as members of the Gwali chiefdom. 435 Ultimately 
however, the allocation of chieftainship was vulnerable to the discretion of the 
government. 
Councillor Mateza echoed the response of the people towards this form of bureaucratic 
appointment: "the Bantu Authorities Act was passed without consulting our Native 
people and that is not according to our Native custom".436 To complement this, Tribal 
Authorities violated the consensual principle behind African governance in favour of a 
less consultative form. Other members of the Tribal Authorities assisted chiefs but these 
members were not close advisors or acknowledged representatives of the people. The 
people had no direct sanction over councils particularly since these lacked effective 
contact with the people they were supposed to serve. Meetings were merely used to 
notify people about administrative matters rather than being used as the platform for the 
people to voice their interests. Furthermore, the migrant labour system had left the 
elderly, sick and uneducated responsible for maintaining popular discipline over the 
chiefs; this opened up the space for a number of chiefly abuses. 437 Hence, "although the 
Tribal Authority was supposed to take on the appearance and character of the traditional 
political structure, there were many ways in which it failed to measure up to this 
ideal".438 In general it left the rural population vulnerable to the corrupt behaviour of the 
chiefs who were no longer accountable to the people they were supposed to serve. 
43' Peires, "Continuity and Change", p. 137; Anonymous, "Ethuicity and Pseudo-Ethuicity", p. 400-401; 
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The second step in the bureaucratisation of the chiefs was entrenching their fillancial 
dependence on the state so as to ensure that they had a material interest in the continued 
existence of the Apartheid regime. As Mbeki argued, 
"The shrewdness ofthe Nationalist play should not be under-estimated. The chiefs 
have been used with skill. Every little chief, even those not getting large stipends 
from the government, has been placed in a position where he can make money for 
himself at the expense of the people. Fresh powers of jurisdiction have been 
placed in the hands of the Chiefs for example, and many have amassed small 
fortunes and bribes ... Many must know, in their hearts, that the self-government 
scheme has proved a swindle. But now they have a particular interest in keeping it 
going" . 439 
The most direct source of chiefly revenue came in the form of a salary, which according 
to official accounts was compensation for the revenues chiefs no longer derived and a 
means of ensuring that chiefs will accord greater respect and authority. As Councillor 
Verkuza argued, "In the eyes ofthe people, it is degrading for a Chief who lives cheek by 
jowl with a female teacher in his location to be paid less than one fifth of the 'bunga' s 
salary. If there is truth in the adage that money talks, then the appearance and words of 
the schoolteacher will count far more than those of the chief'. 440 
In the 1950's the salaries paid to Transkei ' s four most important chiefs were £1200, 
£900, £800 and £600 respectively. In the 1960's the Transkei government announced a 
further twenty-five percent (25%) increase of chiefs and headmen' s salaries. With the 
introduction of the Transkei Legislative Authority the four paramount chiefs each 
received two thousand pounds a year. The salaries of the other chiefs ranged from £ 11 0 
to £300, and if they were members of the Legislative Assembly they received an addition 
£400. In the 1970' s the official expenditure on salaries for chiefs and headmen rose from 
R323 500 in 1974/5 to R536 000 in 1975/6 and to R1446 000 in 1987/8. In addition to 
439 Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt" ,po 62. 
4<0 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 2011011964, p. 56. 
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salaries, chiefs received additional payment for the number of taxpayers in their districts 
as well as a pension and travelling allowance441 
Furthermore, the placement of chiefs at the cornerstone of resource allocation and 
judicial and administrative sectors ensured that they were in a position to extract 
resources from the people through corrupt and coercive mechanisms. Mamdani described 
chiefs as "decentralised despots,,442 as they were the main executors of apartheid policies 
at the local level. Their duties included responsibilities for land allocation, road 
maintenance, water supplies, land rehabilitation, disease prevention, pass controls, 
working permits, the dispersal of unlawful assemblies, and the maintenance of law and 
order. In addition they were given the mandate to make recommendations in connection 
with schools, old age pensions, disability grants and licenses. 443 As they were placed at a 
strategic judicial and administrative juncture, chiefs were able to engage in 'primitive 
accumulation.' Although this was often justified with reference to tradition, it was the 
key element in the consolidation of the one-party regimes in both the Transkei and Ciskei 
homelands. 
Chiefs and headmen were empowered to collect monies raised from taxation, fmes and 
fees. In addition, they received the mandate to impose taxes of up to one pound on adult 
male residents, a general levy and a number of discretionary charges. This money was to 
be placed in treasuries in the Tribal authorities and to be allocated for administrative and 
development purposes. However expenditure was determined by the chiefs and generally 
unduly favoured their needs. Taxation was firmly linked to land allocation which was a 
further means by which chiefs could accrue greater finances444 
In Transkei in 1958, special provisions allowed chiefs to allocate extra arable land in 
order to enable the chief to provide hospitality for visiting administrators. In order to 
obtain land, a person would first have to get the support of the sub-headmen who would 
44' Neocosmos, "Towards a History",p. 29; Southall, "South Africa ' s Transkei", p.174; Mbeki, "Peasant's 
Revolt", p. 104. 
442 Mamdani, "Citizen and SUbject",p. 25-26. 
443 Manona, "Collapse of Tribal Authority", p. 10-11. 
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submit the application to the headman to check whether the individual was married and a 
registered taxpayer. If the person could not produce a registration certificate and taxation 
receipts, the headman would accompany the individual to the magistrate' s office to get 
registered. Thereafter, the headman would grant the application and submit it to the tribal 
authority, which would complete the form and send it to the district commissioner. This 
form would have to be signed by the chief, councillors and Tribal Secretary. However, 
Tribal Authorities would often allocate land without going through the official procedure. 
For example, they would charge unauthorised fees in the form of alcohol, poultry and 
sheep to those wanting land. This placed migrant tenants and refugees in a vulnerable 
position445 As testified in the Ciskei Legislative Authority, "our people are evicted by 
whites, and are thrown at the roadside. They are also evicted by these headmen and chiefs 
and we find them freezing,,446 Land allocation was also contingent on an individual ' s 
support for the ruling party. This benefited government to the extent that the Tomlinson 
Commission's recommendation in 1955 that freehold be granted to homeland populations 
in the interests of development was repudiated by Verwoerd, on the grounds that it would 
"undermine the whole tribal structure" 447 
Similar trends could be found in all other administrative sectors including the judicial 
sector. By 1963 fifteen of the seventeen recognised chiefs in the Ciskei were granted civil 
and criminal jurisdiction. 448 This number increased as the Bantu Affairs Department 
attempted to place all civil cases between Africans and all criminal cases that were within 
the jurisdiction of the chiefs, before Tribal Authority tribunals in the hope that the chiefs 
would succeed where commissioners failed in crushing local resistance. In addition, 
chiefs continued to run 'bush' courts, which enabled them to apply fines in the form of 
animals, alcohol and money. This enabled chiefs to impose authority on recalcitrant 
44' Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt" ,po 106.108. 
445 Letsoalo, "Land Reform", p. 70; L. Ntsebeza, Land Allocation in South Africa's Former Bantustans 
With Specific Re/erence to the Role o/Traditional Authorities. Delivered to TAARN Conference. April 
2001: 2; A. Spiegel, "A Trilogy of Tyranny and Tribulation: Village Politics and Administrative 
Intervemion in Matatiele During the Early 1980' s" in Journal o/Contemporary African Studies. Vol. II 
(2).1992 : 40-41. 
446 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 4/5/1976. 
447 Neocosmos, "Towards a History", p. 29. 
448 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 1963 p. 32. 
124 
people and to ensure the dependence of certain groups on the continued existence of the 
institution of chieftainship 449 
These abuses occurred with the full knowledge of the government. In the Ciskei 
legislature councillors testified that a man "who will be taken to the Magistrate is only a 
man who will have the prerequisite of a bottle of brandy" 450 The Minister of Justice 
complained in 1980 that a survey revealed that employers were "not in favour of Chiefs 
interfering with or assisting them in the recruiting of labour... Chiefs and Headmen are 
alleged to have substituted their favourites and do not select objectively,,451 The Minister 
of Justice stated that he is "quite aware they extract bribes from these people when they 
know they are not supposed to do it".452 Even though they were ' not supposed to do it ' 
and often antagonised the business sector, little action was taken against the chiefs 
because their actions were vital in creating a chain of dependency, which worked in the 
interests of the ruling party. 
The first link in this chain was forged by the ruling CNIP and TNIP governments with the 
Apartheid regime. In 1975, 79 % of Ciskei's annual revenue came from the South 
African government.453 In 1974/5, 77.5% of Transkei ' s annual revenue was derived from 
South Africa. All accounts were audited and approved by South African controllers, the 
Auditor General and the Republican Minister of Finance. Even after independence, the 
Transkei was highly dependent on South African finance. In 197617, the Republic 
provided RllO.8 million (7l.2% of the total revenue). In 1977/8, South Africa provided 
R165 million out ofR239 million directly and provided the Transkei with loans, funded 
services and businesses (most notably the Development Corporation) and even paid the 
salaries of white officials and judges. In general, South Africa supplied over two thirds of 
the Transkeian and Ciskiean government's annual financial requirements454 Economic 
dependence was further exacerbated by the lack of internally generated revenue due to 
449 Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt", p. 100. 
450 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 1970? 
451 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 1980, p. 278. 
452 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 17/04/1972, p. 55. 
m N. Charton, "The Economics and Politics of Dependency" in Charton (ed), Ciskei: Economics and 
Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland .. London: Hurst and Co. 1980: 230. 
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the absence of a broad industrial base within the Ciskei and Transkei . In the Ciskei, two 
growth points existed at Sada and Dimbaza but they required technology, skilled 
personnel and raw materials and markets in the Republic. Consequently, they posed little 
threat to the industrial conglomerates located in the white areas adjacent to the Ciskei in 
Berlin and in King Williamstown455 Thus the homeland government's were dependent 
on the Nationalist Party government for military and financial backing456 This externally 
generated revenue was indirectly responsible for tying the chiefs ' material prosperity to 
the state. The people in turn were made highly dependent on the chiefs for their basic 
subsistence. 
This worked to the advantage of the homeland governments in three main ways. First, it 
ensured the people's political and financial support as "political loyalty or rather 
subservience, is often the sole criterion whereby people in resettlement camps are 
allocated houses, pensions and even jobs".457 It financed the political party machine. As 
one individual complained, "we must pay for rallies every time they ask. Sometimes it is 
one Rand, or two or three. It happens every couple of months. We dare not refuse, 
otherwise our complaints won't be attended to, if we need attention later on" 458 If they 
did not contribute, chiefs and headmen would not recommend them for pensions, 
employment and land. Segar highlights the example where a headman refused to judge 
against a woman who had assaulted her mother-in- law on the basis that 
"you did not pay money for the clinic, you are not a member of the TNIP - you 
haven' t paid - your name is not there in the register. For the gifts for big TNIP 
meetings to buy Matanzima a present - your name is not there. You did not pay 
any money for the morena - three times we were asking for money for him to 
make a feast for him after he became a chief - then there is the Rl for the dipping 
454 R. Southal~ "South Africa 's Transkei", p. 204-206. 
455 N. Charton, "The Economics and Politics of Dependency" , p. 230. 
456 N. Chanon, "The Economics and Politics of Dependency", p. 231. 
457 P. Green and A. Hirsch, The Impact o/Resettlement in the Ciskei: Three Case Studies. Cape Town: 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research. 1983: 31. 
458 S, Duncan, Cory Ms 18 843: Discussion on Advice Office or Related Work in the Ciskei: Peddie, 21 
February 1983 . 
tank. If the people who are still owing are murdered or attacked - I'll never solve 
the problem unless they pay all these amounts,,459 
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Second, it ensured continued electoral victories for the ruling parties. Chiefs played a 
vital role in influencing voting behaviour and in selecting candidates for elective seats. 
According to electoral law secret voting was the norm. However, in cases where the 
voters were illiterate, they were required to state their preferences to the polling officer in 
the presence of two witnesses. Unsurprisingly the majority of chiefs were polling officers 
thereby placing them in a position to influence voters in favour of the TN1P or CNIP. 
This influence was contingent on their central role in allocating resources. Furthermore, 
chiefs played an important role in the selection of candidates for elective seats. In the 
Transkeian elections of 1968 meetings at which party supporters chose their favourite 
candidates by majority vote were held at Tribal Authority offices and chaired by local 
chiefs. This ensured that chiefs could pack the meeting with their supporters and other 
chiefs. In 1973 this role was extended, as nomination courts in Districts composed of 
heads of members of local Tribal Authorities, headmen and subheadmen loyal to the 
TNIP were responsible for the selection of candidates. Hence, chiefs played a critical part 
in securing the re-election of the ruling party460 
Lastly, the chain of dependency benefited the ruling party by ensuring that the chiefs 
were so dependent on the state that they crushed any resistance to this state with vigor. 
As one observer argued, "Traditionally the chiefs got cattle and other things from their 
own people. But now since they are to receive salaries, they are too independent of us, so 
they will be the government' s most active servants in oppressing us. A dog like its 
master,,461 By the Bantu Authorities Act, chiefs were responsible for enforcing all laws 
and all orders, instructions or the requirements of the Government relating to the 
administration and control of the Blacks in their areas. This role was further entrenched 
by the Transkei Authorities Act of 1965, the Ciskeian Administrative Authorities Act and 
the Ciskeian Authorities, Chiefs and Headman Act of 1978 which gave the chiefs powers 
'" Segar, "Fruits of Apartheid", p. 120. 
' 60 Southall, "South Africa' s Trnnskei" , p. 121-123 .. 
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of arrest, powers of search and seIzure, powers to disperse unauthorised gatherings, 
powers to prohibit the carrying of weapons and the shouting of war cries and so forth. In 
general, the chiefs acted as the 'watchdogs' of the Government. They were encouraged to 
be their own police in their own interest, "fmd out those men who respect authority and 
tribal institutions and band them together as the chiefs and headmen's impi which will 
turn out when called to help keep tribes and locations clean and behaved ... Use moderate 
violence . .just like a good chief should do,,4G2 Hence, chiefs became the military arm of 
government in the rural areas because it was in their best interests to do so. If they did not 
follow government policies or ensured that their subjects did so, they would not only lose 
official recognition and an official salary but also the perks that accompanied executing 
government policies. Therefore, the chief was the key figure in the chain of dependency 
that characterised the homeland's economic and political structure. Chiefs were vital in 
enlisting the support and finances of the rural populations, ensuring the continued re-
election of the ruling party and repressing dissent to government policies. 
However, the Nationalist Party recognised that the chiefs were too narrow a base upon 
which to rest the homeland policy. It sought to expand the middle class so that it was also 
highly dependent on the state for resources. By expanding the administrative apparatus 
and trade, a civil service developed. This provided privileged employment opportunities 
for educated blacks in order to ensure that they did not join forces with the liberation 
movements. These civil servants joined forces with the petty bourgeoisie who saw the 
Bantu administration as an important avenue for capital accumulation in the form of 
salaries, allowances, pensions, loans, contracts and so forth 4G3 This, according to 
Nzimande, was typical of parasitic capitalism, which is a "process of using the state 
apparatus for purposes of accumulation,,464 Thus, the chiefs and middle classes were 
united in their dependence on the homeland governments to the extent that chiefs became 
46\ Mayer, "Tribal Elite", p. 294. 
462 Mbeki, "Peasant's Revolt" , p. 58. 
463 Soutball, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 173. 
464 B. Nzimande, "The Zulu Kingdom: Buthelezi's short-cut to power" in The African Communist. First 
Quater 1994: 9. 
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members of the petty bourgeoisie465 This unity between chiefs, civil servants, 
bureaucrats, businessmen, teachers and traders was reflected in a shared lifestyle. Chiefs 
drove the same "flashy American motor cars,,466, lived in "houses similar to those of the 
whites" and could be clearly distinguished from the rural population who continued to 
live in "the old type of wood and mud-constructed huts,,467 and in increasing poverty. 
More than sixty percent of rural households were unable able to produce sufficient food 
to feed themselves let alone purchase cars and luxury houses. 
Hence, "the centre of political gravity rests firmly in the Transkei (and Ciskei) - in the 
kraals and huts of chiefs" 468 However, this created a political vacuum at the local level. 
Chiefs were paid bureaucrats and as a result, failed to serve their communities. Chiefs 
were often more interested in regional issues than local matters particularly since the 
responsibilities between local and regional government overlapped considerably. 
Furthermore, within the bureaucracy procedures of accountability were lacking. 
Consequently, this vacuum provided space for the emergence of alternative forms of 
leadership and organisations that expressed growing resistance from below against the 
chiefs and the entire homeland system469 
465 See the debate over the position of the chiefs in the petty bourgeoisie in lB. Peires, "Transkei on the 
Verge of Emancipation" in Journal 0/ Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 8 (2) December 1997: 189-213 
and R. Southall, "Rethinking Transkei Politics" in Journal a/Contemporary A/rican Studies. Vol 11 (2) 
1992: 1-22. 
466 Mbeki, "Peasants Revolf',p. 180 
467 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 4/511976, p. 120. 
468 Southall, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 140. 
469 E. Ritchken, "Rural Politics" in G.Moss and I.Obery (eds), South African Review 5. England & South 
Africa: Hans Zen Publishers. 1990: 393-394. 
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CHAPTER 5: TARGETS OF POPULAR DISCONTENT 
The' chain of dependency' was greatly flawed. As the traditional structure of chieftaincy 
was bureaucratised, the nature of its legitimacy was distorted. No longer were chiefs 
dependent on legitimacy bestowed from below by their subjects but they were dependent 
on recognition from above47o As a result, chiefs were no longer deemed legitimate by 
their subjects and in turn became the targets of popular discontent against an oppressive 
and intrusive state. This is evident in Witzieshoek in the late 1940's, the Bafurutse 
reserve in 1957, Sekhuhuniland in 1958, Marico in 1958, and in Natal in 1958 and 1959. 
Such rural resistance can be partially attributed to the ANC's defiance campaign in 1951-
2 and the migrant labour system, which acted as a "transmission belt of political 
consciousness" 471 However, as will be shown in the Ciskei and Transkei, the role of the 
liberation organisations was minimal in organising and mobilising rural resistance. 
Rather, resistance against the chiefs erupted in the 1960's and 1980's largely in response 
to increasing poverty, state intrusions and numerous chiefly abuses at all levels of 
government. 
Poverty was a key factor in the chain of dependency. As Segar argues, "Once drawn into 
a network of bribery and corruption - existing in the first place because of a scarcity of 
resources over which there is limited control - resistance becomes very difficult,,472 In 
other words, peasants had little choice but to take part in the chiefs ' patronage schemes 
due to the desperate nature of their economic situations. The Ciskeian Minister of 
Finance once argued that the chiefs could not be blamed for corruption because they "are 
being pushed by the people because they are starving ... The main reason is hunger, it is 
hunger which puts us in such a predicament". 473 According to Innes and O'Meara only 
8.4% of rural households could subsist on agricultural production. Consequently, 
<1. C.J De Wet, An Analysis of the Social and Economic Consequences of Residential Relocation Arising 
Out of the Implementation of an Agricultural Development Scheme in a Rural Ciskei Village. PHD 
(Anthropology) Thesis. Grahamstown: Rhodes University. 1985: 293. 
<1, Southall, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 108, 
m Segar, "Fruits of Apartheid", p. 122. 
413 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 1980, p. 278. 
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households were forced to rely on the sale of their labour power. In 1974 83% of 
Transkei's labour potential was employed as migrant labourers outside the Transkei 474 
Rural resources were further stretched by the influx of landless people removed off black 
spots. Mechanisation and attempts to abolish labour migrancy ensured that between 1960 
and 1974, 740 000 labour tenants were removed from white farmlands and literally 
dumped in the reserves. Furthermore, influx control ensured that people established 
residence in the bantustans. In 1985 government changed emphasis from ' forced removal 
to forced incorporation' , whereby homeland borders were redrawn or redefined to include 
black communities. The rapid increase in the homeland populations further put a 
considerable strain on the limited resources available. In addition, forced removals 
created a class of dispossessed individuals who had no access to land and other means of 
production but were left dependent on handouts, theft, prostitution and so forth. 475 
The situation was further exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of local government. Tribal 
Authorities had limited executive powers and the Department of the Chief Minister 
controlled their budgets. Consequently they were unable to alleviate the impoverishment 
at the local I eve1. 476 Initially this appeared to work in the chiefs' favour as their subjects 
were too poor and too desperate to challenge the patronage schemes upon which they 
were so dependent. This even led Mr. Abraham, the Commissioner-General of the Xhosa 
Ethnic Unit, to declare that "the people have rallied to their chiefs and, if they sustain 
their Chiefs and their Chiefs are wise leaders - as they have proved to be - there is every 
reason to believe that peace will abide within this territory and its people,,477 However, 
once again state intrusions lit the fire of resistance against the chiefs and the bantustan 
system as a whole. 
Ciskei: Betterment? 
474 Labour potential refers to adnlts between tbe ages of sixteen and sixty-four. D. Innes and D. O'Meara, 
"Class Fonnation and Ideology: tbe Transkei Region" in Review of African Economy. No. 7. 1976:71 
'" E. Ritchken, "Rural Politics", p.390-393. 
'" C.W Manona, "Local Government and Service Delivery: tbe Amatola Basin in Ciskei" in Realily. 
January-March 1990: 44. 
' 77 Ciskei Territorial Autbority: 2411 0/ 1962, p. 17. 
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Ciskei initiated a five-year plan in 1962 involving 210 of 243 locations, which were 
declared betterment areas. Betterment involved moving the people into demarcated areas, 
stabilisation of the arable areas, fencing and controlling of grazing areas, reduction of 
stock to the assessed carrying capacity of the area, and division of the population between 
farmers and non-farmers. 478 At face value, betterment aimed to revitalise reserve 
agriculture but as James argued, "such planning was a response to the changing needs 
and demands of capitalist farming, rather than a positive and separate strategy to establish 
viable farming in the peripheral Bantustan areas". 479 As in the past, such schemes were 
regarded by the people as a threat to their security and were consequently met with great 
opposition. Resettlement meant that people would have to abandon the homesteads into 
which they had previously invested large sums of capital. By limiting the number of full-
time farmers in the homelands, the government simultaneously pushed the peasants into 
the much-hated migrant labour system. By reserving land for forestry schemes, 
government restricted access to firewood. Culling once again contravened traditional 
forms of wealth accumulation. Furthermore, rehabilitation measures involved the use of 
unpaid, forced labour under the supervision of chiefs. 480 
In response to people's complaints, the government turned to the chiefs for support. 
Chiefs were offered incentives if they accepted rehabilitation measures including 
increased stipends, land allotments, places of honour and so forth. Unsurprisingly, the 
chiefs accepted such measures without consulting their subjects. 481 As one individual 
complained, "so chiefs think they will get a lot of money and a big house if they move. 
Many times they do. But the people do not get these things,,482 In response to the 
objections to the Peelton removal, Viljoen the Minister of Education and Development 
478 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 22/10/1 963, p. 28. 
479 James, "The Road from Doornkop" in South African Institute of Race Relations. Johannesburg: SAIRR. 
1983: 60. 
480 R. Southall, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 107. 
48 1 G. Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt", p. 97. 
482 Cory Document: "You and Removals" (English Text of Xhosa Wena Wofudso) in Records of the 
Grahamstown Rural Committee dealing with the Resettlement of the Mgwali Community in the Ciskei. In 
the Tyolomoga community people complainted that "we were incorporated into the Ciskei because of the 
chiefs". (Meeting with Tyolomoga Residents, Interim Committee, 19 January 1990). 
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Aid in the Ciskei, claimed that the decision to allocate Peelton was based on an 
application by the Peelton Tribal Authority which was "eager to increase the amount of 
land and people under its control and thus to expand its source of revenue". 483 Thus, "the 
betterment schemes further exposed chiefs as the instruments of white power and focused 
widespread grievance upon the Bantu Authorities System as a cause of popular 
distress" 484 As a result, the people turned against their chiefs. In Mgwali, the people 
refused to accept Nolizwe as their chieftainess because "she amounts to being a 
government agency". 485 In other words, chiefs no longer acted as bulwarks against state 
intrusions but through the chiefs "urhulumente (government), a blanket term for higher 
authority, is making increasing inroads into the community,,486 
Thembuland: 'Good' Versus 'Bad' Chiefs 
The rural revolts in the Transkei revolved largely around the issue of chieftaincy. 
Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo initially accepted the Bantu Authorities Act on the 
grounds that it would restore respect and dignity to the institution of chieftaincy, however 
he soon recognised the negative implications of this Act for the people and for the chiefs. 
He not only sent a delegation to Pretoria but also convened two meetings in May 1961 
and 1962 at which Tembu chiefs condemned the Bantu Authorities Act and the 
rehabilitation schemes. In its attempts to weaken the power of Chief Dalindyebo the 
government subsequently divided Thembuland into Thembuland and Emigrant 
Thembuland. Emigrant Thembuland was placed in the hands of the more compliant 
Kaiser Matanzima. Dalindyebo's district resisted the rehabilitation schemes which would 
ultimately have made a further 113 000 Transkeian families landless. Matanzima on the 
other hand accepted the scheme in 1962487 
483 Daily Dispatch: 2/0611988. 
484 R. Southall, "South Africa ' s Transkei", p. 107. 
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This prompted violent resistance and repression in the 1960' s. In Bo10twa Matanzima's 
supporters burned over one hundred huts. In 1960, one chief and eleven of his 
accomplices were killed in Thembu1and. In late 1962, three attempts were made on 
Matanzima's life. In 1963, violence flared in Engcobo and Umtata and by 1964 
Matanzima was placed in the position of Chief Minister with the power to influence 
formally recalcitrant chiefs. 
However, Matanzima was unable to wield control over Paramount Chief Dalindyebo. In 
March 1979 the Democratic Progressive Party was formed under the leadership of 
Dalindyebo. He was detained in early July on the charge of undermining the dignity of 
the President and for disseminating views subverting parliament and the sovereignty of 
the Transkei. His chieftaincy was suspended and he was replaced by his brother (a TNIP 
MP) as the acting tribal head of the Thembu. In addition, security forces prohibited him 
from entering his viUage 488 This suspension had the opposite effect of increasing 
Dalindyebo's popular legitimacy. In court, he was greeted by a demonstration of five 
thousand supporters protesting his arrest. After his lawyers subpoenaed Sabata's nephew, 
Nelson Mandela, to give evidence, Matanzima realized that it would be too costly to 
continue with the prosecution4 89 After Dalindyebo returned home, he was harassed by 
security forces, banned from reassuming the paramountcy and eventually fled from the 
Transkei. In December 1990, he appeared in Lusaka with Oliver Tambo, the acting 
president of the ANC 490 
The source of the conflict in Thembuland lay in the tension between the 'good' chief who 
serves his people, and the 'bad ' chief who serves the government. Poqo, the violent 
insurrectionary movement aligned with the PAC, played a role in heightening this tension 
by influencing Thembu migrant workers in the hostels of the Western Cape during the 
1960's Sharpeville ' crisis'. Poqo even inspired three attempts on Matanzima' s life491 
488 R. Southall, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 258. 
489 Ibid, p . 259. 
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However, the source of this resistance lay in state intrusions that came in the form of the 
rehabilitation schemes and the appointment of pro-government chiefs492 
Mpondoland: Alternative Authority 
Unlike the sporadic and disjointed Thembuland revolt, the Mpondoland revolt 
"developed into the most sustained and serious armed black challenge to white rule since 
the Zulu war of 1879".493 The issue of paramountcy was central to this revolt. In Eastern 
Mpondo districts the paramount chief wielded great power particularly since Mpondoland 
was the last area annexed by the Cape authorities. This was reflected in the structure of 
the tribal authority; instead of taxpayers electing a quarter of councilors, the paramount 
chief would chose seventy-five percent (75 %) of councilors and the rest would be 
nominated by the Native Commissioner. In 1938 with the support of the government, 
Botha Sigcau acceded to the paramountcy over the rightful heir, his half-brother Nelson. 
Botha Sigcau accepted the Bantu Authorities Act in 1958 and tried to force the people to 
concur. This collaborative stance coupled with reports of corruption left him largely 
discredited. 494 
Consequently, a counter-authority structure began to emerge in opposition to the tribal 
authority system. In the late 1950's committees against the Bantu Authorities Act 
coalesced under the leadership of Cornelius Nguali in what became known as Intaba or 
the ' hill movement' owing to its frequent meetings at the hill near the village of Bizana. 
In its aims and actions, Intaba revealed an awareness of national and international issues. 
It adopted the Freedom Charter as its basic policy, and it sent petitioner Enoch Mbele to 
the United Nations with a petition of grievances. These grievances included the Bantu 
Authorities system, the Bantu Education System, the Agricultural Rehabilitation 
Schemes, Botha Sigcau and the prohibition of meetings of more than ten people. Intaba 
492 R. Southall, "South Africa's Transkei", p. 108; T. Lodge, "Black Politics", p. 283-289. 
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came to establish itself as an alternative political authority by assuming a number of the 
functions of the Tribal Authorities in particular the chiefs courts495 
It also pressured the chiefs and headmen in the area to denounce the Bantu Authorities 
Act. Those chiefs who refused to do so faced serious consequences. Seventeen chiefs, 
headmen or their bodyguards and a further five suspected police informers died at the 
hands ofIntaba. The police retaliated on the 13 June 1960 when a meeting of Intaba at 
Ngquza Hill was bombed from the air by helicopters with tear gas and smoke gas 
followed by an onslaught of bullets. The official death toll was eleven but, others said 
that closer to thirty people died in what has been described as a 'mini-Sharpville.' In 
response, twenty-nine kraals belonging to government supporters were burnt down. A 
number of Mpondo were arrested and tension mounted in their communities. In October 
the government concluded that the complaints concerning taxation, influx control and so 
forth were unfounded and that neither the rehabilitation measures nor the Bantu 
Authorities System would cease to operate. Consequently, the revolt climaxed. By 
December 1960 fifty-four kraals had been burnt including the royal kraal of Paramount 
Chief Botha Sigcau. Twenty-five so-called collaborators died, including two chiefs 
(brother and half-brother Botha Sigcawu), two headmen, seventeen commoners and four 
tribal councillors. The police responded with a reign of terror under a State of Emergency 
in three districts. 4 769 individuals were detained, 2067 faced trial, 30 were sentenced to 
death and 21 eventually executed. By February 1961 resistance was effectively crushed 
and hundreds of tribesmen in Lusikisiki had to publicly apologise to Chief Botha Sigcau. 
Although the Hill had a number of external contacts to the ANC and PAC, the strength of 
the Mpondo movement lay in the youth and high levels of communal mobilisation 
against the institution of chieftaincy 4 96 
By 1969 resistance in both the Ciskei and Transkei had declined considerably. This could 
largely be attributed to the security clampdown in the 1960's and to the drought of 1969 
which killed a fifth of Transkei ' s cattle and forced 35 000 Transkeians onto the labour 
49' D. A. J. Campbell, "Radical Resistance", p. 249. 
136 
market. In the face of increased poverty, resistance to the patronage schemes that offered 
benefits such as employment and housing seemed pointless. In the Ciskei a legislator 
argued "it is very encouraging that here in the Ciskei opposition to reclamation of the soil 
has practically died down, so much so that my department finds it difficult to keep up 
with the pressure from the people themselves for the implementation of the planning" 497 
Hence, the 1960's were characterised by rural passivity owing to people ' s dependence on 
the chiefs, social differentiation, generational conflict and the ability of "power-drunk 
quisling,,498 chiefs to deport recalcitrant tribesmen. 
One can make a number of observations regarding this early resistance. First, each revolt 
was a reaction to socio-political impoverishment and dislocation but was set in motion by 
the implementation of unwanted policies that entrenched tribalism and the power of the 
chiefs. However, tribalism was increasingly regarded as obsolete in the context of 
urbanisation and acculturation to Western ideas and values. Hence, the Bantu Authorities 
system was deemed as a threat to African nationalism, progress and a "blatant attempt to 
force blacks to be black again,,499 and was thus deeply resented. Second, the liberation 
movement largely ignored the militancy of the peasants. Although Govan Mbeki argued 
that it had brought home to the ANC leadership that "a struggle based on the reserves had 
a much greater capacity to absorb the shocks of government repression and was therefore 
capable of being sustained for a much longer time than a struggle based on urban 
locations,"soo as will be shown in the next section, the ANC made little attempt to link the 
rural and urban struggles. Third, these rural struggles highlighted the pathetic plight of 
the chiefs, who by the 1950's were faced with two options namely, to collaborate with 
government and as a consequence receive its protection or to oppose the government and 
receive the protection of the people. Generally, chiefs chose the former option. Although 
496 T. Lodge, "Black Politics", p. 279-283 ; D.A.J. Campbell, "Radical Resistance", p. 244-254; G. Mbeki, 
"Peasant ' s Revolt", p. 16-118; R. Southall, "South Africa ' s Transkei",p. 104-107. 
497 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 1966 Verbatim Report. 
498 Document 69: National Executive Council, 1963 in T. Karis and G. M Gerhart, "Volume 3: Challenge 
and Violence" in Karis and Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Stanford: Harvard University Press. 
1977: 750. 
499 D. A. J. Campbell, "Radical Resistance", p. 260. 
500 Mbeki, "Peasants Revolt", p. 130. 
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the government was able to protect them in the early revolts of the 1950' s and 1960 's, the 
chiefs in the Ciskei in particular, were unable to survive the people's wrath in the 1980's. 
Judgment Day: From Sebe to Gqozo 
In 1981 Ciskei authorities attempted to impose tribal authorities onto the Border corridor 
communities. This was met with great resistance and led to the formation of the 
Democratic Residents Association, which aimed to unite all communities against the 
chiefs, forced removals and Sebe's oppressive government. SOI Its growth coincided with 
the developing political consciousness, mobilisation and militancy amongst the youth in 
black communities across South Africa Student and youth uprisings planted the seeds of 
revolt. School boycotts in 1976, 1977, 1980 and 1983 in the urban areas led parents to 
send their children to the rural areas for education thereby ensuring that political activism 
was transported to these outlying areas. As Chieftainess Matomela complained, "We are 
very anxious to get help, especially in the rural areas, because the behaviour of some of 
our children is the type of behaviour which we have never seen or which was never 
passed on by their parents to them". so2 
Furthermore, the growth and subsequent harassment of trade unions in the 1970' s by the 
Ciskei Central Intelligence Service (CCIS), which culminated in the banning of the South 
African Allied Worker's Union (SAA WU) in 1983, ensured that urban unrest was 
transported to the rural areas by migrant labourers503 The urban areas were teeming with 
political activism as riots occurred at Fort Hare, Mdantsane residents boycotted the 
increase in bus fares, and clandestine ANC activity. In both the rural and urban areas, 
residents association formed rapidly in areas intended for relocation into the Ciskei such 
as Balasi and in areas where repression was the greatest such as Mdantsane. In 1988 the 
Keiskammahoek Residents Association, which had initially operated underground, 
501 M. Kenyon and B. Du toil, "From Forced Removal to Upgrade: State Strategy and Popular Resistauce in 
the Border corridor" in South African Review 5. 1990: 1-3. 
502 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 24/0611982, p. 767 . 
503 C. Cooper, "Bantustan Attitudes to Trade Unions" in South African Review 2. 1984: 165-166. 
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established the Keiskammahoek Youth Congress in 1985, which became affiliated to the 
South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) in 1987504 
Unlike the early acts of resistance, different generations united against the chiefs and 
headmen. Chiefs were the targets of the new social movement because "people had 
simply had enough of years of extortion and forced membership of Sebe's CNIP. If you 
wanted a pension, a job, a piece of land or to get your child to school, then you had to 
bribe the chief and headman, join the CNIP and pay all your 'voluntary' taxes to the Sebe 
government" 50l This was met with increased requests by the chiefs to be issued with 
firearms and protectionl06 because "when the chiefs try to carry out the orders you have 
given them, here you might be putting them to risks"l07 such as "the thuggery and arson 
that has been attempted at our offices,,508 Chief Mqalo complained that the people "make 
a mockery of him and despise him and go about him and talk about him at their drinking 
parties and you get so scared that you can even lose control of your car and get involved 
in an accident" 509 
Clashes between residents' associations and traditional authorities became more frequent 
as local chiefs resisted the formation of these associations. In Volumnga for example, 
members of the residents association 
"were met there by the chief (Goxani) and the headman's council who were all 
armed with guns. The tribal council ran away, two huts of the headman, three huts 
of the chief and the chief s kraal and goats were burnt. That evening two hippos, 
nineteen police vans and a helicopter arrived. Goxani loaded up his bed and table 
and went to his farm near Mount Coke" 510 
504 Manana, "Collapse of Tribal Anthority",p. 18. 
505 Weekend Post: 2/11/1991 
506 See Ciskei Territorial Authority: 26/05/1969, p. 104. Ciskei Legislative Assembly: 16/04/1971, p. 246; 
17/04/1972, p. 200; 24/06/1982, p. 769. 
501 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: ChlefMabandla, 3010511979, p. 541. 
508 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: Councillor Nel, 17/04/1972, p. 200. 
509 Ciskei Legislative Assembly: ChlefMqaio, 13/05/1981, p. 67. 
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In January 1990 resistance in Peelton against incorporation spread to the Community of 
Chalumna involving twenty-two villages and approximately thirty thousand people5 11 In 
the beginning of March 1990, Black Sash estimated that up to two thirds ofCiskei's rural 
population had burnt their CNIP cards or had returned them thereby "breaking their ties 
with the Ciskei government" . 5I2 In addition, small town communities organised crippling 
consumer boycotts across the Ciskei . S!3 In response, the Ciskei government called a State 
of Emergency. 101 people were detained and 70 others were arrested. Allegations of 
headmen collaborating with Ciskeian Security Forces during the State of Emergency 
further undermined the traditional authority system.514 
Dissatisfaction with Sebe's government extended into the security forces . In 1983, Sebe 
detained his brother Lieutenant General Charles Sebe who was the head of state security, 
on the grounds that he was planning a coup. In 1990 Sebe planned to stage a coup against 
himself so as to install his son K wane as president. He was however pre-empted by 
Brigadier Gqozo who headed a bloodless coup on 4 March 1990.515 This was met with 
jubilation as the people sang "iwile, iwile, inyeheke kaSebe" (the big lip of Sebe has 
fallen) . At his inauguration, Gqozo shared the platform with the UDF, stood under the 
banner of the ANC and emphasised that the new government is the "people' s 
government".516 
Three weeks after the coup, Gqozo announced that all headmen had to resign from their 
positions, although chiefs would be retained. In addition he encouraged the people to 
establish residents' associations because he realised that any attempt to stop the formation 
of these bodies would be futile, as they had already assumed many of the functions of 
local government. The dismissal of the headmen led to confusion, particularly since 
SlI Manona, " Collapse of Tribal AUtilOrity", p. 19. 
512 Daily Dispatch: 01 /03/ 1990; L. Field, "Briefing on Events in Chalumna and Khambashe". Cory Library: 
COlY MS 18:842. 
513 National Land Commitee, The Bantlls/ans in Crisis. Johannesburg: NLC. 1990: 6. 
51' Field, "Briefmg on Events in Chalurnna and Khambashe". Cory MS 18:842. 
m B.Streek, "Disunity through the Bantustans" in South Afri can Review 2. 1984: 260; National Land 
Commitee, "Bantustans", p. 7. 
516 Daily Dispatch : 07/0811 991; Manona, "Collapse of Tribal Authority",p. 21; National Land Committee, 
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Gqozo did not stipulate how chiefs were to exercise their duties without the assistance of 
headmen who had previously handled routine matters such as pensions. In addition the 
residents ' associations were not given any guidelines from Gqozo and the Border Civic 
Congress, which was the umbrella organisation for civic associations between the Fish 
and Kei Rivers. There were also a number of skirmishes between residents ' associations 
and headmen who refused to hand over their authority. 517 
As a result of the increased uncertainty, chieftaincy collapsed and by January 1991 it was 
clear that the new government was unpopular. Not only was it unable to effectively 
reorganise local government but it also had come to align itself with the South African 
government. Gqozo had also become increasingly hostile to the ANC and the residents' 
associations because they were threatening the entire basis of the state; if the tribal 
structure collapsed, the Ciskeian state would largely cease to run because chiefs and 
headmen had played a vital role in securing and entrenching the power of the ruling party 
at local and national levels of government. If this key pillar of support collapsed 
completely, new opportunities would emerge for more demands and changes from below, 
thereby preventing the ruling class from shaping the movement to democracy in their 
favour. 
As a result, Gqozo re-introduced the headman system and abolished residents' 
associations. In early June 1991 a meeting was held of chiefs and headmen chaired by 
Gqozo at which "the role of chiefs and headmen in rural local government in Ciskei was 
re-emphasised". SI8 He later argued that this move was justified because residents' 
associations "were not serving the interests of the people at grassroots. Their roles, 
contrary to their protestations, serve to contain political groupings and their ideologies. 
They were a pressure group that was not responsible or accountable to the government. 
Anybody who did not belong to that organisation would not be helped". 5}9 The attempt to 
re-instate headmen was concretised with the launch of the staunchly conservative 
' African Democratic Movement' (ADM) in July 1991. The ADM's policies directly 
'" Manona, "Collapse of Tribal Authority" , p.24-25; Daily Dispatch: 06/0111991. 
518 Daily Dispatch: 06/0611992 
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contradicted those of the ANC. It was "against violence, intimidation and the armed 
struggle". It rejected a unitary state and nationalisation as "dictatorial and undemocratic" 
and it sought to gather all people in a "realistic and moderate basis .. .1 don't want any 
communistsu520 Gqozo argued that the ANC had made a mockery of the aims of the 
military coup, which had been to "get rid of nepotism, corruption and to protect human 
rights"m because the ANC had forced people "to attend meetings at night against their 
wills and to pay protection money ... Children just took over,,522 Gqozo also attempted to 
exacerbate generational conflict in order to undermine the momentum and militancy of 
the democratic movement by appealing to the older, and generally more conservative 
generation for support. After the imposition of the State of Emergency on 29 October 
1991 he broadcast a message to the chiefs on Radio Ciskei claiming that 
"youngsters want old people to go out and toyi-toyi and do all wrong things. They 
want Ciskei to be ruled by an exile, an ANC member or someone from Robben 
Island ... There is no order at schools and in communities, with demonstrations 
during school time. I am unpopular because I am against disorder...A naughty child 
is given a hiding by elderly people by Xhosa tradition. It does not matter whose 
child it is .. ".523 
In other words, Gqozo advocated the ideology of patriarchal social relations in order to 
re-entrench the power of the chiefs and headmen. 
Like the CNIP, the ADM was used as a vehicle for increasing patronage and control 
thereby ensuring the people's dependence on the chiefs and headmen524 From August 
1991 each village was expected to elect a headmen, and funds used by residents' 
associations had to be repaid. l25 Residents' associations responded with widespread 
rejection of headmen because they believed that "as headmen would be paid by 
government their loyalty could be bought - to the detriment of the people they 
519 Daily Dispatch: 31107/1991 
520 Daily Dispatch: 09/0711991 
521 Daily Dispatch: 30110/ 199 1 
522 Daily Dispatch: 07/08/1991 
523 Daily Dispatch: 3011 01199 1 
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represent" .526 In the Alice magisterial district, by November 1991 only eight out of 
seventy-eight villages had headmen and in half the cases these were installed at meetings 
of less than twelve people. Over one hundred residents' associations gathered under 
BOCCO to reject Gqozo 's policies.S27 
At this stage, the large modern petty bourgeoisie joined the revolt against the state as is 
evident in the strikes of civil servants and nurses at Cecilia Makiwane Hospital. This was 
particularly threatening to Gqozo ' s government given the robust and largely independent 
middle class and strong unionised working class that had developed because of the close 
proximity of King Williamstown and East London. Neither of these groups was totally 
reliant on the Ciskei government for housing, employment, trading licenses and so forth. 
The Residents ' Associations came to express the political alliance of the petty-
bourgeoisie and the working class against Gqozo 's government. 528 Gqozo retaliated by 
denying pensions and other government services to those who applied in the absence of 
headmen. This resulted in increasing violence. By 1992, thirty-six headmen had lost their 
homes due to arson, six had been killed and thirty-nine had resigned out of fear. 529 The 
government reacted harshly by calling a state of emergency on 28/29 October 1991. Over 
415 people were arrested before Nelson Mandela managed to persuade Gqozo to lift the 
state of emergency on 17 November. 530 Traditional leaders were thereafter largely 
isolated until Gqozo established the Ciskei Traditional Leaders Association, which 
offered them political and material support in the face of growing unpopularity. 
Nonetheless, although Ciskeian chiefs were largely delegitimised they did not disappear 
with the bantustan state. By mobilising and forming alliances with other groups they 
managed to extract themselves from the state structure and proved "remarkably resilient" 
in maintaining their continued long-term presence.53I 
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From Kaiser to Holomisa 
In the Transkei, Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima's term of office as President expired 
in February 1986, leaving effective power in the hands of the Prime Minister, his brother 
George. George Matanzima faced a great deal of opposition due to numerous allegations 
of corruption and discontent in the military. After dismissing three senior officers of the 
Transkei Defence Force (TDF) in 1981 and hiring a group of ex-Selous Scouts, George 
was criticised in particular by the second in command, Brigadier Bantu Holomisa who 
was detained on 21 January 1987. He was further criticised for the failed double coup of 
September 1986. A group of white mercenaries associated with the TDF had attempted to 
free Charles Sebe from prison and capture Kwane Sebe (president Sebe's son) followed 
by a full-scale military assault on the Ciskei Presidential Palace in February 1987.532 
A further threat to George Matanzima's power came in the form of his brother, Kaiser, 
who attempted to wield influence over the government. Six months after he relinquished 
the presidency he attempted a comeback by nominating his own candidates in the 1986 
elections. When this strategy failed, Kaiser left the Congress of the TNIP in 1987 and 
announced that he would resume control over government. On 3 April 1987 he organised 
a coup with the aid of Craig Duli, the head of the Transkei Military Intelligence. The 
Selous Scouts were deported from the Transkei and Bantu Holomisa was released from 
prison and appointed commander of the TDF. On 24 September 1987 the army attempted 
yet another coup resulting in the forced resignation of George Matanzima and eight 
ministers. Before he was deposed, George enacted a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting Kaiser from taking part in parliament. 533 As a result, the TNIP chose Stella 
Sigcau as the new Prime Minister. She briefly detained Kaiser, questioned the 
independence of the Transkei and her brother met with the ANC. Kaiser was soon 
released due to poor health and subsequently planned another coup. On 30 December 
1987, the TDF declared martial law and took control of the government. Although Bantu 
'" Peires, "Implosion of Transkei", p. 367-368 
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144 
Holomisa was initially regarded as Kaiser's stooge he soon aligned himself with 
. " 534 progressIve ,orces. 
The turning point came in the form of a succession dispute; chieftaincy was once again 
placed in the forefront of national politics. Late paramount Sabata Dalindyebo had been 
driven into exile in 1983 due to his support of the ANC and Bambilanga Mtirara was 
installed in his position. Mtirara died in 1987 and his son, Zondwa Mtirara competed with 
Dalindyebo's exiled son, Buyelekhaya, for the position of paramount. Kaiser nominated 
Zondwa who was Holomisa's old rival in the TDF. Holomisa blocked the application and 
referred it to the Dalindyebo Regional Authority.535 A further incident involving the 
Thembu paramountcy once again drew Holomisa closer to the liberation movement. 
Kaiser had conducted the funeral of Sabata Dalindyebo but Sabata's family suspected 
that Kaiser had tampered with the body. Holomisa approved the request to rebury Sabata 
in a symbolic gesture to correct Matanzima's abuses. The funeral was attended by 
thousands who openly sang revolutionary songs and displayed the ANC flag. 536 In the 
face of growing resistance to the independence of the Transkei, Holomisa announced a 
referendum to overturn the independence of the Transkei and announced his intention to 
unban the ANC and PAC three months before De Klerk made the same gesture. 
Holomisa did not attempt to dislodge the tribal authorities and civic associations took 
longer to develop support in these areas. 537 However, after the formation of SANCO, 
mass action spread to Mount Ayliff, Tabankulu, Ngqeleni, Cala, Lusikisiki, Mount Frere, 
Ezebeleni, Mqanduli, Port St. Johns, Qumbu, and Butterworth in August 1992.538 In the 
face of increasing challenges from the people, the chiefs formed the Transkei Traditional 
Leaders Association (TTLA) which claimed to be a non-aligned body but was clearly 
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against the ANC. Due to the late development of resistance to the chiefs in the Transkei, 
Transkeian chiefs were able to hold onto their position. 539 
In both the Transkei and Ciskei homelands the institution of chieftaincy was essential in 
consolidating the one-party regimes under the TNIP and CNIP respectively, as chiefs 
formed the repressive arm of government at the local level. Consequently, attacks against 
this government were directed primarily at the chiefs. In the Ciskei, Gqozo's support of 
the residents associations provided the momentum that ultimately led to the collapse of 
the institution of chieftaincy. However, in the face of competition he clung desperately to 
the patriarchal ideology that informed the institution of traditional leadership. His 
attempts to reinstate the power of this institution undermined the popular legitimacy of 
the chiefs in the Ciskei. In the Transkei, chiefs faced similar threats from the peasants. 
However, Holomisa's failure to denounce this institution and his alliance with the 
liberation movements, allowed chieftaincy to retain a degree of legitimacy. The 
institution of chieftaincy was greatly tarnished by a history of abuses, corruption and 
collaboration, but it managed to shield itself from threats from below by forming an 
alliance with the liberation movement in the late 1980's. 
Tlte Liberation Movements 
Until the 1960's the ANC continued to seek an alliance with the chiefs in an attempt to 
mobilize united action against the oppressive Nationalist Party government. This strategy 
was largely influenced by the leadership of Chief Albert Luthuli who became the 
President of the ANC branch in Natal in 1951 and National President of the ANC in 
December 1952 and was re-elected to this position in 1955 and 1958. In his address to the 
Annual Conference of the Natal Branch of the ANC on 23 November 1951 he invited 
"chiefs and headmen to support with all their spirit and all their ability, and all their 
wealth, the good efforts of the nation, particularly the great experiment of the 
'" Southall,1996: 416; Southall, 2001: 16. 
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congress,,540 However, with the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act Luthuli 
was faced with personal challenges that made him question the ' new debased version' of 
chieftaincy as advocated by the National Party government. 
In 1952 Eiselen, the Minister of Native Affairs, gave ChiefLuthuli an ultimatum. He was 
told to choose between his work as a chief at Umvoti and his affiliation to the ANC. 
Luthuli refused to make the choice because he "saw no real conflict in my dual leadership 
of my people: leader of the tribe as chief and political leader of the congress. I saw no 
cause to resign from either". 541 Consequently, he was deposed from the chieftainship in 
November 1952. The people of Umvoti refused to elect another chief and Luthuli 
remained their chief though deprived of his official duties542 Luthuli argued, 
"A chief is primarily a servant of his people. He is the voice of his people in local 
affairs. Unlike a Native Commissioner, he is part and parcel of the tribe, and not a 
local agent of the government. Within the bounds of loyalty, it is conceivable that 
he may vote and press the claims of his people even if they should be unpalatable 
to the government of the day,,543 
However, the Bantu Authorities Act turned chiefs into "minor dictators" whose 
imposition on African communities has "sidetracked" African development544 
In this period, the ANC attempted to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' chiefs. In the 
Report of the National Executive Council in December 1958, it was argued that the 
African Chiefs 
"on the whole have a tradition of working with the ANC from its inception. To 
continue on this has become more difficult in recent years, yet many of them are 
with the people. Some have in fact been deported as a result of their work but they 
do not complain. There are some, however, who have become loyal agents of 
government even better than the police. It is this group, which has become 
540 "Address to Annual Conference of Natal Brauch of ANC", 23 November 1951. Published in GJ Pillay, 
VoicesojLiberaiion: Alberl Lulhuli. Pretoria: HSRC. 1993 : 42. 
541 Luthuli, "The Road to Freedom is Via the Cross", published in Pillay, "Voices of Liberation", p. 48-49. 
542 G.1 PilIay, "Voices of Liberation", p. II. 
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'" Luthuli, "Our Vision is a Democratic society", published in Pillay, "Voices of Liberation", p. 128 
desperate in its efforts to implement the government's plan and has become very 
cruel and brutal against the people. This distinction is necessary because some 
people condemn all chiefs and some think all the chiefs are with us". 545 
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At a later stage the ANC claimed that it was "not opposed to the chiefs as such. The 
government is attempting to cause conflict between the chiefs and the ANC. We must not 
fall into this trap and we warn chiefs not to allow themselves to be used as pawns against 
the ANC. Our struggle is primarily against the Government and those Africans including 
chiefs who support and pilot Government schemes".546 Increasingly however, as chiefs 
were absorbed into homeland structures as "bossboys", the "indunas, the policemen of 
Apartheid", the ANC adopted a hardline attitude against them. In a memorandum to the 
United Nations in 1959, the ANC described the chiefs as "employees of the state,,547 In 
1962 Chief Luthuli argued that it was "no surprise that certain chiefs and tribesmen have 
already welcomed the plan. They have, by their actions in the past, shown that they are 
prepared to support the government in all its plans because of certain benefits they 
receive by their support,,548 At a later stage, Govan Mbeki stated that if the Africans have 
had chiefs, "it was because all human societies have had them at one stage or another. 
But when a people have developed to a stage which discards chieftainship, when their 
social development contradicts the need for such an institution, then to force it on them is 
not liberation but enslavemenfd49 Increasingly, circles within the ANC began to believe 
that the next stage in African development lay with communism. 
The influence of the South African Communist Party served to increase the ANC's 
attitude against the chiefs. The SACP argued that government's attempts to turn chiefs 
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into "BAD officials with black skins - working for boy's wages"SSO would "hasten the 
breakdown of tribal institutions" because "those chiefs who collaborate with the 
government have become the most hated group in the countryside, relying on dictatorship 
and terror, contrary to African traditions, to enforce the laws of the White authorities on 
the unwilling people". SSi 
Although the ANC and SACP were vocal in their criticism of the chiefs their 
involvement in rural struggles against the chiefs were minimal. The ANC was banned in 
1960 and set about rebuilding the democratic movement in exile. Nevertheless it 
remained hopeful about the revolutionary potential of the bantustans and possibility of a 
united rural-urban struggle. SS2 This was echoed by the SACP which stated that "in a 
country like ours, where such close links already exist between the Africans in the town 
and their brothers in the platteiand, it is the duty of every member of our party to assist 
the rural people in their bitter struggles and to show in practice that the staunchest ally of 
the peasant masses is the industrial working class of South Africa". SS3 
In the Eastern Cape, East London was a stronghold of the ANC particularly during the 
Defiance Campaign. As a result ofthe close proximity to the Ciskei, the ANC established 
a number of branches in the Pedi districts, which had over a thousand paid-up members. 
The ANC was actively involved in strikes at the Good Hope Textile Mills and in the 
student revolts in Fort Hare.ss4 However, the ANC did not feature in the peasant revolts 
of the early 1960 ' s although officials blamed the uprisings on the ANC and other 
"subversive elements from outside the Bantu homelands".sss 
550 SACP Document 133: "Transkei Sham" Statement published in the underground Inkululeko-Freedom, 
February 1977. In South African Communists Speak. London: Inkululeko Publishers. 1981 :432. 
551 SACP Docyment 115: "The Road to South African Freedom", programme of the South African 
Communist Party adopted at the 5th national conference in 1962. Published in South African Communists 
Sr,eak, p. 302. 
, 2 I. van Kessel and B. Ooman, "One Chief, One vote: The Revival of Traditional Authorities in Post-
Apartheid South Africa" in E.A.B van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and R. VanD Dijk (eds), African 
Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape. Hamburg: Lit Verlag. 1999: 158. 
m SACP Document 116: "The Revolutionary Way Out," statement by the Central Committee of the South 
African Communist Party, April-June 1963 in South African Communists Speak, p. 328. 
554 T. Lodge, "Black Politics",p. 290. 
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The ANC also had a number of links to the Transkei. Govan Mbeki and Nelson Mandela 
were sons of Transkeian chiefs and Mandela had a close relationship to Paramount Chief 
Sabata Dalindyebo. Walter Sisulu was a member of the Transkeian aristocracy and 
leading ANC figures such as Nokwe, Resha and Oliver Tambo were Transkeians. 556 
However, it also played an insignificant role in the Transkeian rural uprisings. In 1954 it 
was still looking to Bunga councillors for support. In Tembuland, the PAC and its 
affiliate Poqo played a role instigating the conflict, but the ANC was virtually absent. In 
Mpondoland, the ANC played an indirect role through the Hill 's secretary, Anderson 
Ganyile who had been a member of the ANC Youth League and a leading ANC official 
in the Eastern Cape. Furthermore, the Hill's chairman Leonard Mdingi was a local ANC 
member. But the same can be said of the PAC and SACP. Zibonyile Ganyile, Cornelius' 
right hand man, was a PAC leader and Rawley Anderson, a veteran communist from 
Durban, was the lawyer and advisor of the Hill movement. 557 The ANC did not however 
play a direct role in these rural revolts. After the 1976 Soweto uprising, the ANC had 
clearly shifted its focus to the urban areas as "the road to power, it was now believed, was 
not through rural rebellion, but through urban guerilla warfare in combination with 
indefinite strikes and mass risings". 558 
In the 1980's the ANC attempted to re-enter the rural areas with the UDF, which was an 
umbrella organisation under which a multitude of organisations united and functioned as 
the internal ally of the banned liberation movement. In 1986 the National Working 
Committee of the UDF argued that organisation in the Bantustans "must be intensified 
and tribal structures should be replaced with democratic organisations".559 Terror Lekota 
described the institution of chieftaincy as a "dying institution" because "as the pressures 
of the capitalist economy penetrate even those rural areas, more and more people are 
making a break with the tribal ties of loyalties to the chief - who are being seen to be 
serving not the community but themselves. What we are going to see is the building of 
555 Ciskei Territorial Authority: 24/1 0/1962. 
556 T. Lodge and B. Nasson,AIl Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s. Cape Town: 
Ford Foundation. 1991: 236-237. 
551 Canlpbell, "Radical Resistance", p. 247-249. 
558 van Kessel and Ooman, "One Chief, One Vote", p. 158. 
55'Ibid, p. 161. 
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new leaders, not on the basis of old tradition" .560 The UDF sought to create a unitary 
state, which ethnically based homelands and their chiefly functionaries contradicted. 
Thus the UDF stood firmly against the chiefs. Nevertheless, its role in the rural areas was 
also minimal. Its rural affiliates were mainly students in secondary and tertiary schools 
and its campaigns were generally geared to the urban areas. 561 
The Chiefly Centrepiece 
Chieftaincy was the centrepiece around which the National Party ' s grand attempt at 
social engineering revolved. The chiefs were placed at the centre of discourse on cultural 
segregation in order to justifY the exclusion of Africans from equal representation in the 
South African parliament and to divide the increasingly urbanised, united and volatile 
black opposition. Hence, the chiefs formed the basis of the independent, culturally and 
linguistically distinct Bantustans. Within the Bantustans, chiefs dominated national, 
provincial and local levels of governance and consequently, political parties competed for 
their support to dominate parliament, ensure electoral victories, finance party machines 
and crush opposition. Due to bureaucratisation, which placed the chiefs' succession and 
incumbency in the hands of government and ensured that they were financially dependent 
on this government, the institution of traditional leadership became a pliable instrument 
in the quest for power. 
However, bureaucratisation distorted the tradition of the democratic 'good ' chief by 
creating a 'civil servant' chief, who relied on legitimacy bestowed from above, rather 
than from below. The tension between the 'good' and 'bad' chief formed the centrepiece 
of conflict in the 1960' s, as the chiefs became the focus of attacks against the oppressive 
TNIP and CNIP governments in Thembuland and Mpondoland in the Transkei, and in the 
Ciskei respectively. In the 1980' s chieftaincy came under threat once again. In the Ciskei, 
Gqozo 's dismissal and re-instatement of headmen, provided the impetus for the collapse 
' 60 Terror Lekota cited in I. Van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: Th e UDF and the Transformation of 
South Africa. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 2000: 80. 
>61 Van Kessel and Ooman, "One Chief. One Vote", p. 159. 
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of the entire traditional authority system. In the Transkei, the chiefs managed to retain a 
degree of legitimacy by organising behind the Transkei Traditional Leaders Association. 
The liberation movement was vocal in its attacks against the chiefs, but its urban 
orientation ensured that it played a minimal role in the struggles against the chiefs. 
However, as will be shown the next chapter, the late 1980's and 1990's found the ANC 
playing on a new field characterised by the politics of transition, negotiation and 
elections. In this next phase, chieftaincy became once again the centrepiece of party 
competition and political control. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUBORDINATION OF THE CHIEFS 
Recognition at the National Level 
Expediency and pragmatism have largely formed the basis of the ANC's attitude towards 
the chiefs. This was evident in the democratic transition, multi-party negotiation process, 
and ensuing national, provincial and local elections of 1994, 1995, 1999 and 2000. The 
vague and ambiguous treatment of the chiefs in the final constitution of 1996 opened the 
space for the increased subordination of the chiefs in the provincial and local domains in 
the name of democratisation and modernisation. Hence, although it has been convenient 
for the ANC and the chiefs to invent the myth of an ahistorical, precolonial democratic 
institution of chieftaincy which will live in harmony with an indigenous, modernised 
government, this myth simply masks the true power relations of a dominant, centralising 
party utilising the weak, divided and dependent institution of chieftaincy for its own 
purposes. 
Liberation 
"Dear Compatriots! Dear Traditional Leaders! You have an important role to play NOW 
in the struggles against Apartheid Your place is in the front ranks of the mass 
democratic offensive. Let us together shape the future South Africa in which justice, 
peace and prosperity will reign n.562 
A history of collaboration with Apartheid structures severely alienated the chiefs from the 
liberation movement. The South African Communist Party (SACP), civic bodies and the 
youth called for the abolition of Traditional Authority on the grounds that their 
legitimacy and authority was derived from oppressive higher authorities; they were 
562 Joint Communiques of Meeting between the Congress of Traditional Chiefs and the African National 
Congress Appeal to all Traditional Leaders of South Africa, 19 August 1989. Published in Unite for 
Freedom: Statements by the African National Congress on the Question of Unity and Anti-Apartheid 
Coalition 1985-1990. 1990: 40. 
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inefficient, corrupt, and undemocratic and their tribal orientation undermined attempts at 
developing a national consciousness563 However, the issue was far from clear-cut. Not 
all chiefs collaborated with the Apartheid regime, in fact, some openly sided with the 
liberation movement. 564 Despite the history of corruption and pervasive coercion, rural 
dwellers (particularly the elderly and less educated), continued to hold the institution of 
chieftainship in high regard, largely because it was seen as the center and protector of 
culture and identity. This ambiguity towards the chiefs is evident in two letters published 
in Horizon in 1991. Mothale argued that even though "many people, particularly in the 
rural areas, still have a strong traditional attachment to hereditary chiefs" and many 
patriotic chiefs played a "heroic role" in the struggle, "this should not divert us from our 
objective of striving for democratic elections at every level" and thus, "our approach 
should be guided by the need to, in the long term, to do away with the system of 
chieftainship altogether".s65 Molato on the other hand, argued that because "we are the 
custodians of democracy ... we should forge working relations with these chiefs, for the 
sake of educating and liberating the millions of oppressed people who still pay allegiance 
to these chiefs". 566 
The outcome of this debate was swayed by four further factors . First, many older ANC 
stalwarts respected the institution of chieftaincy, notably Nelson Mandela, who was 
himself a minor chief. Second, the ANC feared that Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha 
movement would undermine its attempts at developing a unity against the Nationalist 
563 Alastair Mcintosh, Sipho Sibanda, Anne Vaughan, Thokozani Zaba, "Traditional authorities and land 
reform in South Africa: Lessons from KwaZulu Natal" in Development Southern Africa. Vol. l3. No.3. 
June 1996: 27. The fact that worker-based, urban parties such as the SACP were against the chiefs is 
important given Neocosmos' assertion that the liberation movement's urban bias ensured that identification 
of the institution of chieftaincy with colonialism and Apartheid did not enter the mass popular 
consciousness (Neocosmos, Towards a History o/Nationalities in Southern Africa. Denmark: Centre for 
Development. October 1995:38). But as shown, urban and rural areas were interlinked by the migrant 
labour system and even though the ANC and SACP were not active participants in the struggles against the 
chiefs they overtly criticised and denounced them. Thus, Neocosmos ' explanation for the durability of the 
institution of chieftaincy is inadequate. 
,., For exanlple, Paramount Chief Sabala Dalindyebo, who was described by the ANC as a "stalwart who, 
of so long, held high the banner of genuine nationalliberation ... an outstanding leader of our people". 
"Extract from the Political Report of tile National Executive Committee to the National consultative 
Conference", June 1985. Published in Unite /or Freedom: 2. 
565 Caiphus Mothale, "Differ on Chiefs" in Horizon. May/June 1991: 2-3. Horizon was the journal of the 
AN C Youth League. 
566 P. Moloto, "Traditional Leaders and Change" in Horizon. July/August 1991 : 2. 
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Party government. In the mid-1980's a low-intensity civil was raging in Natal between 
Inkatha and the United Democratic Front, pitting traditionalists and whole rural villages 
against militant youth. Although Apartheid security forces actively supported Inkatha, 
Buthelezi skillfully manipulated tradition and Zulu identity to accrue support. In 1990 
Inkatha transformed itself into a nation-wide political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP), and violence spread to the Witwatersrand.567 The ANC feared that Bantustan elites 
would adopt a similar strategy across the country and thus aimed to prevent the 
emergence of an alliance between bantustan leaders, National Party officials and the 
chiefs. Although it criticised Gatsha for dressing "Inkatha in the clothes of the AN C, 
exactly because he knew that the masses to whom he was appealing were loyal to the 
ANC,,,568 the ANC attempted to adopt the 'attire' ofInkatha by appealing to chieftaincy 
and royalty to accrue support particularly in Natal and the rural areas. 
Third, ANC strategists began to focus on negotiated settlement as the route to liberation. 
A negotiated transfer of power would only be affected through elections; thus, chiefs 
were regarded as vital in 'recruiting' votes in rural areas from which the ANC was 
largely alienated. Hence, chiefs could become "strategic allies in the conquest of state 
power" by delivering their "bloc vote" 569 As Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo stated in 
1990, "Once a chief has identified himself with us, then we know that the whole tribe or 
the majority of the people in that area are now with the progressive forces,,57o 
The fourth factor altering the attitude of the ANC towards the chiefs was the alliance of 
thirty-eight (38) chiefs in the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA) on 20 September 1987. CONTRALESA aimed to "school the 
traditional leaders about the aims of the South African liberation struggle and their role in 
56' Ineke van Kessel and Barbara Ooman, "One Chief, One Vote:The Revival of Traditional Authorities in 
Post-apartheid South Africa" in E. Adriaan B. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (eds), African Chieftaincy in a 
New Socia-Political Landscape. Hamburg: Lit Verlag. 1999: 63. 
568 The ANC accused Buthelezi of presenting the IFP as a liberation movement but then using it as a 
"personal power base" as opposed to an "active and conscious force for revolutionary change". TItis power 
base could only be maintained by collaboration with the Apartheid government and active coercion. 
"Extract from the Political Report of the National Executive Comntittee to the National consultative 
Conference", June 1985. Published io Unite for Freedom: 2. 
569 Van Kessel and Ooman, "Onc Chief, One Vote", p. 164. 
510 Cited in Van Kessel and Ooman, "One Chief, One Vote", p. 164. 
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it" and to win back "the land of our forefathers and share it among those who work in it 
in order to banish famine and land hunger".57I In CONTRALESA' s constitution the 
historical tradition of chiefly resistance against the colonial overlords, and in particular 
their relationship with Nelson Mandela was emphasised: "We look to our forefathers 
amongst the Sekhukhuni, Ramabulana, Cetshawayo, Ngunguna, Moshoeshoe, Faku, 
Luthuli and now Mandela, to define our duty and the role we are to play in the ongoing 
national liberation struggle for a free, unitary and non-racial South Africa".572 They 
further blamed their collaboration on "the evil system of Apartheid" which forcibly used 
"chiefs to oppress their own people,,,573 and highlighted their role in the liberation 
movement which led some chiefs to "have been subjected to imprisonment, banishment 
and all other known form of atrocities committed by Pretoria against its opponents".574 In 
1989, Chief Mhlanbunzima Maphumulo became the president of CONTRALESA. He 
predicted that CONTRALESA "will be a big force in South African politics". 575 In 1990, 
Chief Patekile Holomisa, the cousin of Transkei ' s former military leader, Bantu 
Holomisa, was selected as the new president. At the official launch of CONTRALESA as 
a national body, Chief Holomisa emphasised that its main objective is to restore "dignity, 
reverence and respect" to the ancient institution of chieftaincy and to shed the image of 
chiefs as collaborators and government "sell-outs", and thereby prove that they are 
"worthy leaders" and would aid the liberation movement. He further emphasised that 
chiefs should make themselves more accountable at local level, co-exist with Residents 
Associations and become receptive to democratic processes. 57G 
Initially the SACP, UDF, South African Youth Congress (SA YCO) and trade unionists 
dismissed the attempts of the chiefs to re-organise themselves in line with the liberation 
571 Cited in Ineke van Kessel, Beyond our Wildest Dreams -The UDF and the Transformation of South 
Africa. London, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 2000: 83. For an extensive list of 
CONTRALESA's aims see Thando Zuma, "The Role of the Chiefs in the Struggle for Liberation" in 
A/tican Communist. 2nd Quarter. 1990: 69. 
5 2 Zuma, "Chiefs in the Struggle", p.69. 
513 Ibid, p. 69. In reality, as was shown in Chapter 3, although constraints were placed on the chiefs, their 
collaboration was largely motivated by self-interest. 
574 Zuma, "Chiefs in the Struggle", p. 69. For details regarding the bartishment of chiefs see Helen Joseph, 
Tomorrows Sun. New York: John Day Company. 1967. 
575 Weekly Mail, 6-12110/1989. 
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movement. 577 Then some came to regard this institution as important to achieve liberation 
with the ultimate goal of abolishing it in a democratic and possibly, classless society. 
Lessons from Angola and Mozambique showed that repudiating the chiefs would lead to 
more damage than good. In Mozambique, the FRELIMO government abolished the 
institution of chieftaincy shortly after coming to power; in retaliation, the chiefs set up 
power bases outside official structures and supported the opposition RENAMO 
(Mozambique National Resistance Movement) resulting in civil war. S78 In order to 
prevent the chiefs from subverting the struggle, the liberation movement embraced chiefs 
who had genuinely repented. The UDF hailed it as "a great achievement to see chiefs 
coming back to the people" and called "on all chiefs to join CONTRALESA and become 
part of the oppressed people's struggle for liberation".S79 SAYCO stated, "We are proud 
that traditional leaders are beginning to realise the truth ... We have a long history of chiefs 
who fought on the side of the people ... Let the present chiefs, if they are still chiefs, lead 
the people in the fight against what actually deprives their people of their land ... Let them 
be accountable to the people and directed by them" 580 In February 1988, a 
CONTRALESA deputation visited Lusaka to meet an ANC delegation headed by the 
secretary-general Alfred Nzo. The ANC's 1988 party guidelines reflected this alliance: 
"The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests 
of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the 
constitution,,581 Thus, in order to protect and ensure liberation, the ANC used the chiefs 
as part of a broad alliance to build up constitutional negotiations and to break the alliance 
between government and conservative Apartheid supporters. Hence, chiefs were invited 
to climb aboard the "liberation bandwagon". 582 
576 Daily Dispatch, 18/0911990; Leslie Bank and Roger Southall, "Traditional Leaders in South Africa' s 
New Democracy" in Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law. 1996: 416. 
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CONTRALESA' s position In the homelands was varied and often ambiguous. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, CONTRALESA had a limited impact largely because in September 
1989, Buthelezi ordered the chiefs not to join the organisation.583 According to some 
commentators approximately eighty percent (80%) of chiefs in the Transkei declared 
themselves in favour ofCONTRALESA (and the ANC)584, although others argue that the 
majority of chiefs were part of the Transkei Traditional Leaders Association (TTLA), 
which was in theory non-aligned but tended to adopt an anti-ANC stance.585 The Ciskei 
Traditional Leaders Association (CTLA) lost supporters to CONTRALESA when Gqozo 
began to lose power. However, the Border region of CONTRALESA endorsed the 
election of headmen proposed by Gqozo, which was claimed by Bums-Ncamashe "as 
conforming to the ANC's constitutional guidelines which provides for the continuation of 
the chieftainships within a democratic framework".586 In the face of opposition from 
BOCC0587, Patekile Holomisa intervened saying his organisation could not dictate that 
chieftain structures be accepted although he thought headmanship was a ' sensitive issue ' 
in Ciskei and urged reconciliation588 
The fact that CONTRALESA was based on an undemocratic institution, supporting 
undemocratic bodies such as headmen, was a bone of contention5 89 The ANC' s support 
of the old homeland elite created ambiguity and confusion because "the picture of ANC 
leaders wining and dining with bantustan leaders and paying homage to chiefs was 
thoroughly upsetting to rural activists,,590 This led to an "at best-uneasy relationship 
between CONTRALESA, youth and migrant groupings,,591 in Sekhukhuniland, and 
583 Zuma, "Chiefs in the Struggle", p. 72. 
584 Weekly Mail, 6-12/1011989. 
585 Bank and Southall, "Traditional Leaders in South Africa", p. 416. 
586 Daily Dispatch: 31 /0811991. 
587 Daily Dispatch: 0910911991 
588 Daily Dispatch: 09/0911991. 
5" The institution of traditional leadership was regarded as undemocratic because of its sexist, racist, 
autocratic and hierarchical nature. C. Keulder, Traditional Leaders and Local Government in Africa: 
Lessonsfor South Africa. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. 1998: 2, 10. A. Sachs, Advancing 
Human Rights In South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 1992: 77. M.O Hinz, "The 
'traditional ' of traditional government: traditional views versus democracy-based legitimacy" in 
Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa. University ofNarnibia: New Namibia Books. 
1998: 14-31. 
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spurts of violence between residents associations and the chiefs in the Eastern Cape. Even 
though the relationship was 'uneasy' the ANC used the chiefs as part of a national 
alliance against Apartheid forces. 
In 1990, the ANC's National Executive Committee gave a special tribute to the chiefs 
who "having broken away from the stable of those who help to administer the apartheid 
system" have "regained the respect of the people and are a valuable and indispensable 
component of the genuine forces for change,,592 However, the extent to which the ANC 
would "re-instate, protect and promote the institution of chieftainship, its traditional 
status and bonding function in the community,,593 after change had been enacted, was still 
unclear. 
Multiparty Negotiations 
On 2 February 1990 F.W De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and 
PAC. This was the year of 'talks about talks' culminating in an agreement to hold 
CODESA, an all party conference in which the ground work for the election of the 
constituent assembly, the interim government, constitutional principles and the time-
frame for transition would be laid; in other words, CODESA was to establish the 
framework for the transition towards a new 'democratic' South Africa. The Pan-African 
Congress (PAC), Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), South African Communist 
Party (SACP) and Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (AWE) announced that they would 
not take part. Buthelezi stated that the IFP's involvement was contingent on the inclusion 
of separate delegations representing the IFP, KwaZulu government and Zulu King 
Goodwill Zwelinthini. He justified this latter demand on the basis that Zwelinthini 
represents the interests of tribal authority and through it, the 'specific ' interests of the 
Zulu people as a whole594 CONTRALESA and other individual chiefs also demanded 
'92 Zuma, " Chiefs in the Struggle", p. 75. 
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inclusion into CODESA.59S Nelson Mandela supported this request because "in keeping 
with the spirit of unity the ANC considers it important that traditional leaders be involved 
in the process ... Just as traditional leaders were present at the formation of the ANC, they 
should be present at the watershed events that herald the dawn of a new, democratic 
South Africa".596 CODESA had originally excluded the chiefs because their entrance 
would necessitate the inclusion of other interest groups namely, business and labour. 597 
The result was a negotiated agreement in which all traditional leaders including 
Zwelinthini would be represented by one delegate and five advisers from each of the four 
provinces, although their role and degree of participation was not defined. The CODESA 
Working Group Two Steering Committee concluded that the "constitution should define 
a suitable role for traditional leaders consistent with the objective of a united, non-racial, 
non-sexist, democratic South Africa,,598 
In the draft Bill of Rights, no mention was made of culture other than freedom to speak 
language of choice and to pursue artistic, sporting or recreational activities, because of 
the political implications of culture. Right wing political groups used cultural uniqueness 
as justification for gaining recognition as a separate self-governing nation. Buthelezi was 
using culture and traditional leaders (as protectors of culture), to campaign for 
constitutional autonomy in KwaZulu-Natal. In contrast, the ANC was advocating a 
unitary state based on a single national identity underpinned by norms of equality and 
non-discrimination.599 However, the participation of the chiefs at the transitional talks at 
the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park in 1993 forced attention to be focused on 
culture, customary law and the role of the chiefs. 
595 Jason C. Myers, "The spontaneous ideology of tradition in post-apartheid South Africa" in Politi/«m. 
Vol 26 (I). May 1999: 36. 
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The involvement of the chiefs was an attempt by the ANC to ensure the IFP's 
participation in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process and to ensure the chiefly vote in the 
upcoming elections. In return for political support the traditional leaders were promised 
that their position would be maintained in the future constitutional order60o As Nelson 
Mandela stated, "the institution of chieftainship has played an important role in the 
history of our country and chiefs will continue to have an important role to play in 
unifying our people and performing ceremonial and other functions allocated to them by 
law,,601 This importance was entrenched in the Interim Constitution. 
Interim Constitution 
The interim constitution (l993t02 did not define the precise role of the chiefs in the new 
dispensation but clarified the defmition of 'traditional' leaders, and the extent and nature 
of their authority in national, provincial and local levels of government. In terms of 
recognition, a traditional authority recognised as such by the previous constitution, would 
retain that status for the five-year transitional period603 In other words, it delayed dealing 
with the issue of approximately 734 chiefs, a large number of whom owed their position 
to the National Party and homeland governments604 "A traditional authority which 
observes a system of indigenous law and is recognised by law immediately before the 
commencement of this constitution, shall continue as such an authority and continue to 
exercise and perform the powers and functions vested in it in accordance with the 
applicable laws and customs, subj ect to any amendment or repeal of such law and 
customs by a competent authority.,,605 
600 Sibongile Zungu, "Traditional Leaders Capability and Disposition to Democracy: the example of South 
Africa" in Traditional and Contemporary Forms oj Local Participation and self-government in Africa. 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung: lliB. 1997: 170. 
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In the face of an outcry from rural women, an additional clause was inserted that 
"indigenous law shall be subject to regulation by law.,,606 In other words, attempts by 
chiefs to get customary law entrenched as a 'fundamental right' were thwarted, thus 
making it subject to the more general 'equality clause.' Under customary law, women fall 
under the guardianship of fathers or husbands. Without the consent of their male 
guardians they are have no contractual capacity, cannot appear in court and are 
sometimes precluded from obtaining land and inheritance rights. 607 The patriarchal nature 
of customary law is clear in Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana's complaint that "who must 
lobola whom if we are all equal?,,608 In addition he lamented that "my son can be 
successfully challenged for my throne by may daughter because the Bill says that all 
forms of discrimination - as is emphatic on gender - should not be permitted,,609 The 
threat by women's groups to boycott the election was abated by section 33(2) that "no 
law, whether a rule of the common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any right 
h d · h' ,,610 entrenc e In t IS paper. 
In terms of representation, the Interim constitution stated that provincial legislatures must 
establish a House of Traditional Leaders (HTL) consisting of representatives, elected or 
nominated by the authority in the province. The HTL is entitled to advise and make 
proposals to the provincial legislature or government in respect of matters relating to 
traditional authorities, indigenous law, traditions and customs of indigenous 
communities611 At the national level, a Council of Traditional Leaders was to be 
established in due course consisting of a chairperson and nineteen representatives elected 
by the traditional authorities. This council was entitled to advise and make 
recommendations to the national government and president at his request and could delay 
the passing of a bill for thirty days.612 At the local level, the interim constitution stated 
that "the traditional leader of a community observing a system of indigenous law and 
605 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill B212B--93(GA), p. 116. 
606 Ibid 
607 Van Kessel and Ooman, "One Chief, One Vote", p. 167. 
608 Neocosmos, "Towards a History", p. 38. 
609 Bennett, "Human Rights and Customary Law", p. 21. 
61 0 Section 33 (2) 
61 I Section 183 (2)a 
612 Section 184(4) 
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residing on land within the area of jurisdiction of an elected local government referred to 
in Chapter 10, shall ex officio be entitled to be a member of that local government, and 
shall be eligible to be elected to any office of such local government".613 However, it also 
stated that there shall be democratic representation at all levels of government. Hence, 
although traditional leaders were given a measure of representation at the national, 
provincial and local levels, their real power was limited. 
Final Constitution 
Three main factors influenced the making of the final constitution: first, ambivalence 
within the ranks of the ANC about the future role of traditional leaders. Civics called for 
their abolition whereas others recognised the role that traditional authorities could play in 
mobilising communities for political ends and implementing development projects; 
second, increasing independence of CONTRALESA from the ANC; and third, the 
importance of drafting a constitution based on the consensus of the major parties. 614 The 
exclusion of the chiefs would invariably lead to the exclusion of the IFP, which could 
irrevocably damage the democratisation process. However, political scuffles between the 
ANC and IFP could not be avoided, particularly over the issue of remuneration and the 
political neutrality of the chiefs. 
In the opening speech of the forty-ninth ANC national conference in 1994, Mandela 
stated that the objective of the ANC should be to liberate traditional leaders by ensuring 
that they become non-partisan servants of the people and that no party should threaten 
peace and democracy in South Africa by claiming to represent a kingdom or a king615 
Mandela was explicitly chastising Buthelezi and his attempts to use his nephew, King 
Goodwill Zwelinthini against his rivals, the UDF and CONTRALESA. In the 
constitutional negotiations, Buthelezi tried to secure the status of the King in the 
constitution because the regarded the monarch's support for the IFP in the 1994 elections 
613 See Ch. II. 
614 Chris Tapscott, "The Institutionalisation of Rural Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa" in 
traditional and Contemporary Forms of Local Participation and Self-Government in Africa. JHB: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung. 1997: 302. 
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as crucial for its victory in KwaZulu-Natal. After the 1994 election and the formation of 
the Government of National Unity, Mandela recognised the importance of having a king 
' in his pocket' even though he continued to emphasise the non-partisan nature of 
chieftainship. He paid courtesy visits to the King and backed pro-ANC Zulu Royal 
members ' attempts to re-establish the Royal Council, which had been disbanded by 
Buthelezi. Tension between the King and Buthelezi increased and finally erupted when 
Buthelezi appointed himself as the chairman of the HTL in KwaZulu Natal in the face of 
protests from the King's Royal Council616 
In terms of remuneration, the ANC proposed empowering the central government to pay 
the chiefs. The NP, DP and IFP opposed this. The NP questioned the implementation of 
such an initiative; it recommended that a body of experts be formed to assist the payment 
of salaries and to ensure that traditional leaders were bona fide. The DP questioned the 
genuine leadership of many traditional leaders, opposed the notion of inherited leadership 
and argued that it was unacceptable for government to pay for services rendered by 
cultural groups. The IFP accused the ANC of political bribery and dispensing party 
patronage at the taxpayer's expense. Buthelezi further stated that this initiative was aimed 
to remove powers from the provincial government617 Business Day complained that it 
"would create another layer of parasitic officials at a time when the ANC has suggested 
reducing the number of national MPs to relieve the hard-pressed fiscus". 618 In the face of 
all this opposition, the Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Bill was passed at the end of 
June 1995. It dictated that payment of traditional leaders was to be handled by the central 
government although provinces could add extra allowances for example, for attending 
sessions of the HTL. Five out the six provinces accepted the bill; however, the IFP 
615 Business Day: 1994/ 12/ 19 
616 Yang Lihua, African Traditional Authority and Its Role in South Africa's Current Social Transition " in 
B. Brothers, J. Hermans and D. Nteta (eds), Botswana in the 21" Century. Gaborone: The Botswana 
Society. 1994: 299-300; Ooman and Van Kessel, "One Chief, One Vote", p. 164. In a speech given on 24 
July 1993 , King Zwelenthini stated that he does not support a single political party. The ANC hailed this 
announcement as "an important milestone", which would help towards "the creation of a climate for free 
political activity in Natal". In other words, it would open up space for the ANC to compete equally with the 
IFP in Natal. Department of Information and Publicity, Response /0 King Zwelenthini Speech at FNB 
Stadium, Internet: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslpr/1993/pr0728.html. 
611 Lihua, "Mrican Traditiortal Authority", p. 300-1 
618 Business Day: 1995/0611 4. 
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continued to insist that payment remain the responsibility of provincial government. The 
IFP-dominated provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal passed legislation prohibiting 
traditional leaders (including the King) from receiving remuneration from the central 
government619 Buthelezi further mandated the KwaZulu- Natal government to challenge 
the Act in the Constitutional Court, which ruled in July 1996 that on the grounds of the 
constitution, the province had the right to pass such legislation. This ruling was met with 
great criticism, and by the end of 1996, legislation on remuneration had not yet been 
impiemented620 
A further factor influencing the structure of the final constitution was that although 
CONTRALESA was aligned with the ANC it had increasingly carved out an independent 
role for itself. The first sign of this was in 1991 when Chief Holomisa led a delegation to 
the war-torn Eastern Townships as a 'neutral broker' for peace, although numerous 
verbal attacks against the IFP highlighted its obvious ANC alignment.621 This 
independence increased as traditional leaders relied less on the ' liberation bandwagon' 
and more on their 'traditional' status. In other words, in a society characterised by 
growing discontent with the slow process of formal and substantive liberation, it was 
more expedient to rely on tradition and culture to which many South Africans had turned. 
Hence, Holomisa emphasised that "chieftaincy was deeply rooted in African societies and 
should be trained and harmonised with modern societies. Chiefs being the custodian of 
norms, customs and folklore would continue to be needed by communities ... and remain 
unifying symbols by wielding their communities together at all times,,622 Using tradition, 
the ANC's 'need ' for the chiefs 'voting blocks' and the obvious importance of the chiefs 
in ensuring a consensus-based constitution, CONTRALESA began to demand more 
power particularly in the sphere of local governance.623 In five out of the six provinces, 
619 The payment of salaries, allowances and other privileges to the Jnganyam Amendment Bill of 1995 and 
KwaZulu Natal Amakhosi and Iziphakanyaniswa Amendment Bill of 1995. 
620 Ooman and Van Kessel, "One Chief, One Vote", p. 169. As a result, salaries and differences between 
the provinces varied greatly. Chiefs in the Northern Province received about RSO 000 annually while those 
in the West Province received only R6000 annually. 
621 Bank and Southall, "Traditional Leaders in South Africa", p. 417. 
622 Daily Dispatch: 14 October 1991. 
623 The dynamics of local governance will be addressed in greater detail with reference to the Eastern Cape 
province. 
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chiefs favoured the ANC, but as democratic reform increased in these communities, 
chiefs felt threatened. Although President Chief Holomisa was an ANC member and 
CONTRALESA was ANC-aligned, Holomisa led a protest march together with Chief 
Buthelezi in November 1995 against the local government elections. The chiefs clearly 
played on party competition to accrue greater power. However, Holomisa justified this 
behaviour to the ANC disciplinary committee, on the grounds that CONTRALESA's 
action was directed at the government, not the ANC and that this position could cut 
across political divides. Holomisa also called for a strengthened national council of 
traditional leaders and the power to block legislation that affects traditional authorities624 
This ' independent action' forced the ANC to recognise that chiefs are actors, who seek 
power and seek to entrench their own positions at any cost. 
Thus, the ANC was forced to 'tip-toe' around the chiefs. It needed to entrench their 
power in the constitution to ensure that they did not align with the opposition, did not 
cause 'havoc' in the countryside and ultimately did not jeopardise the democratisation 
process. On the other hand, it was clear that the ANC could not give the chiefs too much 
power due to the possibility of a rival threat for authority, particularly in the rural areas. 
Hence, the faction of the ANC which argued that traditional leaders "are entitled to a 
dignified and respected role which enables them to take their place in and make their 
contribution towards building a new democratic South Africa",62S was victorious. On the 
other hand, the ANC sought to restrain the chiefs ' power within a democratic framework. 
In terms of its strategy and tactics, the ANC stated that "while recognizing the existence 
of traditional leaders and traditional structures of governance, we must ensure that these 
leaders and structures recognize, respect and facilitate the process of democratization in 
the country while they serve as institutions to unite the people around questions of peace, 
development and nation-building,,626 These tensions were reflected in the final 
constitution; although it made provisions for the chiefs it was extremely vague about their 
624 Lihua, "African Traditional Authority", p. 301. 
625 Albie Sachs, Advancing Human Rights in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 1992: 77. 
Albie Sachs was a member of the ANC Constitutional Commitlee and National Executive COlllCil. 
626 Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress, as adopted at the 49th ANC National Conference, 
December 1994. Internet: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/stratact.html. 
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powers and functions due to the ANC's internal tensions, the growing independence of 
CONTRALESA and the ANC's attempts to satisfy all parties, NP, DP and IFP. 
The National Assembly adopted the new constitution on 8 May 1996.627 Section 211(1) 
stated, "The institution, status and role of traditional leadersbip, according to customary 
law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution.,,628 The courts are directed to apply 
customary law but this law is still subject to the constitution.629 National and provincial 
legislation630 is permitted to provide for the creation of houses oftraditionalleadership631 
National legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders and may provide a role 
for traditional leaders at local level. 632 At the national level, traditional leaders can 
propose legislation but cannot generate statutes of their own accord; they can advise and 
may insist on being consulted about new bills concerning customary law and they can 
delay the passing of an act by thirty days. However, by October 1996, Houses of 
Traditional Leaders had only been established in four out of the six provinces namely, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Northwest, Mpumulanga and the Free State.633 As a result, it was 
impossible to proceed toward establishing a National Council of Traditional Leaders, and 
consequently, the enabling legislation was withdrawn from parliament in October 
1996634 
627 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 
1996. Act 108 of 1996. 
628 Constitution of South Africa, 1996: Section 211 (I). 
629 Ibid: Section 211 (3). Nzebeza questions what "counts as ' customary law', ' tradition ' and 'custom' in a 
rapidly urbanising, late-twentieth century South Africa." Customary law is regarded as a dubious invention 
originating in the first colonial explorations into Africa. Furthennore, one needs to question whether 
traditional authorities are necessarily experts on various customs in their areas since there are great 
variations between clans and groups. Lungisile Nzebeza, "Rural local government in post-apartheid South 
Africa" in AJrican Sociological Review, 2 (I) 1998: 159. See T.W Bennett, Human Rights and AJrican 
CustomGlY Lcrw Under the South African Constitution . Cape Town: Juta & co. 1995 for a detailed outline 
of the origins and nature of . customary law' as defined by the South African constitution. 
630 Provinces were given space to promuJgate legislature but by assigning responsibility for defining the 
overall status of traditional leaders to the national legislature, provincial powers were curtailed. 
631 Constitution of South Africa, 1996: Section 212 (2) (a) 
63' Ibid: Section 212(2)(b) and 212(1) 
633 The Eastern Cape was deadlocked by conflict between chiefs and civics while in the Nothern Province, 
the issue hinged on the mode of representation of chiefs. The Northern Cape, Gauteng and Western Cape 
were not destined to have an HTL as they did not incorporate former bantustans. 
634 Ooman and Van Kessel, "One Chief, One Vote", p. 166. 
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This ambiguous and vague recognition of traditional leadership at national level had a 
number of important ramifications for chiefs and local governance across the country. In 
the Eastern Cape, this ambiguity opened the space for the increased subordination of the 
chiefs. As in developments at the national level, the ANC-Ied provincial government used 
the chiefs to accrue rural votes in competition with the United Democratic Movement in 
the local and national elections. However, once chiefs had served their purpose and 
elections had faded into memory, chiefs were largely marginalised, subordinated and 
contained in a highly dependent relationship with the provincial government. 
Subordination at the Provincial Level: The Eastern Cape 
The Eastern Cape posed unique and enormous challenges to the new ANC-led provincial 
government, headed by Raymond Mhlaba, a former Robben Island prisoner and longtime 
party member. Central to these problems was the issue of combining the poverty-stricken 
Transkei and Ciskei bantustans with a large segment of the former, 'wealthy' white Cape. 
This required establishing a unified administrative and political structure in Bisho, the 
former capital of Ciskei. This led to a number of difficulties. First, former Transkeians 
resented the fact that Umtata was not chosen to house the new government. Second, in 
order to reduce bureaucratic duplication and cost, a significant number of the 131 000 
civil servants had to be retrenched. Third, the bantustans' heritage of corruption had to be 
addressed. 635 And fourth, it had to address the issue of the chiefs who by and large had 
formed a large portion of the corrupt civil service but continued to wield a degree of 
authority particularly in areas in the former Transkei. 
The national leadership of the ANC opted to intervene in an increasingly volatile 
situation. Senior personnel were sent to the Eastern Cape to restructure the provincial 
administration. Mhlaba was replaced by the younger Arnold Stofile as Premier, and from 
1997 the Eastern Cape was subj ected to increasingly severe financial restraints636 In 
635 Roger Southall, "A Deepening of Democracy? Establishing Provincial Government in South Africa" in 
Afjica Insight, 28, 112: 5-18. 
6 6 Roger Southall and Zosa De Sas Kropiwnicki, Containing the Chieft: the ANC and Traditional Leaders 
in the Eastern Cape. Working Paper. Grahamstown: Rhodes University. 2001 : 8. 
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terms of traditional leadership, the ANC adopted a pragmatic strategy: pay lip service to 
the chiefs when it is important to do so, and ignore them when it is not. The importance . 
of chiefs lay in their ability to deliver rural votes; hence, increased chiefly status was a 
precursor to the local elections in 1995, provincial elections in 1999 and local elections in 
2000. 
Local Elections 0/1995 
The ANC attempted to secure the chiefs' support and in turn, their 'voting constituencies' 
by literally cementing its relationship with key individuals such as Stella Sigcau and 
Phatakile Holomisa. Stella Sigcau who was the former Prime Minister of Transkei and 
the sister of Mpondombini Sigcau (the Paramount Chief of Pondoland) was appointed to 
the cabinet. Phatakile Holomisa, the nephew of General Bantu Holomisa and the 
president of CONTRALESA was made a member of parliament. It was hoped that these 
appointments would permanently ensure that the chiefs toe the ANC's party line. 637 In 
addition, R17 million was spent on the province's 138 chiefs and 832 headmen during 
1994, with each of Transkei's five paramounts earning R281 256 annually.638 These 
national initiatives aimed to ensure that the chiefs' influence in the rural areas would be 
used in the ANC's favour. However, squabbles between the ANC-Ied provincial 
government and the chiefs threatened to subvert national efforts. 
The delay in the establishment of the House of Traditional Leaders (HTL) was caused by 
conflict between the chiefs and the new provincial government over the issue of 
increased salaries and increased seats in the HTL Max Mamase, the Minister of Housing 
and Local Government in the Eastern Cape overtly supported the South African National 
Civics Organisation (SAN CO) and its call for the abolition of the headman system. He 
was cited as saying, "there will be no headmen in this province any more. We want 
637 TItis did not work on Phatakile Holomisa as he used his new found status and power to seek more 
power, even if this meant criticising the ANC. However, official chastisement was often used to bring ltim 
in line. 
638 Compared to an !'vIP' s basic salary of approximately RI50 000 armnally. Tshediso Maloka, "Traditional 
Leaders and the Current Transition" in the African Communist. Second Quarter 1995: 41-2. 
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people who are democratically elected,,639 In response, CONTRALESA took the issue to 
court, citing the Transkei Traditional Authorities Act of 1965 in its defence. Chiefs 
further threatened to deny SAN CO activists access to rural areas. 
The national Amendment of Local Government Transition Act further worsened the 
situation in June 1995640 This Act gave provincial MEC's the option of excluding chiefs 
from rural governance, allowing traditional leaders to be ex officio members of 
transitional local councils or be represented on this council as one of four interest groups, 
which included levy payers (commercial farmers), women, farm workers and traditional 
leaders. All interest groups together could not have more than twenty percent (20%) of 
elected seats and no interest group alone could have more than ten percent (10%) of 
elected seats. The choice of interest group and the exact percentage each would represent 
was left at the discretion of the MEC 641 Holomisa complained that the ex officio status 
gives chiefs less rights than elected councillors, which invariably leads to the status 
problem that the chief s subjects are more powerful than the chief642 He also complained 
about the interest group option because "this will put the position of the traditional 
leaders in the hands of the people who are so hostile to US,,643 Other chiefs resented being 
. h I ~ put In t e same category as rura women. 
The Eastern Cape government chose the model excluding chiefs from participating in 
rural governance. In response, CONTRALESA attempted to reverse the decision, called 
for national government intervention and organised a boycott of the local elections. 
Contrary to Holomisa's assumption that about sixty percent of people under traditional 
639 Daily Dispatch: 2010111995. 
640 TIris Act attempted to remedy the urban bias inherent in the Local Government Transition Act of 1993, 
whlch made no account of the diJferences in rural areas, the lack of experienced leadershlp and the absence 
oflocal government negotiating forums. For the rural areas it simply proposed a nlirror image of provisions 
outlined for urban areas. It also left the role of traditional leadershlp ill defined and open-ended. For further 
details see Tapscott, "The institutionalisation of Rural Local Government", p.299 and Galvin, "Impact of 
local government", p. 90. 
641 Nzebeza, "Rural Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa" in African Sociological Review, 2 
(I) 1998: 156-157 
642 Ooman and Van Kessel, "One ehlef, One Vote", p. 168. 
643 The Star: 23/08/1995. 
644 Weekly Mail and Guardian: 18-24/08/1995. 
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leaders would join their boycott645, many people defied their chiefs by voting, thus 
reinforcing the provincial government's argument that "people don't listen to 
amakhosi,,646 When CONTRALESA declared the election null and void, the ANC 
threatened Holomisa and Nonkonyana with disciplinary action on the grounds that their 
actions have "the effect of denying citizens in the rural areas of their right to vote and 
shape their own future, and is contrary to everything the AN C stands for" 647 Holomisa 
and Nonkonyama were suspended from CONTRALESA due to the promptings of the 
KwaZulu-Natal CONTRALESA branch because of their increased orientation towards 
the IFP. Holomisa chastised the ANC for dividing the chiefs within CONTRALESA and 
ignored the suspension. He continued to work within CONTRALESA with Winnie 
Mandela, who not only used the organisation to mobilise personal support but also to 
buttress her claim that she was the Princess of the Madikazela clan in Bizana. 648 
Nevertheless, CONTRALESA was brought in line with official ANC policy at the 
provincial level. 
With the local elections becoming a mere memory, the chiefs were increasingly 
subordinated to the provincial government. This is evident in the weak and essentially 
ineffectual House of Traditional Leaders. The chiefs boycotted the public hearings on the 
establishment of the HTL because they were held in urban areas and the provincial 
government had allegedly not consulted the chiefs. 649 Regardless, the provincial 
government proceeded to establish an HTL composed oftwenty (20) members nominated 
by traditional leaders and drawn from ten separate regions. On the basis of the ANC 's 
argument for the non-partisan nature of traditional leaders, the six paramount chiefs were 
originally excluded from the House. However once established, the House membership 
increased to twenty-six members, thereby including the paramount chiefs. 
645 Business Day: 21/0911995. 
646 Daily Dispatch: 30/10/1995. 
647 Cyril Ramaphosa, Statement on Call to Boycott Local Government Elections. Internet: 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslpr/1995/prI030b.html. 
648 Tshediso (Eddie) Maloka, "Populism and the Politics of Chieftaincy and Nation-Building in the New 
South Africa", Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 14, 2, 1996: 173-96. See also Maloka, 
"Trdditional Leaders and the Current Transition" in the African Communist. Second Quarter 1995: 41-2. 
649 Daily Dispatch: 2010111995. 
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A further bone of contention between the provincial government and the chiefs was the 
location of the HTL. Due to insufficient funds, the government asked that the HTL meet 
in the Bunga, which housed the former Transkeian legislature. Then the government, on 
the recommendation of SANCO, turned the Bunga into a museum dedicated to Nelson 
Mandela and transferred the HTL to a temporary structure in Bisho namely, the 
agricultural hall of the former Ciskei. Renovations costing a mere R250 000 left the 
chiefs with limited resources and poor facilities650 After its first meeting in October 1996 
the House has allegedly given frequent advice and information to the South African Law 
Commission. However, the provincial government has refrained from utilising the HTL's 
official mandate set out by the Interim constitution namely, to advice on matters related 
to indigenous communities. Hence, the chief's contribution was largely ignored. 
The Provincial Elections of 1999 
In the 1994 provincial election, the ANC secured 84.4 percent (%) of the vote in the 
Eastern Cape thereby ensuring that it did not have to accommodate the chiefs in order to 
accrue rural votes in the 1995 local elections. However, by 1998 the tables had turned 
somewhat: first, the ANC could not rely on an automatic victory on the basis of its role as 
the 'liberator' of the African masses. The fear that its failure to ensure substantive 
equality would significantly affect the electoral outcomes greatly influenced its attitude 
towards the chiefs. Second, although the attempt to boycott the 1995 local elections was a 
failure, the chiefs appeared more organised and popular, thereby entrenching the 
assumption that the chiefs could deliver the vote to their favoured party. Third, the ANC 
was no longer the only contender for the people's votes in the Eastern Cape. The United 
Democratic Movement (UDM) founded by the youthful and popular former military 
leader Bantu Holomisa after his expulsion from the ANC in 1997, offered a non-racial 
challenge to the ANC, particularly in the former Transkei. Recognising the value of 
chieftainship in mobilising support and votes, the UDM competed with the ANC for the 
allegiance of the chiefs. 
650 Annual Report of the House of Traditional Leaders (Eastern Cape Province), 1999-2000: 5-6. 
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The ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) launched during the 
1994 elections aimed to alleviate poverty and reconstruct the economy on an equitable 
basis. This involved the construction of infrastructure in rural areas, the improvement of 
education and communication and general socio-economic upliftment.G5l It was believed 
that the RDP would reduce the material base of chieftaincy as people no longer had to 
rely on the chiefs for access to strategic resources such as education and health 
facilities. 652 However, its failure had the converse effect. In both the former Ciskei and 
former Transkei poverty persisted. In Melani (in former Ciskei), 41 percent of all adults 
were unemployed, 73 percent of households were supported by members working 
elsewhere, 70 percent of citizens did not have land and only 24 percent of landholders 
managed to sell something they cultivated. Furthermore, it was riddled by drought and a 
severe shortage of effective, motivated labour.6S3 Soon after the 1995 local government 
elections, the RDP steering committee initiated a national Rural Administration 
Development (RAID) programme, which aimed to provide administrative infrastructure 
and trained administrative staff; however, it produced no meaningful results 654 The 
Regulation of Development in Rural Areas Act removed the powers of traditional leaders 
to handle development in rural areas in favour of District Councils and transitional 
representative councils (TRC's). However, these councils faced numerous problems, 
which included a shortage of funds and personnel. Vast lands and inaccessible rural 
villagers left the limited number of officials unable to deal with local problems; for 
example, in Mquanduli, there were only seventeen councillors for forty villages. In the 
Eastern Cape councillors earned a mere RI20 and R160 a meeting and a monthly 
allowance of between R300 and R350. Transitional Representative Councils (TRepC's) 
also lacked control over resources; they were entirely dependent on district, provincial 
and national governments to address their needs.655 Even with authority to extract 
resources from the people, there was nothing to extract from the poverty-ridden former 
reserves. According to the Rural Development Framework in 1997, three quarters of 
651 For a succinct account of the RDP see Tom Lodge, South African Politics Since 1994. Cape Town & 
Johannesburg: David Philip Publishers. 1999: chapter 3, pp. 28-4l. 6" Lihua, "African Traditional Authority", p. 304. 
653 Cecil Manona, "The virtual collapse of agriculture in a fonner Ciskei community" in Africa InSight. Vol 
28 (3/4). 1998: 161-162. 
654 Nzebeza, "Rural local government", p. 157. 
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people in South Africa live below the poverty line in rural areas6S6 "When the rural 
masses voted in the 1995/6 elections they dreamt of a better life that would give them 
access to services that were only available to urban residents,,6S7, but by 1999 their 
expectations were dashed by low service delivery, financial crisis, backlogs in 
infrastructure and decreased economic activity in rural areas . 
As in the past, when the government failed to deliver, rural dwellers turned increasingly 
to the chiefs as an alternate form of authority. Unlike councillors who were chosen by 
proportional representation and thus, distanced from the people, the chief was a figure to 
turn to in crisis for emotional and often economic support. For example, 'good chief 
Richard Nchabeleng has been described as being "on the side of the people" because "he 
represents our needs and aspirations. He is a developer. We judge him according to his 
participation and involvement in matters that intimately affect the community and as a 
consequence, he is highly regarded by the community" .6S8 Hence, the ANC was faced 
with the threat of a rival authority, which could transfer the people's allegiance elsewhere 
particularly since this allegiance was no longer based solely on gratitude and respect for 
the liberation movement. 
CONTRALESA's ambiguous position over non-partisanship ensured that chiefs could be 
enticed to support a party that serves their needs. CONTRALESA decided to allow its 
members to stand as party candidates but as a body it would remain non-partisan. This 
allowed Phatakile Holomisa and Mwelo Nonkonyama to be placed at high positions on 
the ANC's national list even though they were highly critical of the ANC's treatment of 
traditional leaders. As shown above, the ANC members supported the notion that chiefs 
must remain ' above politics' when it suited them. However, in the upcoming national 
elections it was vital to ensure that chiefs did not join the ranks of the UDM. Thus it was 
that the ANC dangled a number of 'carrots' before the chiefs, such as an unscheduled pay 
'" Ibid.,p. 157-158. 
656 K.O Lefanya, Th e Role a/Traditional Leaders in Local Economic Development presented at TAARN 
conference. April 200 l: 3. 
651 Sicelo DJadla, "New Plans for Local Government" in Land and Rural Digest. November-December 
2000: 12. 
658 Sicelo DJadla, "Good Chief Nchabeleng" inLand and Rural Digest. November-December 2000: 27 . 
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rise for chiefs in the Eastern Cape. Paramounts received R322,800 and chiefs R77,472 
per annum. In addition, it backtracked on its decision to exclude headmen from these 
benefits by announcing a R5 million package for Transkei's 997 headmen6 59 Even so, 
despite these salary increases, the chiefs inclined informally to the UDM. 
In early March 1999, the UDM claimed twenty out of twenty five of the most senior 
traditional leaders. Instead of resorting to bribery, it focused on tensions between the 
chiefs and the Bisho government in order to accrue support. These tensions included the 
conflict over the refusal of the provincial government to remunerate headmen in Ciskei; 
the minimal influence accorded to the HTL and the increased tendency to divert power 
from the chiefs and headmen to elected Transitional Local Councils at local level. In 
addition, the UDM exploited the discontent felt by members of the former Transkeian 
petty bourgeoisie who failed to accrue the same status and power under the ANC-Ied 
provincial government. Bantu Holomisa stressed how his former government had 
delivered benefits to the people and remained constant to the chiefs. Consequently, 
former members of the TTLA (Transkei Traditional Leaders Association) joined the 
UDM in droves under the leadership of Chief Dumisane Gwadis0 6 60 
Ultimately however, the ANC's financial 'enticement ' prompted a stronger reaction from 
the chiefs. With 73.8% of the vote, it returned to dominate the provincial legislature once 
again. However, it lost approximately 10% of the votes accrued in 1994661 to the UDM 
which secured 13 .6% of the vote in the provincial election largely derived from areas 
surrounding Umtata, where it won 56 % of the vote cast in the rural areas and 53% in the 
town itself. 662 Hence, it was that the chiefs were regarded by both the UDM and the ANC 
as vital for securing power in the rural areas on the basis of an unproven assumption that 
659 Roger Southall, "The Struggle for a Place Called Home: the ANC versus the UDM in the Eastern Cape" 
in Politikon, 26 (2). 1999: 163. These pay rises were legalised by the Proclamation on Remuneration of 
Public Office Bearers Act No. 20 of 1998 which stated that kings/paramount chiefs and chiefs would be 
entitled to salary adjustruents from I April 1999. See Department of Housing, Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs. Budget Speech. 199912000. 
660 Gwadiso is now the UDM's provincial leader and was the candidate for prentier. 
661 It received 84.4 % of the votes in 1994. 
662 For extended details of this contest for the chiefs see Southall, "The struggle for a place called home", p. 
155-166. 
175 
the chiefs could deliver the vote. This assumption was reinforced by tbe fact that the 
people began to question the ANC's ability to secure not only formal rights, but also 
substantive rights on an equitable basis given the continued impoverishment of the 
former reserves. 
Tlte Local Elections of2000 
After the ANC secured its dominance in the Eastern Cape provincial government it no 
longer needed to court the chiefs. Although the upcoming local elections in 2000 led once 
again to the belief that traditional leaders and their bloc votes were of importance, the 
tables had turned yet again. The HTL was divided, dependent and weak and the UDM 
failed to offer any serious political competition due to its poor performance and internal 
divisions at national level. Hence, the ANC in the Eastern Cape no longer needed to ' tip 
toe' around the chiefs or ' dangle carrots' in their path because the threat of chiefs 
influencing votes in an alternate party' s favour, was virtually non-existent. On the other 
hand, for safety sake, the ANC avoided alienating the chiefs completely by appeasing 
them with (as yet unfulfilled) promises of more power at the local level. 
According to Nonkonyana, Chairperson of the Eastern Cape, House of Traditional 
Leaders, "During 2000 we have seen lots of pressures from all corners seeking to 
destabilise our system. This year we are going to emerge more united than before and 
fight any system that seeks to undermine traditional leadership in our country,,663 This 
unity is unlikely given the number of bitter squabbles within the provincial HTL. The 
deputy chairman of the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders, Chief Dumisani 
Gwadisho, made allegations that the outspoken house member Prince Zolile Burns-
Ncamashe was an ' illegitimate prince' because he is only a nephew of the Burns-
Ncamashe family and therefore not qualified to be a member of the House of Traditional 
Leaders664 The divisions between the chiefs were once again evident in the conflict over 
the election of chiefs to the provincial HTL. Nonkonyana argued that the replacement of 
663 Daily Dispatch: 0110112001. 
664 Daily Dispatch: 15/0112001. 
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ChiefMphulo Jongilanga by AmaRharhabe's Prince Langa Mavuso was " irregular" and 
the results of the nomination and election were "null and void" because Jongilanga had 
not resigned fully. AmaRharhabe King Mxhoba Sandile disagreed and berated 
Nonkonyama for acting prematurely665 These divisions even led the executive 
coordinator of the Xhosa Royal Council, Prince Xhanti Sigcawu, to urge the provincial 
government to disband the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders because it fails to 
meet the needs of the community and is used instead to discuss personal differences666 In 
response, Premier Stofile announced the Provincial Government's intention to conduct a 
"chiefs ' audit" which he argued would have "sweet" outcomes for "those undermined by 
Apartheid and other political whims" but would be "bitter for those who benefited from 
the punishment and sidelining of their legitimate senior and should-be rulers,,667 This 
measure would threaten the power of present traditional leaders by placing succession 
and incumbency in the hands of government, and would invite continuing divisions, 
thereby weakening and neutralising the chiefs as significant actors. 
The extent to which traditional leaders are significant actors is debatable given their high 
levels of material dependency on the state. Traditional leaders want a basic salary, 
medical aid, pension fund, car, travel allowances, housing subsidies and a thirteenth 
cheque668 In June 2000, CONTRALESA asked government to upgrade the perks of 
traditional leaders to match those ofMP' s even though this would cost taxpayers RI72.8 
million per year. Provincial and Local Government Department Chief Director of 
Traditional Leaders, Thaka Seboka said that South Africa' s eight hundred traditional 
leaders each receive a monthly salary of approximately R7000 whereas the average 
member of parliament receives Rl8 000. CONTRALESA also requested a ministry of 
traditional affairs and a school to train chiefs ' children669 In the Eastern Cape House of 
Traditional Leaders' submission to the 'Draft Discussion Document Towards a White 
Paper on Traditional Leadership and Institutions', the chiefs argued that government, "as 
665 Daily Dispatch: 02/ ll/2000, 
666 Daily Dispatch: 27/112001. 
667 Daily Dispatch: 10/03/2001. 
668 Peires, "Traditional Leaders in Purgatory: Local Government in Tsolo, Qumbu and Port St. Johns 1990-
2000" inAfrican Studies, Vol 59 (1), 2000: 109, 
669 Business Day: 21/0612000, 
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custodian of the taxes of our people, should be responsible for the remuneration of 
traditional leaders. The fact that government pays traditional leaders does not make them 
public servants, they remain accountable to their communities and the nation in the same 
manner that other public office bearers account to their constituencies and the nation,,670 
However, their dependency on the state for resources and their inability or unwillingness 
to openly question the ANC government cannot be denied. Hence, the ANC no longer 
needed to cater to the chiefs' whims to secure electoral victory because the chiefs were 
too divided and dependent upon the ANC to mobilise an attack against it. 
A further reason why the ANC could afford to sideline the chiefs was that the UDM was 
unable to live up to its expectations because it was divided nationally and did not provide 
robust opposition to the ANC-dominated legislature. In the run up to the 2000 local 
elections, it was forced to rely wholly upon its Umtata constituency It once again 
focused on the discontents of the former Transkeian bureaucracy. This orientation was 
indicated by its leading lights. For instance, its political leader, Chief Gwadiso was a 
minister under both George Matanzima and Stella Sigcau. Herbert Tshegwa, mayoral 
candidate for Mbashe, was the former Minister of Education in the Transkei,. Dowa 
Mgudlwa, the UDM's mayoral candidate for Umtata, was a minister under Kaiser 
Matanzima, a businessman and a chief from Engcob0671 In terms of the chiefs, it backed 
CONTRALESA's attempts to discourage people from registering as voters, on the 
grounds that the "dignity of traditional leaders have been denigrated,,672 Nevertheless, 
the UDM was increasingly appearing as the "TNIP in Disguise,,673, couched in homeland 
politics. Thus, the fact that it offered no major competition to the ANC in the Eastern 
Cape (apart from in Umtata674), led many ANC officials to believe that a 'race for the 
chiefs' would be pointless. 
670 Eastern Cape House o/Traditional Leaders Submission towards a White Paper on Traditional 
Leadership and Institutions. Bisho: 2000:32. 
671 See Roger Southall, "Election Updates" in Local Government Elections 2000. NO.5 1111112000. 
672 Business Day: 0311012000; Daily Dispatch: 14/09/2000. 
673 Southall, "The struggle for a place called home". 
674 In the elections, the UDM performed poorly throughout the province except in Umtata. See Roger 
Southall, "Eastern Cape", Local Government Elections 2000. No.5, II. November 2000. Electoral Institute 
of Southern Africa. Also see David Pottie and Heather Ford (Eds), Local Government in South Africa: 
Elections 2000. EISA: Johannesburg. 2001. 
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Hence it was that the ANC could afford to subordinate the chiefs in the restructuring of 
local governance. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 called for the introduction of 
three types of municipality : Metropolitan Councils (category A), local councils (category 
B) and district councils (category C). The latter two categories would share powers and 
responsibilities. District councils would be responsible for delivering infrastructure and 
facilitating regional planning and monitoring wide geographical areas and areas of lower 
population densities . Category A and B councils would be directly elected while 60 
percent of category C's membership would be selected by local councils, and the 
remaining forty percent would be directly elected by proportional representation. In areas 
where traditional leaders govern communities by customary law, provision is made for 
not more than 10 percent of the total membership to be ftlled by traditional leaders on a 
non-voting basis.67S A Municipal Demarcation Board was also created to provide for the 
834 existing local councils to be replaced by six metropolitan councils, 241 local 
councils, 52 district councils and district management areas in sparsely populated areas. 
In the Eastern Cape, 182 municipalities were to be translated into a single Metropolitan 
Municipality, 38 new smaller municipalities and six new district councils676 
These proposals led to a national and provincial outcry from traditional leaders who 
argued that traditional entities will be split and others amalgamated with traditional 
rivals, and that the new the system of local government undermines their traditional 
powers and responsibilities to be directly involved in the welfare of their communities677 
What the White Paper on Local Government described in 1998 as an "innovative 
institutional arrangement" combining "the natural capacities of both traditional and 
elected local government to advance development or rural areas and communities,,678 was 
regarded by the chiefs as a farce. Instead of establishing "cooperative governance" based 
675 EISA, Locol Government Elections, I , II September 2000. 
676 Roger Southall, "Eastern Cape", Local Government Elections 2000, No.2. 27 September 2000: 3. 
677 Peires, "Traditional Leaders in Purgatory", p. 113. 
678 Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, While Paper on Local Government, 
March 1998: 75-79. 
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on "mutual trust and joint interest,,679 chiefs regarded this arrangement as "another form 
of colonialism" which could result in their "kings and chiefs losing their powers over 
people they have ruled for decades" . 680 In other words, this Act entrenched an alien 
system of governance based on westernised values and was thus, "unconstitutional.,,681 
The Eastern Cape HTL argued that chiefs should be the sole local authority in rural areas 
of traditional jurisdiction, even if this meant that the majority of traditional authorities 
would be elected for the sake of democratisation and gender sensitivity. Thus, traditional 
authorities should not fall under the control of town councils and should have 
representatives on district councils. It further asserted that these changes were necessary 
to ensure conditions "conducive to free and fair local government election". 682 
This underlying threat was reiterated by traditional leaders nationally, to President Thabo 
Mbeki, on 28 June 2000 in their demands that traditional authorities should have the 
same status as category B municipalities and should be allowed to work directly with 
Category C councils. In his response, Mbeki rejected the traditional leaders' argument for 
a central role in rural local government; however, he did stress the need for "a dual 
system, which provides for the retention of traditional leadership, while at the same time 
allowing local communities to elect their public representatives" .683 In addition he agreed 
to a few marginal concessions: first, the participation of non-voting traditional leaders in 
category B councils would be increased from ten per cent to twenty percent, although this 
would not extend to representatives of traditional leaders; second, the demarcation 
process would be re-examined; third, national and provincial governments would 
examine functions that might be assigned to traditional authorities; fourth, local 
government MEC's will be advised to provide a role for traditional leaders in the affairs 
of districts or local municipalities as stipulated by Section 81 (4) (6); and fifth, the role of 
679 Department of Provincial and Local Govenunent, A Drajl Discussion Documenl Towards a While Paper 
on Traditional Leadership and Instilulions, 11 April 2000, p. 40. 
680 Chief Jongita Ngubo cited in Daily Di'palch: 14/0912000. 
681 Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, Submission o/the House o/Traditional Leaders (Easlern 
Cape) 10 Ihe Drajl Discussion Document Towards a While Paper on Traditional Leadership and 
Inslilutions. June 2000. 
682 Ibid 
683 John Seiler, "The continuing Stand-off between the National Govenunent and Amakhosi: Can it be 
resolved?" Unpublished document. 2000. 
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the house of traditional leaders will be reviewed in order to strengthen "their participation 
in the national and provincial legislative processes,,684 Lastly, Mbeki emphasised that the 
white paper would proceed and be approved in March 2001 and national legislation will 
be enacted in July 2001. However, Mbeki emitted a negative view of traditional 
authorities who propose to "disenfranchise a section of our people" and "negate the 
aspirations of millions, including some traditional leaders, who fought for democracy" . 685 
The chiefs rejected these proposals and mobilised the people against the demarcation and 
registration process. Many people believed that the incorporation of rural areas into new 
municipalities would result in increased taxes for services in rural areas and consequently 
supported the chiefs against these proposals686 Popular protests forced the closure of 
seven voting districts in Qumbu over the registration process of 16th and 17th 
September. 687 In response, former President Nelson Mandela stated with reference to 
kings in Europe that "all those who did not respect democracy are gone. Those who have 
survived are the ones who have respected democracy". He further warned the chiefs not 
to proceed with their planned demonstration to the Union Building in Pretoria on 21 
October. 688 
Nevertheless, the government attempted to carry out a form of 'damage control' by 
pushing two measures through parliament in September. The Municipal Structures Act 
compelled municipalities to consult communities when making decisions concerning 
local development and. The Municipal Structures Amendment Bill increased the number 
of non-voting traditional leaders in a municipality to 20 percent689 Further negotiations 
took place on 9 October. Once again, traditional leaders argued that the new municipal 
structures would erode their powers in the rural areas and municipal boundaries would 
incorporate areas under their jurisdiction. The state, on the other hand, argued that 
democratically elected councils would improve service delivery in the rural areas. The 
684 Ibid, p. 2. 
68' Ibid, p. 3. 
GB' Daily Dispatch: 04/0912000 
'81 Daily Dispatch: 24111/2000; Eastern Province Herald: 26/0912000. 
' 88 Daily Dispatch: 19/0912000. 
689 Eastern Province Herald: 26/09/2000. 
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meeting ended in a deadlock and government was forced to postpone the elections to 
December 5690 Nonkonyama put forward another proposal that traditional authorities be 
reconstituted as Regional Authorities and share equal status with Category B 
municipalities. Yet again, the government refused to concede691 
In response, the chiefs threatened to discourage voting and to take the issue to the 
constitutional court692 The government attempted to appease the chiefs one last time by 
proposing the Municipal Structures Second Amendment Bill to parliament in November. 
It vested Municipalities with the power to delegate tasks to traditional leaders. It also 
gave traditional leaders powers on matters related to witchcraft, divination, burials and 
the "gathering of firewood,,693 However, this bill was withdrawn from parliament due to 
procedural problems694 Regardless, traditional leaders were unhappy with the bill, which 
they described as "insulting and meaningless". 695 In order to offset possible disruptions in 
the election, a ministerial task team was established under Deputy President Zuma, to 
work on the new Local Government Structures Second Amendment Bill to be passed the 
following year. The government further emphasised its commitment "to ensure that the 
powers and functions of traditional authorities in local government are not eroded" by 
issuing a Statement of Intent which indicated their joint commitment to recognising the 
critical role of traditional leaders in the system of govemance696 
On the 5 December local elections went ahead amidst worries that traditional leaders 
would disrupt the election process. The chiefs eventually agreed to cooperate in the 
elections but not in the new local government councils until both the constitution and the 
690 Daily Dispatch: 0911012000. 
691 Daily Dispatch: 2611 012000; Business Day: 0911 0/2000. 
692 Business Day: 09/10/2000. 
693 Daily Dispatch: 0211212000; Eastern Province Herald: 06/1112000. 
694 111e bill was withdrawn fTOm parliament because it differed from the version gazetted on 3 November. 
The bill published on the 3 November was a Section 75 bill; in other words, mandates from the provincial 
legislature were not necessary. After publication and consultation, the department reworked the bill with 
the result that it became a Section 76 bill (requiring mandates from provinciallegislatnres). Hence, if the 
original bill had been passed it would have been deemed unconstitutional. Daily Dispatch: 18/ 11 /2000. 
695 Mail and Guardian: 25/1112000. 
696 Daily Di;patch: 02/1212000. 
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Municipal Structures Act had been amended in their favour697 However, ten months 
down the line (August 2001), these amendments have not been carried out. In early May 
2001 Sydney Mufamadi stated that major progress had been made in terms of 
consultations with the Congress of South African Trade Unions, SANCO, the South 
African Local Government Association, the Municipal Demarcation Board and the 
Commission of Gender Equality. However, the exclusion of the chiefs from these 
meetings was met with contempt. IFP councillors warned that chiefs would disrupt the 
functioning of municipal structures and Nonkonyama announced a possible "programme 
of action" by the chiefs in the Eastern Cape698 Over and above this dispute, the National 
Land Committee criticised the government for not consulting the "ordinary rural people" 
in what had become an "elitist" debate699 
Hence, in retrospect the chiefs were corralled into accepting a compromise, which they 
rejected. In addition they were fed promises that as yet, have not been carried out. It is 
clear that the government was able to sideline the chiefs because they were too weak, too 
divided and too dependent upon the government to counter the ANC. In the run-up to the 
1994 and 1999 elections, traditional leaders were successful in exploiting party 
competition to their advantage; however in the 2000 local elections, the UDM's failure to 
provide the most basic competition undermined the chiefs ' attempts to use this strategy 
yet again. 
So Where Do the Chiefs Lie? 
Clearly the accommodation of chieftaincy to the new arrangement of power is still very 
fluid . In agreement with Pieres one cannot assume that there is a homogeneity of interest 
amongst the chieftaincy 700. However, speculative evidence suggests that the Eastern Cape 
House of Traditional Leaders is a vehicle for a relatively well off band of the chieftaincy. 
This group includes lawyers, politicians absorbed into ANC structures, the new black 
697 Daily Dispatch: 0411212000. 
698 Sunday Independent: 06/051200 I . 
699 Business Day: 10, 14/0512001. 
100 Pieres, "Transkei on the Verge of Emancipation", p.193. 
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bourgeoisie/middle class as well as chiefs who benefited from their role in homeland 
governance and are now relatively well-off businessmen and educators. As Dladla aptly 
states, "They drive Porsche cars out of the very poor communities they leave behind,, 701 
Similarly, CONTRALESA has been described as "a vehicle for certain petty bourgeois 
elements to get into government through the back door trying to establish a power base 
for their own class interests,,702 Patekile Holomisa until recently was an active legal 
practitioner in the Transkei Supreme Court and did not grow up among the Hegebe 
people over whom he was to become a traditional leader703 Maloka describes him as 
more a member of the urban educated elite than a traditional leader704 In other words, 
those claiming the status of 'traditional ' leaders are simply exploiting tradition for their 
own ambitions and class interests. This explains why Winnie Mandela is suddenly a 
'princess ' of the Madikizela clan in Bizana705 
As in Apartheid, traditional leaders are more dependent on the state for power than on the 
people or the land. By attempting to counter the state through boycotts, public criticism 
and so forth it appears as though the link between the state and the chiefs has loosened, 
thereby moving the chiefs from the core to the periphery of the state structure. Today, 
chiefs share the lifestyles and ambitions of the middle class. The majority of the chiefs in 
the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders are doctors, lawyers and businessmen but 
have largely been excluded from political power706 As has been shown above, chiefs 
may be represented in the House of Traditional Leaders but its advisory role accords 
them limited political power. In addition they have been relegated to a symbolic role and 
their official local authority has been removed. The fact that they are part of the periphery 
provides them with space to counter government; however, this space is limited. As 
members of the petty bourgeoisie they are still dependent on state resources in the form 
of salaries, pensions, contracts and so forth. Given their past history of collaboration, it is 
clear that traditional leaders are inclined to work with whoever holds power and whoever 
701 Dladla, "Good ChiefNchabeleng", p. 27. 
702 Maloka, "Traditional Leaders and the Current Transition", p.41. 
70J Business Day: 06/10/2000. 
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subsidises their opportunistic business and political career purposes. Hence, unless an 
alternative force offers them these benefits, they will more than likely collaborate with 
the government. This suggests that the UDM will find its attempts to gain the support of 
traditional leaders more difficult given its present divisions and weaknesses. 
The extent to which traditional leaders are representative of headmen is unknown, 
however it is clear that as leadership is being drawn into ruling structures via the House 
of Traditional Leaders and CONTRALESA, the independence of chieftaincy is being 
eroded. The extent to which traditional leaders have a resource in the form of the 
allegiance of the people is also not known. According to a survey conducted by Ooman in 
the former Lebowa in the Northern Province, seventy-three percent of the populace 
support chieftaincy.707 However, a similar investigation has not to my knowledge been 
conducted in the Eastern Cape. They may remain figures of local influence, yet evidence 
from the Eastern Cape has shown that traditional leaders are being steadily subordinated 
to the ANC-Ied government. 
Subordination of the Chiefs? 
In, 'Traditional Leaders in South Africa's New Democracy' , Bank and Southall question 
whether the current dispensation can be described as a form of mixed government or 
' mix_up, 708 As shown in the first chapter, Sklar' s ideal ofa mixed government refers to a 
system of governance in which state and traditional authorities co-exist peacefully and 
autonomously. The extent to which this occurs depends upon a number of factors which 
include the historical relationship of the chiefs with the colonial/Apartheid structures; the 
nature of the democratic transition; the nature of the post-colonial institution of 
chieftainship and the nature and ideology ofthe ruling party. 
In the first case, a history of collaboration and absorption into Apartheid structures 
ensured that the chiefs were greatly delegitimised; hence, the fact that the democratic 
707 Ooman, B. "We must now go back to our history: Retraditionalism in a Northern Province Chieftaincy" 
in African Studies. Vol. 59 (I). 2000: 79. 
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transition needed the institution of chieftaincy to ensure a smooth, consensual based 
negotiated settlement, required a great deal of invented tradition. This 'invented tradition' 
emphasised the' good chief who was the protector and father of culture; played an active 
role in the liberation struggle; was often forced to cooperate with government structures 
and who suffered as much as the average black person. However, this invention did little 
to pacify former rural activists in the throngs of the South African National Civic 
Organisation (SANCO) who continued to associate chieftaincy with material deprivation 
and out-dated tradition. SANCO was incorporated into the Tripartite Alliance (ANC, 
SACP and CP) as a junior party in 1995709 Furthermore, many SANCO members were 
incorporated into the Eastern Cape provincial government. Hence, it would be more 
costly to alienate former alliance partners than it would be to isolate the chiefs. Thus, 
although the constitution recognised the institution of traditional leadership it remained 
vague, ambiguous and open-ended about precisely what role the chiefs should play in 
provincial and local governments. In many ways it left this role to the discretion of 
provincial MECs who as in the case of the Eastern Cape adopted a hard-line attitude 
towards the chiefs: utilise their services when it is expedient to do so and subordinate 
them when it is not. In the 1995 elections, the ANC was relatively confident about its 
victory in the Eastern Cape and hence, courted the chiefs to a limited point. However, in 
the 1999 elections, the ANC could no longer rely on its status as the liberation party and 
faced growing challenges from the emergent UDM. Hence, it resorted to a campaign of 
bribery to win the allegiance of the chiefs. In the 2000 local elections, the chiefs were no 
longer of great importance because the UDM had failed in its role as the official 
opposition in the Eastern Cape and the chiefs were themselves weak, divided and 
dependent. As history as shown, chiefs refrain from biting the hand that feeds them. They 
are thus unlikely to risk their positions as members of the petty bourgeoisie by overtly 
challenging the government. 
708 Bank and Southall, "Traditional Leaders in South Africa's New Democracy", p.425. 
709 The electoral structure provides that 60% of elected candidates should be from the ANC while the 
alliance partners (SACP, COSATIJ and SANCO) share the remaining forty percent. Southall, "Eastern 
Cape" in Local Government Elections 2000. No.5. 11/11/2000: 4. 
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Therefore, the more obvious interpretation is that instead of a mixed government, 
chieftaincy has been subordinated in the name of 'democracy' . Chiefs have been 
relegated to a symbolic honorific role; collaboration with the new government is the only 
way in which their power can be enhanced. In the Eastern Cape government is being run 
effectively by urban interests, thereby excluding interests that have their basis in rural 
society, namely traditional leadership. Much more germaine is the centralisation of power 
within the ANC. Powers have been allocated to the local governments, especially to the 
metropoles, but these new local governments are still heavily financially dependent upon 
the centre. As a centralising party, the ANC is unlikely to devolve significant powers to 
other actors at the local level. Hence, increased centralisation has negative implications 
for the future ofthe institution of traditional leadership in South Africa710 
Accommodations to the institution of traditional leadership have been motivated by 
pragmatic considerations as opposed to a firmly based ideological commitment to mixed 
government. Increasingly, these pragmatic considerations have been overshadowed by 
the need to extend modernisation into the former -reserves through the new structures of 
local government; chiefs are no longer seen as vital representatives of the rural people 
and hence, their ability to deliver 'bloc votes' is increasingly called into question. The 
extent to which this is true will be revealed in the next elections when the ANC will 
decide whether it is pragmatic to entice the chiefs with benefits or subordinate them 
further in the name of democratisation and modernisation. 
71 0 The issue of centralisation and decentralisation will be discussed in the next chapter. See Southall, "The 
Centralisation and Fragmentation of South Africa ' s Dominant Party System", in African Affairs, 97. 1998: 
443-469; Geoffrey Hawker, "Political Leadership in the ANC: The South African Provinces, 1994-99" , 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 38, 4, 2000: 631-650. 
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 
Cultural theorists attribute the failure of democracy in Africa to the universalisation of 
the democratic model. Leaders assumed identical codes of morality and political 
conditions without recognising the diverse historical and cultural dimensions of the 
African continent. In so doing, they dismissed the institution of traditional leadership as 
an "irritant appendage to a largely misunderstood and misapplied European style of 
parliamentary democracy".711 Consequently, they subordinated the chiefs in the name of 
modernisation and democratisation without recognising the important role that chiefs 
could play in furthering democracy, development and even modernisation in a uniquely 
African form of governance. 
Democratisation 
South Africa's transition usually refers to the extension of the right to vote and the end of 
legally sanctioned racial discrimination. It also refers to the victory of democratic 
principles namely, equality, human dignity and human rights. However, liberals argue 
that the continued existence of the institution of traditional leadership is not in 
accordance with democracy because of its hereditary title, male-centeredness, racial and 
tribal nature and its history as an auxiliary of a repressive government. In contrast, they 
argue that democracy is based on free and fair competition for office, regular expression 
of interests and opinions through popular vote, transparent decision-making through 
elected representatives and the opportunity for the electorate to remove unpopular 
decision-makers. 712 They conclude that "traditional authorities want apartheid style 
structures that are undemocratic, unaccountable and contrary to the spirit of the 
71l Ramose cited in D.S Kanyana, "Administrative functions of traditional leaders" in Traditional Authority 
and Democracy in Southern Africa. University of Namibia: New Namibia Books. 1998: 127. 
"2 C. Keulder, Traditional Leaders and Local Government in Africa: Lessons for South Africa. Pretoria: 
Human Sciences Research Council. 1998: 2, 10. A. Sachs, Advancing Human Rights In South Africa. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press. 1992: 77. M.O Hinz, "The 'traditional' of traditional government: 
traditional views versus democracy-based legitimacy" in Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern 
Africa. University ofNarnibia: New Namibia Books. 1998: 14-31. 
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Constitution,,713 and hence, the subordination of the chiefs is necessary to ensure formal 
and substantive democratisation. 
In contrast, others argue that there "is no inherent or inevitable tension between 
traditionalism and democracy" 714 In fact, the institution of traditional leadership could be 
vital in furthering the impact of democracy. Democracy as defined by Abraham Lincoln 
is "government of the people, by the people and for the people". Therefore, if the people 
support traditional leaders, the fact that they are subordinated has negative implications 
for democracy in South Africa. In 1994, Vali Moosa stated that 
"for as long as the people who live in faraway valleys, majestic green hills, on 
widely stretched out plains and mountainsides honour and support traditional 
leaders, the Government of the day will support and respect traditional leaders, as 
they are the custodians ofpeople's culture and we are a people's government".715 
A survey held in 1996 by Market Research Africa found that 60% of blacks believed that 
traditional leaders should serve in local government and nearly 70% of South African 
adults of all races regarded them as important players in community affairs716 The 
conclusion that traditional leaders enjoy the support of the people has been affirmed by a 
number of other studies. Dlamini' s surveys indicated that tribal courts are preferred to 
magistrate's courts amongst respondents throughout KwaZulu districts. This is echoed by 
Marais, whose survey amongst fifty-four chiefs revealed that 10% of chiefs had never 
had cases taken on appeal to the magistrate717 Ooman's survey in the former Lebowa in 
the Northern Province revealed that 73% of the populace supported chieftaincy 718 
713 L. Nzebeza, "Traditional Authorities Rule OK? In Land and Rural Digest. NovlDecember 2000: 24. 
714 Sachs, "Advancing Human Rights", p. 77. 
715 RSA: House of Assembly Debates, 14 Nov 1994, cl4237 cited in J. Myers, "The spontaneous ideology 
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Although this support may be attributed to a number of different factors such as fears of 
taxation increases, necessity, patronage networks, and state support, one can nevertheless 
attempt to make the tentative assumption using historical evidence, qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, that in parts of South Africa traditional leaders are 
regarded as legitimate. This contradicts Myer's argument that "the intertwining of 
chieftaincy with the powers of patronage and the overarching authority of the state makes 
impossible any independent measure of the political power of belief. In this sense, the 
proof of cultural legitimacy becomes the political scientist's equivalent of the 
philosopher' s proof of god,,719 Nevertheless, even though such an analysis forces one to 
make a leap from compliance to belief, it is not necessarily unfounded. 
If one had to exclude traditional leaders from governance on the grounds that overt action 
in support of them does not necessarily mean that they are regarded as legitimate, one 
would also be forced to question the nature of representative democracy. Although 
elections are supposedly free and fair, an individual's explicit voting behaviour may be 
influenced by factors other than belief in the legitimacy of a particular party, but this does 
not mean that one must disregard their vote or question the legitimacy of the particular 
party. Hence, although traditional leaders are supported for a multiple of reasons, they are 
still supported and must be accommodated in a democracy that purports to represent the 
will of the people. As the Regional Consultative Forum on Rural Development (ReF) 
stated, "The institution of traditional authorities is an old institution with a lot of 
influence on its people. This will not change overnight and will not change because of 
any law, proclamation or constitutional clause ... This issue is not simply a question of 
political patronage, but a complex part of people's lives which needs to be taken 
seriously and accommodated in some way"no Therefore, by subordinating the chiefs, a 
government, which ignores the will of the people, cannot claim to be democratic. 
719 J. C. Myers, "Ideology of Tradition", p. 63. 
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Traditional Authorities are a diverse group. Similarly, democratic elected representatives 
are not homogenous. Just because they are elected democratically does not mean that 
they are necessarily honest. Reports have emerged about Transitional Representative 
Councils involved in corruption, embezzlement, nepotism and so forth. Without proper 
checks and balances, transparency and accountability, the institutions of hereditary and 
elected leadership are open for abuse721 With this in mind, one cannot discount the 
important role that traditional leaders can play in shaping political perspectives, 
orientation to politics and attitudes to authority; in other words, traditional leaders can 
affect the success of modern political activity. Hence, "the attainment of constitutional 
democracy can develop from a mere dream into reality provided institutions like 
chieftaincy are allowed to playa more meaningful role than at present".722 
Decentralisation 
The subordination of the chiefs undermines an important way in which of democracy can 
be extended into outlying areas. Because the chiefs are "more in touch with community 
sentiment than the central state,,723 they can playa vital role as agents of decentralisation, 
which is based on the rationale that to succeed in making a meaningful improvement in 
each community the best actors and decision-makers are on the ground724 The objects of 
decentralisation include the transfer of political, administrative, financial and planning 
powers from the national level to the local level in order to promote popular participation, 
empower the local people to make their own decisions, and enhance accountability and 
·b·l· 725 respons! ! !ty. 
721 S. Bekker and P. Mawhood, "Poor Relatives: Rural Local Government" in Indicator South Africa. Vol. 
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Decentralisation is pursued in a number of ways. First, constraints are placed on state 
activities in particular its role in the economy. Second, society is given a large role in 
governance; in other words, public participation in politics is increased and organisations 
in civil society are legalised. And third, local government is given greater authority, 
responsibility and a role in developing projects726 Thus, decentralisation occurs by 
means of three processes namely, deconcentration, delegation and devolution. 
Deconcentration involves passing authority to a field office of the central government 
thereby ensuring that the central government retains its autonomy and authority as it 
reviews all decisions made by the lower body. Delegation involves granting power to an 
autonomous agency over which government maintains a degree of control through 
appointments. Devolution involves granting local bodies with authority to make 
decisions. This creates conditions of accountability and improves the applicability of 
decisions to local conditions727 
Developing governments are wary of this latter option because it weakens the power of 
central government in local areas, leads to increased pressure for change as local areas 
become empowered, and may lead to the development of new leaders and new opposition 
in these areas. Developing countries generally follow a similar pattern. Colonial rule was 
based on centralised rule through a form of indirect rule or association with the district 
commissioner. The transition from colonial rule was met with a degree of devolution to 
dampen nationalist demands. Post-colonial governments then reverted to centralisation at 
national level, destroyed alternate political organisations and limited the power of local 
government728 They also marginalised, subordinated or manipulated traditional leaders 
in local government arrangements because they feared that the chiefs could divert loyalty 
away from the state. In the 1980's international donors switched their rhetoric from state-
led development to decentralisation as a means of "tapping the energy and potential 
and Chieftaincy" in International Roundtable on Democratic Constitutional Development. ffiB: 
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untapped at Africa's grassroots,,729 However, developing states often opted for 
deconcentration as opposed to devolution as is evident in South Africa. 
The 1996 constitution ensured a level of devolution. Local government was given a new 
status as one of three spheres of government. Section 151 defined local government as "a 
sphere of government which has the right to govern on its initiative, the local government 
affairs on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its own community, subj ect to 
national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the constitution" 730 Section 54 
states that national and provincial government "supports and strengthens the capacity of 
municipalities to manage their own affairs, exercise their powers and perform their 
functions through legislative and other means".731 Local government is required to 
"structure and manage its own administration and budgeting and planning processes to 
give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and 
economic development of the community". Section 214 and 227 ensures that central 
government cannot remove local government functions arbitrarily unless it lodges a 
complaint, goes through strict procedures and even then it can only take over these 
functions temporarily. Furthermore, local government is guaranteed an equitable share of 
revenue raised nationally732 Provincial governments are responsible for education, 
health, welfare, town and regional planning while local governments are responsible for 
portable water supply, sanitation, electricity, gas, roads, market and municipal planning. 
However, the failure of the constitution to clarify the implementation of this devolution 
left provincial and local levels of governance open to abuses by the central government. 
Over a third of local government structures faced financial and administrative trouble. 
The municipal budget expenditure for 1996-97 was over R48 billion whereas rural 
councils only received R5.2 billion through intergovernmental transfers, local taxes and 
from services.733 The result was that rural local government became the "poor relative" 
729 Ibid, p. 95. 
730 South African Constitution, 1996: Section IS!. 
131 Ibid: Section 54. 
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requiring support, training, technical assistance and additional funding, thereby justifying 
increased central government interference.734 
Centralizing tendencies have a number of important implications for the chiefs. First, 
central government could exploit the tensions between the chiefs and local governments 
in order to weaken local government and provide a standing excuse for increased 
interference in this level. Second, the government could devolve increased powers to the 
chiefs (and not elected local governments) because chiefs are easily manipulated. 
Alternatively, it could lead to direct constraints on the institution of traditional leadership 
and increased exclusion from local governance. And third, the inefficiency and 
inadequacies oflocal government (caused by lack of expertise and finances) could lead to 
an increase in the chiefs' popular legitimacy, but, their exclusion from meaningful 
political participation may lead them to use their popular legitimacy for undemocratic 
purposes, such as boycotting local elections. As Rutsch argues, "Chiefs who lose 
politically will turn against the system and divide the community. The traditional terrain 
will be a constant field of political struggle, and disharmony will result". 735 
Hence, by subordinating the chiefs, developing countries may undermine the 
development of a "decentralised cushion for the centre of an evolving democracy,,736 Not 
only could they provide pillars of local government on the ground and facilitate 
communication between the people and the government, but they could also ensure a 
degree of social stability, and thereby give the central government little reason to 
interfere in local governance. This would also work in the central government's favour by 
shielding it from popular confrontation737 Furthermore, chiefs "symbolise the integrity 
and unity of communities and provide the necessary sense of cultural identity to their 
people. Chiefs are therefore, amongst the best placed individuals for social 
734 Bekker and Mawhood, "Poor Relatives", p. 50. For more details regarding the ANC's centralising 
tendencies see R. Southall, "The Centralisation and Fragmentation of South Africa's Dominant Party 
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mobilisation".738 They can thus play an important role in encouraging political 
participation by being accountable and responsive to their communities' interests and 
needs. 
On the other hand, some advocates of decentralisation argue that it is necessary to 
subordinate the chiefs in order to further democracy because they "encourage people to 
focus on their differences rather than what unites them as human beings" thereby creating 
social disorder and necessitating state intervention739 Furthermore, they argue that chiefs 
cannot playa role as organs of civil society because civil society is the realm of civility, 
bargaining, rationality, compromise, accommodation, negotiation and tolerance, whereas 
traditional authorities represent intolerance and emotive behaviour, thereby leading to 
social polarisation and the demolition of the public sphere740 
However, these arguments are based on two failed assumptions: first, it assumes that 
national identity is an "all-or-nothing proposition" but in reality "ethnic loyalty and 
national integration do not represent two fixed and irreconcilable points on a 
continuum,,741 Traditional authorities represent an African culture and represent African 
values and can thus be used to create a sense of pride in the national community, which is 
necessary to build a sense of national identity. South Africa's ' rainbow nation' celebrates 
differences in the name of unity. Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance attempts to inspire 
nationalism largely through culture. Traditional leaders, as agents and protectors of 
culture, could be vital in this regard. Second, the argument that the European notion of 
democracy and civil society is necessarily the form that civil society and democracy must 
take in African societies is a false assumption742 As Kanyama argues, "the whole issue is 
tied up with perceptions: there is democracy in the African sense, and there is democracy 
738 Kgosi Linchwe II, "Chieftainship in the 21st Century" in Botswana in the 21st Century. Gaborone: The 
Botswana Society. 1994: 395. 
739 R. Mujyala-Makiika, "Traditional Leaders and Decentralisation", p. 98. 
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141 Sibongile Zungu, "Traditional Leaders Capability and Disposition to Democracy: The Example of South 
Africa" in Traditional and Contemporary Forms of local Participation and Self-Government in Africa. 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. 1997: 175. 
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in the Western sense. The greatest mistake that can be made is summarily dismissing one 
system or another as 'undemocratic,,?43 
Utilising traditional leaders as agents of decentralisation does provide opportunities for 
abuse; granting them greater powers and resources may lead to authoritarianism, 
corruption and political manipulation?44 Buthelezi used the chiefs as servants of the 
Inkatha Freedom Party to ban gatherings and limit political activity within their 
jurisdiction. The ANC used the chiefs to mobilise votes against the opposition. In 
Cameroon, Uganda and Mozambique chiefs are also used to interfere with opposition 
political activities?45 Furthermore, chiefs may be self-serving and use their influence to 
discourage political participation as was evident in the local elections of 1995. 
However, the fact that the chiefs may be co-opted for undemocratic purposes does not 
justify the exclusion of all chiefs from governance. In fact their exclusion would not 
solve the root of the problem, which rests with the political system itself; in the absence 
of 'checks and balances ', horizontal and vertical forms of accountability, and in the 
presence of centralising tendencies, abuses will take place with/without chiefs being 
present. The extent to which the chiefs can play a role in governance, as agents of 
decentralisation, development and even modernisation depends on the nature of the 
political system and the nature of the institution of chieftainship, specifically its 
organisational strength, financial autonomy and organisational cohesion. 
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Traditional leaders' 'organisational strength' depends upon the extent that they can act as 
a counter veiling force against the state. In other words, it depends upon the extent that 
they can remain autonomous from state structures in order to subvert the state's attempts 
to use them to extend its own hegemony. This often involves acting in a non-partisan 
manner, backing an opposition party or creating an independent niche in civil society. 
Internal divisions and a lack of financial autonomy often undermine organisational 
strength. If chiefs rely on the state for finances their ability to question or counter it, is 
limited. Alternatively, chiefs often rely on donations or voluntary contributions which 
they justify as their traditional right. However, this often leads to difficulties in holding 
them accountable to a ' romanticised past'. On the other hand, chiefs may engage in 
independent business practices for their own self-interest at the expense of their 
communities ' welfare. Organisational cohesion depends on the extent to which they 
enjoy popular legitimacy, and the extent to which this can be used as a political 
resource
746 Thus, a number of different factors determine whether traditional leaders can 
be harnessed to further the aims of decentralisation (and democracy). 
In the Eastern Cape, chiefs are weak, divided, and dependent on the state for finances and 
in many areas (particularly in the former Ciskei) they do not enjoy any popular 
legitimacy. Hence, their ability to counter the state and its decision to exclude them from 
local governance is limited. This situation can be contrasted with the chiefs of the 
Bafokeng tribe of the Northern Province. Utilising the resources from platinum royalties, 
they have developed a casino, water-park, Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace747, fly in 
helicopters and provide services to the local community. In many ways they have 
superseded the functions of the local municipality in this area748 The Bafokeng's vision 
statement states that they, "the Royal Bafokeng nation, the Supreme Council and Kgosi 
are determined to develop themselves to be a self-sufficient nation by the second decade 
of the 21 st century,,749 Other chiefs set up nature reserves through negotiations directly 
with eco-tourism companies as a means of generating income. These chiefs have the 
746 Mukyala-Makiika, "Traditional Leaders and Decentralisation", p. 99-102. 
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power to challenge government, stand outside government as autonomous entities and 
fulfill development and democratic functions . 
Hence, the nature of the political system and the nature of the chieftaincy determine the 
extent to which chiefs can play an important role as agents of democratisation. By 
subordinating the chiefs in the Eastern Cape, the government has undermined the extent 
to which chiefs can play an important role in consolidating democracy. 
Development 
The notion that economIC growth and development has a positive correlation with 
democracy is associated with the 'old orthodox'; the idea that class formation manifest in 
the middle class and working classes push for political reforms because they regard the 
old system as not serving their interests. Lipset associates wealth, industrialisation and 
education with economic growth, which in turn are used as yardsticks to measure the 
level of democracy in a country. Economic development increases the chances of 
democratic consolidation. This notion is linked to Aristotle who argued that in the 
absence of high levels of real poverty, a population can intelligently participate in 
politics. Education is vital because it broadens one's outlook, increases one's 
understanding of norms of tolerance and increases a citizen's capacity to make rational 
electoral choices. In other words, education is not a sufficient but a necessary condition 
for democracy.750 In agreement, Mick Moore argues that there is a structural link between 
economic development and democracy.751 
However, as argued in Chapter One the idea that yardsticks are used to measure 
democracy is problematic as these yardsticks are generally derived from the West and 
ignore cultural and social diversities. In the social sciences in particular it is difficult to 
pinpoint prerequisites for democracy as contextual factors are often unaccounted for. At 
749 Ibid, p. 8. 
150 S. Lipset. Political Man. Heinemann. 1960: 50. 
198 
best, one can rely on requisites that depend on different contingencies752 Nevertheless, 
one can say that there is a positive correlation between economic development 
(associated with wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation and education) and democracy.753 
However, this correlation depends on complex interactions in each society, which include 
cultural, historical, economic, social, political and psychological factors . Traditional 
leaders have an important role to play in furthering economic development and thereby, 
democracy, but once again this depends on the nature of the political system and the 
nature of traditional leadership in the country in question. 
In Uganda, traditional leaders formed the Buganda Cultural Development Foundation 
(BUCADEF), which aimed to blend progressive traditional management practices with 
modern managerial styles for sustainable development754 In Namibia, traditional leaders 
are involved in natural resource management and conservation755 In Zaire, the Mwaant 
Yav collective launched a community programme involving twenty-one groups of 
chieftaincy to solve socio-economic problems over six economic regions756 In Namibia, 
officials of the Cuvelai Pipeline project stated that traditional leaders were instrumental in 
mobilising free community labour; contributed constructively to debates by articulating 
the community's needs to the water bodies; provided legitimacy to the project and 
decisions made; and formed an important means of checks and balances by ensuring that 
political leaders did not simply use the development projects for political gain. 757 In the 
Northern Namibia Rural Development Project (NNRDP), the traditional leader was vital 
for linking the team and the community by disseminating information about meetings and 
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organising the community for trials .758 On the other hand, in a second community where 
the project was launched, the traditional leader realised that neither he nor his family 
would be the primary beneficiaries of the project and consequently adopted a hostile 
attitude towards it759 In the Integrated Area-Based (development) Programme launched 
by UNICEF, the king ofUukwaluudhi supported the project without trying to monopolise 
it, was regularly consulted and played an active role in mobilising community support for 
h . 760 t e project. 
In the Eastern Cape, traditional leaders have been excluded from development projects. 
In Qumbu, a businessperson, Mrs Dywili organised a development forum for chiefs and 
former members of homeland structures. However, this was rejected by the TRe. The 
Mditshwa royal family managed to convince Mandela and two wealthy businessmen in 
1999 to contribute money to the establishment of a community center out of the 
Mdibanisweni Great Place at Tsolo, which was destroyed by a tornad0761 In general 
however, the system of local governance excludes traditional leaders from playing a role 
in development; this exclusion often leads to frustration and attempts to subvert 
development projects. For example, Chief Majeke of Mahlungulu in Qumbu stopped a 
soil erosion project because he claimed that he was not consulted beforehand762 
Hence, there are at least four reasons why development agencies, including the state, 
would benefit in using the chiefs. First, traditional leaders are the most effective channel 
through which these agencies can penetrate rural communities due to the presence of 
weak and underdeveloped local and regional authorities. Second, traditional leaders can 
be an effective link between project officials and the community. They can playa role in 
gathering and disseminating information, and mobilising the community. Third, 
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traditional leaders still control vital resources namely land and labour. And fourth, many 
chiefs enjoy wide-ranging support and are an important source of legitimacy for 
community projects. 
However, the extent to which a chief can play such a positive role "depends on his/her 
personal support, and his/her attitude towards development in general and the project 
specifically",763 because "many chiefs run the risk of adopting a policy of blocking 
development" 764 It also depends on the nature of the political system. As Keulder argues, 
"further subordination, could alienate traditional authorities as agencies for development, 
especially from state-driven development projects. They would no doubt cause 
substantial disengagement from the state. In fact, it is doubtful if the state can capture the 
peasantry without capturing its leaders firsLThe strategy of subordination can only be 
successful if a viable alternative to the institution is provided" 765 Whether the new 
municipalities and local councils in the Eastern Cape are able to offset the possible 
negative effects of the chiefs' subordination, by providing a viable alternative authority, 
is as yet not known. However, the ANC-government's readiness to exclude chiefs from 
local governance and development undermines the important role that traditional leaders 
can play in extending development, and thereby confidence in the new democracy, into 
the rural areas. 
Modernisation 
It is generally assumed that traditional leaders cannot be harnessed to support democracy 
and development because they are a conservative body that runs counter to the spirit of 
modernisation. Hence, modernisation theorists would argue that the subordination of the 
chiefs has positive implications for democracy. 
Berger and Luckman argue that institutions embody the values of society in which they 
are located. As societies evolve so do the institutions, which regulate social relations 
763 Keulder, "Traditional Leaders and Rural Development", p. 312. 
764 Oyong, "Traditional Authorities and Local Autonomy", p. 198. 
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according to the values recognised by the people. When institutions symbolise, uphold 
and enforce values that hold sway in society, equilibrium or order results766 However, in 
the case of South Africa, Ndletyana argues that the chief s constitutional entrenchment 
has 'temporarily arrested' a social evolution in which the values that traditional rulers 
represent are regarded as redundant by their former subjects767 So one needs to question 
whether societal values have changed with modernising trends in South Africa and 
consequently, whether chieftaincy is "an endangered species whose future is rather 
gloomy and fraught with an uncertain future or no future at all"? 768 
According to modernisation theorists, education, Chistianity, development of the modern 
enterprise economy and urbanisation have had a negative, irrevocable impact on the 
authority of the chiefs. Education has ensured that social phenomenon can be explained 
through science as opposed to the power of the ancestors and the chiefs. Christianity has 
removed the mystical aura from the chiefs. The chiefs have faced a total loss of executive 
and legislative powers; substantial emasculation of administrative duties; an erosion of 
judicial powers and a loss of traditional sources of income. Chiefs can no longer dispense 
military protection or material fulfillment. Even land, their remaining form of patronage, 
is under threat by the development of the free enterprise economic system; it reinforces 
the individualisation of property ownership and places pressure on those who hold 
communal titles to change from customary to common law titles which can be sold or 
used as security for bank loans769 Hence, modernisation has transformed society and 
societal values in many ways. However, this transformation is not uniform. 
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In Africa, the line of demarcation between 'traditional community' and modern society is 
a permeable barrier. In some areas the modern market economy is omnipresent and has a 
great influence on social behaviour while traditional values continue to hold a grip on the 
people. Surveys in KwaZulu Natal in the early 1980' s point out that over 90% of rural 
households included some form of wage labour yet tradition continues to persist.77o In 
many areas people continue to hold onto tradition as a 'safety-net' in rapidly fluctuating 
societies, and as a buffer where modernisation has not made a positive impact. The agents 
of modernisation are often too far and distant from the ground. For example, members of 
the TRes were selected by proportional representation thereby ensuring that the people's 
control over who represented their interests in a modernising society was limited. 
Furthermore, even though modernisation is heralded as paving the way to formal and 
substantive liberty and equality, poverty persists on an inequitable basis, thereby calling 
into question its ability to further democracy.771 In other words where modern institutions 
or systems of government seem to fail, the chiefs and the tradition they represent, are 
regarded as bulwarks against modernising state intrusions. 
Political leaders recognise this continued influence. As Miller argues, "As seen by nation 
builders and development experts, the rural leader is tacitly pointed to as the key to 
success. It is he who can mobilise the people. It is through him that more energy will be 
expended, more muscles used, and more attitudes changed,,772 Hence, modernisation 
schemes often rely on traditional leaders as translators, interpreters, and mediators of 
government goals because they "provide the vital linkage between the government and 
the people".773 On the other hand, traditional leaders also need modern bureaucratic 
leaders, administrators and party officials to make up for their lack of legal ability to use 
coercive force. 774 The result is an emergence of a synchretic form of leadership, which is 
110 Myers, "The Spontaneous Ideology of Tradition", p. 39. 
m Ampem, " Chieftaincy in the Ghanaian constitution", p. 395; Linchwe, "Chieftainship in the 21st 
Century", p. 396; Engelbronner-Kolf, Hinz and Sindano,"!ntrodnction", p. xii. 
772 Norman Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership" in L L Markovitz (ed), African 
Politics and Society: Basic Issues and Problems o/Government and Development. New York: The Free 
Press. 1970: 118. 
173 Ibid, p. 119. 
m Ibid, p. 120. 
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"neither modern nor traditional but an incorporation of both,,775 It is based on the 
accommodation and compromise of traditional, custom-bound elements of society and 
modernising bureaucratic demands. This accommodation ensures that "skilful political 
entrepreneurs such as Buthelezi and Holomisa are thus able to trade simultaneously in the 
urban and rural markers for traditional authority. In the rural areas, the institutional 
capacities of chieftaincy can be tapped to maintain patronage networks, mobilse voters 
and intimidate opponents. In the urban politics of the parliament and the press, the fetish 
power of traditional authority is played as a trump card with which to ensure that its 
material powers are kept intact".776 The relationship between the 'traditional' chief and 
the modern government vacillates from alliance to coercion; in each situation, traditional 
leaders manipulate and capitalise on culture-bound factors that support traditionalism 
such as local myth, ritual, symbol and customary law. The result is a form of neo-
traditionalism in which traditional values are brought forward and embraced in a slightly 
altered form, which embodies the "moral prescriptions of the past" but can be applied to 
modern conditions.777 
Hence, societal values are not necessarily wholly transformed by modernisation. 
Consequently, the institutions that represent and protect these values cannot be dismissed 
as redundant. Rather through a process of adaptation, these synchretic leaders have a role 
to play in a modernising country. As Albie Sachs argues, "There is no contradiction in 
the idea of traditionalism modernising itself As their name indicates, traditional leaders 
are expected to be not only traditional but lead. Leadership means going forward, not 
back. It presupposes taking the best of the past into the future, not pushing the present 
into the past". 778 Hence, traditional leaders can remain relevant by relating to the 
changing needs and experiences of their people and thereby "avoiding the stigma of 
being labelled a relic of the conservative past with little relevance to the future,,779 
775 lbid, p. 119. 
776 Myers, "Spontaneous Ideology of Tradition", p. 51. 
777 Miller, "Political Survival of Traditional Leadership", p. 120-122. 
778 Sachs, "Advancing Human Rights", p. 78. 
779 Linchwe, "Cheiftainship in the 21st Century", p. 396. 
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Chiefs in the Eastern Cape have attempted to 'move with the times', thereby ensuring 
their continued relevance. Many progressive traditional leaders have welcomed the 
upsurge of self-reliance and affirmation amongst women and many have even welcomed 
(though warily) women into their ranks 780 In November 2000, Chieftainess Nosiseko 
Gayika was elected to the male-dominated Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders781 
Traditional leaders have also attempted to dispel the notion that they are a hierarchical 
institution excluding the youth. In January 2001 CONTRALESA announced its intention 
to create a youth wing. 782 The Eastern Cape HTL also elected twenty-seven year old, 
AmaRharhabe's Prince Langa Mavuso into its ranks. 783 Furthermore, traditional leaders 
have attempted to dispel the argument that they playa divisive role in society. Although 
divisions have obscured the Eastern Cape HTL, CONTRALESA has united chiefs across 
tribal lines. Hence, the fact that a former autocratic and exploitative institution is 
attempting to change is an important symbol for a society undergoing a transition to a 
'new' democratic society. 
Traditional leaders can playa positive role in furthering modern democratic aims such as 
decentralisation and development. However, the extent to which this will occur depends 
upon history, the nature of the chieftainship and the nature of the political system. As was 
shown in the Eastern Cape, the ANC-Ied provincial government subordinated, sidelined 
and contained the chiefs, who were weak, divided and highly dependent. This may have 
negative implications for democracy for a number of reasons. First, it ignores the fact that 
in many areas in the former Transkei, the people regard the chiefs as legitimate. Second, 
it creates a tense relationship between local governments and the chiefs thereby providing 
a standing excuse for increased intervention by the central government. Third, it 
undermines the role that an independent institution of chieftaincy can play in encouraging 
political participation; holding the central government accountable; creating a situation of 
stability conducive to development; and furthering nationalism and pride in the new 
democratic South Africa. Fourth, it reduces the important role that traditional leaders can 
180 Sachs, "Advancing Human Rights", p. 79. 
781 Daily Dispatch: 0611112000. 
782 Daily Dispatch: 01l011200l. 
783 Daily Dispatch: 02/1112000. 
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play in development, which is a requisite for democratic consolidation. Fifth, it creates a 
volatile relationship based on 'coercion' between the state and the chiefs, which increases 
the chances that chiefs will utilise their influence for undemocratic purposes. And sixth, it 
undermines the dialogue and search for a unique, African indigenous concept of 
democracy. As Ramose argues, the institution of traditional leadership is important 
because "it forms the battleground for the construction of a home-grown and genuinely 
representative theory and practice of democracy which can be truly called a South 
African democracy,,784 
Hence, although the subordination of the chiefs may be justified with reference to 
democratisation, it is in fact used to subvert this goal. It not only entrenches increased 
centralisation, but it also undermines the important role that traditional leaders can play in 
furthering democracy. In contrast, the institution of traditional leadership can be 
harnessed to build a truly democratic South Africa, which utilises the past and the present 
to construct a positive future. As Zungu argues, "We need to take what was good from 
the past, to adapt it to the present and then to amalgamate both the past and the present in 
order to build something that will be able to withstand all the challenges of the future: we 
cannot build our future with the ashes of our heritage".785 
"'Ramose cited in D.S Kanyana, "Administrative functions of traditional leaders" in Traditional Authority 
and Democracy in Southern A/rica. University of Namibia: New Namibia Books. 1998: 127. 
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CONCLUSION: VICTORY FOR MODERNITY? 
Subordination implies that traditional authorities are made subservient and answerable to 
other institutions. Modernisation theorists would herald this as a victory for modernity 
over tradition. However, this view ignores the extent to which many people continue to 
regard 'traditional' rulers as legitimate; the extent to which the modern state relies on 
these 'traditional' rulers; the extent to which traditional leaders, as synchretic leaders, 
encapsulate modern values; and the extent to which this is an empty victory as it 
undermines ways in which 'tradition' can be used to further modern democratic aims . 
. \ In the Eastern Cape colonialists subordinated the chiefs to local councils because they , 
feared the chiefs' power and ability to mobilise the people against them. However, this 
had the converse effect of increasing the power of the chiefs in terms of their popular 
legitimacy. State intrusions into the rural areas were enacted by headmen and local 
councillors, who did not act in the interests of the people. Increased taxation, segregation, 
loss of land and impoverishment combined with dipping, betterment and rehabilitation 
schemes affected the peasant's livelihood and offended their customs. In particular, 
intrusions involving land and cattle sparked violent unrest against the council system. In 
these acts of revolt, the people rallied around the chiefs who represented an idyllic past, 
an alternate form of authority, security and protection. Consequently, the emerging 
liberation movement regarded the chiefs as an integral means of mobilising support and 
funding. They justified this alliance with the chiefs by pointing to their democratic nature 
and history of resistance. 
However, by the 1930's headmen were greatly delegitimised and local councils were not 
exercising sufficient control over the peasants. Thus, the government turned to the chiefs 
as a form of control. Constraints imposed by the 1927 Native Administrative Act made it 
785 Sibongile Zungu, "Traditional Leaders Capability and Disposition to Democracy: The Example of South 
Africa" in Traditional and Conlemporary Forms oJloeal Partieipalion and Self-Governmenl in AJrica. 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. 1997: 174. 
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costly not to collaborate with the government, while salaries and other benefits made this 
collaboration worthwhile, particularly since the liberation movement appeared to serve 
the interests of workers over and above the chiefs and had failed to accrue the chiefs 
more land. The Congress movement attempted to renew its bonds with the chiefs but the 
efforts of individuals such as Seme, Xuma and Calata largely fell on deaf ears because 
the chiefs had already turned their backs on the people. 
This transformation was entrenched by the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, which abolished 
the council system and increased the powers of the chiefs at local, regional and national 
levels. This move can be attributed to the National Party government's attempts to use 
the chiefs to implement the notion of cultural segregation. By giving black people their 
own indigenous form of government the National Party did not have to risk 
accommodating them on an equal basis in the South African government. Furthermore, 
using the chiefs as representatives of culture, the National Party sought to divide the 
black opposition and reverse the unifying trends of urbanisation. Hence, the chiefs came 
to stand at the forefront of the discourse of cultural segregation and later neo-colonialism, 
which divided the black people into independent, culturally and linguistically distinct 
Bantustans. 
Within the Transkei and Ciskei homelands, political parties (TNIP and CNIP 
respectively) vied for the support of the chiefs for a number of reasons. First, the chiefs ' 
automatic, numerical majority in the legislatures made their support imperative for any 
party seeking power. Second, chiefs and their patronage networks were a vital means of 
accruing rural votes in the elections. Third, they were also a means of financing the party 
machine and lastly, a means of crushing opposition at the local level. The chiefs were 
particularly effective in this regard because they relied on the continued existence of the 
homeland government for their survival. Not only were they highly dependent on the 
homeland government in terms of salaries and other benefits, but bureaucratisation had 
also ensured that succession and incumbency were vulnerable to the whims of politicians. 
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The result was that the new ' civil servant' chiefs faced great opposition from the people. 
They were no longer bulwarks against state intrusions but were the prime vehicle for 
these intrusions. Conflict occurred across the Ciskei, and in Thembuland and 
Mpondoland in the Transkei focusing on the issues of 'good' and 'bad ' chiefs, legitimacy 
and authority. Good chiefs were those who sided with the people, whereas bad chiefs 
were those who sold themselves and their people, to the Apartheid forces. In the Ciskei, 
the rise of Gqozo became 'judgment day ' for the chiefs. He dismissed and then re-
instated headmen, thereby providing the impetus for the fall of the entire traditional 
authority system. In the Transkei, General Holomisa aligned himself with the liberation 
movement and did not question the authority of the chiefs, thereby ensuring that they 
retained a degree of legitimacy. The liberation movement was vocal in its attacks against 
the chiefs, but it played a minimal role in the struggles against the chiefs because of its 
urban orientation and neglect of the rural arena. 
However, in the late 1980' s the ANC required the support of the chiefs for a number of 
reasons: first, it sought to create a broad alliance against the National Party government; 
it thus needed the support of the rural areas from which it was largely alienated and it 
needed to ensure that no major political actors were neglected. Second, it attempted to 
neutralise the IFP . Third, examples from the rest of Africa showed that alienating the 
chiefs could undermine the stability and success of the transition. Fourth, the chiefs 
organised themselves in favour of democratic principles within CONTRALESA. And 
fifth, a negotiated settlement would culminate in an election and in this regard the chiefs ' 
ability to deliver a bloc vote was seen as essential. Hence, traditional leaders were 
recognised in the Interim (1993) and final (1996) constitutions. However, their role was 
not clearly defined due to pressure from women and civic groups, ambivalence within the 
ANC' s ranks, increasing autonomy of the chiefs and criticism from opposition parties. 
This vagueness increased abuses at provincial and local levels of governance as the ANC 
used the chiefs for its own purposes. In the 1995 local elections, the ANC was confident 
about its victory in the Eastern Cape and did little to dispel tension caused by the issue of 
headmen, salaries, the location of, and the number of seats in the House of Traditional 
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Leaders. But in the 1999 elections the ANC needed the support of the chiefs because its 
failure to alleviate the poverty in the region called a complete victory into question. In 
addition, the emergent United Democratic Movement offered an alternate party to which 
the chiefs could promise their support and bloc votes. Hence, the ANC resorted to bribery 
by granting loyal chiefs increased salaries and powerful positions in government. 
However, by the local elections of 2001, the UDM had failed to offer much competition 
and the chiefs were weak, divided and highly dependent on the government for resources. 
Consequently, the ANC sidelined them in its legislation on local government but made a 
few minor concessions and promises (as yet unfulfilled) to ensure that they were not 
completely alienated. 
Although this subordination was justified in terms of democratisation, it has negative 
implications for democracy. It entrenches the ANC's centralising tendencies and the 
future conflict that may arise between the chiefs and the new municipalities may further 
weaken local and provincial government, thereby providing standing excuses for 
increased intervention by the central government. In other words, increased subordination 
and centralisation draws the government further away from the people it is supposed to 
represent. Furthermore, by subordinating the chiefs, the important role that they can play 
in furthering democratisation, development and even modernisation, is undermined. 
Subordination need not signal the death knell for chieftaincy. The chiefs need to adapt to 
the times, they need to develop new skills and act on new opportunities. They need to 
become more inclusive. By excluding individuals on the basis of age, gender and culture 
from the male, black, elderly, African position of chief, they are fuelling allegations that 
they are divisive, sexist, racist, conservative and undemocratic, thereby justifying not 
only their subordination but also their annihilation in a democratic society. In addition, 
they need to develop a degree of organisational autonomy by overcoming divisions, 
which justify increased governmental controls over their succession and incumbency. 
They also need to increase their financial autonomy; as members of the middle class they 
need to find sources of income that lie outside the realm of the state. State subsidies 
usually come with strings attached, which dictate support, compliance and 
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submissiveness. This financial dependence also opens up accusations that chiefs are 
nothing more than civil servants and government stooges. Not only does this call into 
question the chiefs' relationship with the people they are supposed to serve, but it also 
makes their position vulnerable to bureaucratic procedures, which remove the mysticism, 
cultural sanctity and independence of the chiefs. 
Furthermore, the chiefs need to playa larger role in civil society furthering democratic 
goals in the best interests of the people. Power need not derive from a political, 
governmental source; rather, power derived from the allegiance of the people is not only 
more durable but is also a greater bargaining chip in a country that purports to represent 
the will of the people. History has shown that when the state does not act in the people' s 
best interests the people turn to the chiefs as an alternative form of authority. The ANe' s 
increased centralisation has negative implications for democracy and the people. Thus the 
chiefs need to realise that their long-term future lies with the people as opposed to with a 
particular party. 
It appears that modernity is victorious and that the chiefs are a spent force, simply used 
by a modernising party in its own interests. However, this view is shortsighted. The 
ANe' s trends toward centralisation may limit traditional leader's formal power but it 
opens up opportunities for chiefs in the public realm if the people see them as pursuing 
democratic and development functions . Hence, one must not underestimate the chiefs; 
they could someday be central to a truly African form of democracy, which mixes the 
modern and the traditional to further the rights ofboth citizens and subjects. 
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